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This thesis examines the effects of fiscal consolidation on banking sector stability for 53 
randomly selected developing and developed countries for the period 1960 to 2017. This thesis 
includes two parts. The first part investigates a causal link between public debt and primary 
surplus to estimate the vulnerability of a country to fiscal crisis. We estimate vulnerability 
through three debt methods: Bohn’s approach, a screening process and a threshold regression. 
The threshold model estimates a unique level of debt to gross domestic product (GDP) for 
every country, beyond which the economy may slip into fiscal crisis—called a vulnerable 
economy. Further, we offer a reconciliation of a debt approach with investment approach, 
analysed through financial net worth, to distinguish vulnerable from non-vulnerable economies. 
Using these debt and investment approaches, we propose a fiscal vulnerability selection 
procedure (Figure 5.2, Chapter 5). Applying this procedure, we find 26 economies vulnerable 
to fiscal crisis, with threshold ranges from a minimum of 21.16 per cent to a maximum of 84.06 
per cent of public debt to GDP, respectively, for France and Belgium. These results are in 
contrast to the findings of Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), which considered 90 per cent of debt to 
GDP a criterion of vulnerability to fiscal crisis. Further, we observe some economies where the 
debt approach suggests those economies to be vulnerable, in contrast with the investment 
approach. The first part provides the basis (by distinguishing countries into vulnerable and non-
vulnerable to fiscal crisis) for the second part of thesis, which investigates the effects of fiscal 
consolidation on financial sector stability. 
In the second part, we analyse the effects of fiscal consolidation on the financial sector stability 
for all countries and also for the subsamples of vulnerable and non-vulnerable economies. We 
use the conservative definition of fiscal consolidation (Ardagna, 2009) and carefully identify 
consolidation episodes for each country. In our panel analysis, we use bank-level capital 
adequacy ratios (Tier-1 and Tier-2) for each country by employing Bankscope data for the 
period from 1960 to 2017. We estimate both fixed-effects panel data models and the 
generalised method of moments proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) through Roodman 
(2009) collapse to analyse the role of fiscal consolidation in banking sector stability. This 
enables two-dimensional analyses covering both the panel settings, where the number of 
countries and banks may affect estimations. We find that financial stability (Tier-1 ratio) 
improves by 0.36 percentage points as a result of one episode of fiscal consolidation across all 
countries included in the sample. The results follow by improvement of 0.58 percentage points 
III 
 
in the subsample of vulnerable economies; however, non-vulnerable economies appear neutral 
in response to fiscal consolidation. Further, we conduct a country-wise empirical analysis to 
observe whether the country-specific settings may add some additional value to the panel 
analysis. For this purpose, we conduct aggregated and disaggregated analysis using data from 
1960 to 2017. For aggregate analysis, we use risk-weighted regulatory capital, Z-scores and 
stock market capitalisation. The results of aggregated analysis reveal that standard capital 
adequacy ratios improve significantly in the vulnerable economies, compared with the non-
vulnerable economies. For disaggregated analysis, we use the bank-wise Bankscope data on 
different banking variables. The results reveal that Indonesia, South Korea, New Zealand and 
Germany—as non-vulnerable economies—have also responded to fiscal consolidation. More 
interestingly, we find that strict fiscal consolidation may allow banks to compromise with their 
capital adequacy ratio; however, this seems true only for New Zealand and Germany. Therefore, 
we may infer that fiscal consolidation helps generate financial stability, particularly in 
economies vulnerable to fiscal crisis. 
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A decade after the global financial crisis (GFC), policy makers, analysts and academicians are 
still struggling to unfold the fiscal–financial conundrum.1 The current debate on the issue of 
sovereign defaults 2  and banking crisis offers two distinguishing viewpoints: (i) financial 
turmoil leads to sovereign defaults and (ii) sovereign defaults trigger banking crises. Recently, 
Broner, Erce, Martin, and Ventura (2014), among others,3 have found that financial turmoil 
leads to sovereign defaults through fiscal costs, including bailout money, the materialisation of 
contingent liabilities and government deposits. However, Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl 
(2014) and Gennaioli, Martin, and Rossi (2014), among many others,4 believe that sovereign 
defaults may cause banking sector crises through various means. Predominantly, they include 
the channels of sovereign downgrades, stress between the public and financial sector, 
borrowing costs, direct balance sheet effect and asset channels. Consistent with the latter, 
Panizza and Borensztein (2008) observed that the conditional probability of banking crises is 
much higher than the unconditional probability of banking. 5  They further stated that the 
conditional probability of sovereign defaults is not higher than the unconditional probability of 
                                                 
1 The fiscal–financial conundrum implies interdependence of the fiscal (sovereign risk/sovereign defaults) and 
financial sector (banking sector stability). 
2 Standard & Poor’s define sovereign defaults as the failure of a government to meet a principal and interest 
payment on the due date (or within a specified grace period) contained in the original terms of the debt issue 
(Gennaioli et al., 2014, p. 841). For further details on the definition of sovereign defaults, see Manasse, Roubini, 
and Schimmelpfennig (2003). 
3 For example, Reinhart and Rogoff (2011), Haldane and Alessandri (2009), Rixtel and Gasperini (2013) and 
Broner et al. (2014). 
4 See Noyer (2010); De Paoli, Hoggarth, and Saporta (2009); Acharya et al. (2014); Gennaioli et al. (2014); 
Hemming, Schimmelpfenning, and Kell (2003) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2002). 




sovereign defaults.6 Gennaioli et al. (2014) documented a long history of defaults and crisis 
episodes, indicating that sovereign defaults led banking crises in almost 60 per cent of a total 
110 crisis episodes from 1980 to 2005 in 81 economies. This thesis draws motivation from the 
above competing views regarding the direction of causality between sovereign defaults and 
banking sector crisis. 
Contemporary debates 7  on twin crises 8  have emphasised that sovereign defaults prompt 
financial crises in the banking sector. Therefore, sovereign risk appears to be a focal point in 
the debate on fiscal–financial interactions. For example, Akitoby and Stratmann (2008) found 
a strong connection between sovereign risks and banking crisis—a weak fiscal position that 
spills over into the bank’s balance sheet mainly because of the bank holdings of a defaulted 
government. Similarly, Agnello, Castro, Jalles, and Sousa (2015b) indicated that sovereign 
risks may further deteriorate the financial position of banks, thereby shaking investors’ 
confidence in the economy. Consequently, higher sovereign risk requires banks to make 
changes in the composition of their portfolios, mainly between investments in private and 
government securities. The banks’ portfolio rebalancing 9  directly translates into the 
composition of risk-weighted assets—a phenomenon of financial sector stability (banking 
sector stability10). Therefore, relevant to the importance of the composition of risk-weighted 
assets, the Basel Accords and other prudential standards have allocated less risk weight to 
government securities. 
In light of the above discussion, we argue that the policy option of fiscal consolidation helps 
improve fiscal health (commonly known as fiscal vulnerability to crisis), which eventually 
determines the financial stability of a country. Further, we identify the appropriate channels 
through which banks make adjustments to their portfolios in response to the policy stance of 
fiscal consolidation. Hence, a higher capital adequacy ensures the stability of the banking sector. 
                                                 
6 The conditional probability of sovereign defaults is defined as the probability of sovereign defaults conditional 
on a banking crisis. 
7 For further discussion on transmission channels, see Noyer (2010), De Paoli et al. (2009), Acharya et al. 
(2014), Gennaioli et al. (2014), Hemming et al. (2003) and IMF (2002). 
8 Balteanu, Erce, and Fernandez (2013) defined twin crises as sovereign defaults that result in financial/banking 
crises, or vice-versa. See Table A1 (Appendix A) for further details on these crises. A review of 110 crisis 
episodes from 1980 to 2005 in 81 economies indicated that sovereign defaults led to banking crises in almost 60 
per cent of these cases (Gennaioli et al., 2014). 
9 This portfolio rebalancing is a trade-off between risk and return (Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga, 2010). This 
concept is further explained in various ways by different researchers. For example, rebalancing is expected to 
increase shareholders’ wealth (Cybo-Ottone & Murgia, 2000).  
10 The Basel Accords allocate higher weights to private securities; thus, risk-weighted assets will be higher. 
Risk-weighted assets are used as denominators in measuring banking stability through capital adequacy ratios 
(Bank for International Settlement, 2017). Therefore, lower capital adequacy ratios cause banking instability. 
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This thesis explores the above linkages and investigates them empirically, which has been 
largely ignored in the available literature on the issue of sovereign defaults and banking crisis.11 
This thesis has two main parts. Each part contributes in several ways to the literature on the 
role of fiscal stance in the financial stability of a country. The first part identifies economies 
with vulnerability to fiscal crises, from a large sample of countries. This is achieved through 
using a multi-approach (static to dynamic analysis) method to correctly identify whether each 
country is vulnerable to fiscal crisis. Further, we extend our analysis from the conventional 
debt approach to the investment approach, and select countries commonly identified by both 
approaches as vulnerable to fiscal crisis. This procedure offers a rigorous analysis and may be 
considered superior to the existing procedures, which are subject to heavy criticism involving 
methodological issues or suggesting a single cut-off of public debt to gross domestic product 
(GDP) as a criterion for vulnerability to fiscal crisis. We largely use the debt approach led by 
the threshold regression model, which estimates the optimal level of public debt to GDP, 
beyond which an economy is identified as vulnerable to fiscal crisis. Further, we use the 
investment approach, which calculates the financial net worth of all sample countries to 
determine their fiscal vulnerability. We finally match the results of both the above approaches 
to determine the fiscal health (vulnerability to fiscal crisis) of an economy. We find 26 countries 
commonly identified by the debt and financial net worth approaches as vulnerable to fiscal 
crisis, from 1960 to 2017. Interestingly, some economies appear to be vulnerable to fiscal crisis 
according to the debt approach, yet non-vulnerable according to the net worth approach. We 
successfully classify the entire sample of countries (53) into economies that are vulnerable (26) 
and non-vulnerable (27) to fiscal crisis, based on the above fiscal vulnerability selection 
procedure of debt and investment analysis. 
The second part contributes to the literature through analysing the role of fiscal consolidation 
(a policy option) in financial sector stability. In this part, we maintain that the fiscal health 
(vulnerability to fiscal crisis) of a country largely depends on the pace of fiscal consolidation, 
which eventually determines the financial stability (banking sector stability) of the country. In 
general, fiscal consolidation refers to a tight policy stance—a deliberate attempt to reduce the 
budget deficit. In this study, we use the fiscal consolidation concept described in Ardagna 
(2009), and define fiscal consolidation episode as a period where the cyclically adjusted 
primary balance (CAPB) improves by at least 1.5 per cent of GDP in a year, or improves by at 
                                                 
11 This is according to the best information of the authors. 
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least one per cent of GDP per year for a period of two consecutive years. We finally estimate 
the effects of fiscal consolidation on financial sector stability for the panel of all sample 
countries and subsamples of vulnerable and non-vulnerable economies for the period 1990 to 
2017.12 We further replicate estimations for each country by considering bank-wise panels. The 
above scheme of estimations may help us confirm the results if the coefficient of fiscal 
consolidation in association with financial stability remains relevant and may vary (in terms of 
magnitude) depending on the fiscal health of a country. The above scheme of analysis was 
motivated by propositions suggested in Ardagna (2009) that fiscal consolidation may result in 
a greater effect on financial sector stability in economies that are vulnerable to fiscal crisis. We 
estimate both fixed-effects panel data models and the generalised method of moments proposed 
by Arellano and Bond (1991) through Roodman (2009) collapse to analyse the role of fiscal 
consolidation and banking sector stability. This allows two-dimensional analyses covering both 
the panel settings, where the number of countries and banks may influence the estimations. 
We find overwhelming evidence that fiscal consolidation (policy stance) improves financial 
stability (capital adequacy ratio—Tier-1) by 0.36 percentage points across the full sample of 
selected countries (vulnerable and non-vulnerable economies). These findings are followed by 
a 0.58 percentage point improvement in financial stability (Tier-1) in the subsample of 
economies vulnerable to fiscal crisis. In the overall panel of non-vulnerable economies, the 
results of fiscal consolidation are not significant (statistically). However, two countries 
(individual country analysis) from the group of non-vulnerable economies indicate 1.27 
(Indonesia) and 0.13 (South Korea) percentage point improvement in financial stability (Tier-
1). In contrast, New Zealand and Germany indicate a 1.32 and 0.28 percentage point decline, 
respectively, in their capital adequacy ratio (Tier-1) because of their stance on fiscal 
consolidation. This is interesting to note because, in New Zealand and Germany, excessive 
fiscal consolidation might be occurring, which may further force the financial sector to opt for 
more risky assets in their portfolio of investment. In other words, this finding implies that fiscal 
surplus may not warrant financial stability.13 Therefore, we can extract from the above results 
that fiscal consolidation helps generate financial stability, particularly in economies vulnerable 
to fiscal crisis. 
                                                 
12 The Bankscope database maintains individual bank balance sheet data from 1990 onwards. Therefore, we 
could not maintain the time period considered in the fiscal health analysis. We used banking and financial data 
from 1990 to 2016 for the financial sector stability analysis. 
13 See the discussion on the demand and supply effect of direct channel at the end of Section 3.3, Chapter 3. 
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The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the concept and 
issues involved in measuring fiscal vulnerability. Section 1.3 presents the concept of fiscal 
consolidation, along with its measurement issues. Section 1.4 discusses financial stability and 
its alternative measures, while Section 1.5 presents an overview of the linkages between fiscal 
consolidation and financial sector stability. Section 1.6 discusses the thesis research question, 
objectives and potential contributions. Finally, Section 1.7 explains the organisation of the 
thesis. 
1.2 Concept of Fiscal Vulnerability and Measurement Issues 
In general, fiscal vulnerability refers to a situation in which the increasing level of public debt 
may deplete the primary surplus of a country. More generally, fiscal vulnerability is related to 
vulnerability to crises. The typical dictionary definition of vulnerability is being open to attack 
or damage. In this sense, an increase in vulnerability indicates an increase in probability that 
the shock will be translated into crisis, rather than being absorbed by the economy (Furman, 
Stiglitz, Bosworth, & Radelet, 1998). Vulnerability is also defined as the risk that solvency and 
liquidity conditions are violated. 14  Following these definitions, fiscal vulnerability is a 
component of overall vulnerability. Hemming and Petrie (2002, p. 161) defined fiscal 
vulnerability as a situation in which the government is exposed to the possibility of failing to 
achieve the aggregate objectives of the fiscal policy.15 
The literature has identified many inevitable reasons for increasing the public debt of a country. 
For example, Reinhart, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2012) considered decreasing economic growth 
as a reason for accumulating debt stocks.16  Similarly, Ghosh, Kim, Mendoza, Ostry, and 
Qureshi (2013); Ciarlone and Trebeschi (2005); and Tinker (2002) considered social spending, 
solvency risk exposure and an ageing population, respectively, to be relevant sources of 
                                                 
14 See Allen, Setser, Keller, and Roubini (2002) for further detail. 
15 See Section II background of Hemming et al. (2003) for further detail on fiscal vulnerability. 
16 The GFC from 2007 to 2009 has left a legacy of a historically high and surging level of public debt in 
developed economies (Lane, 2012; Reinhart et al., 2012). However, there is inconsistency with the argument of 
growing public debt after the GFC in developed economies. For example, some of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) economies, including Switzerland and Norway, managed to 
reduce their public debt, while Sweden and Germany managed to maintain their level of debt. In contrast, the 
public debt of Australia increased by 280.47 per cent—from 9.68 per cent of GDP in 2007 to 36.83 per cent of 
GDP in 2015 (see Figure A1, Appendix A). The Australian general government public debt was at a historic low 
(9.68 per cent of GDP) in 2007, and surged to 36.83 per cent of GDP in 2015 because of a series of spending-
driven budget deficits. Meanwhile, private credit in Australia is also at its highest level of 137.60 per cent of 
GDP. This situation requires empirical investigation because debt is a double-edged sword—a moderate level 
helps improve welfare, while excess levels result in financial disaster (Cecchetti, Mohanty, & Zampolli, 2011; 
Reinhart & Rogoff, 2010). 
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increasing public debt, which may further cause fiscal vulnerability to crisis. Consequently, 
fiscally vulnerable economies may face difficulties in absorbing exogenous (averse) shocks, 
and, in some cases, countries may declare their sovereign defaults. Sovereign defaults through 
sovereign downgrades, stress between the public and financial sector through borrowing costs, 
direct balance sheet effect and assets channels may further transmit into banking sector crises.17 
Most of the empirical literature follows Bohn (1998) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) to 
quantify fiscal vulnerability. However, both approaches are different in terms of vulnerability 
assessment. Moreover, they hold apparent methodological issues. Bohn’s (1998) approach 
measures vulnerability through calculating the coefficient (negative) of debt to GDP in relation 
to primary surplus. Bohn’s model is simple, yet allows many caveats, including overestimating 
the debt coefficient—with misleading results. Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) calculated a unique 
(single) cut-off of 90 per cent public debt to GDP, beyond which debt crisis is triggered. This 
approach remained prevalent until Herndon, Ash, and Pollin (2014) and Egert (2015) 
reproduced different results by using the same dataset as Reinhart and Rogoff (2010). They 
discovered that a single cut-off is a biased and misleading explanation of fiscal vulnerability. 
We overcome the above methodological issues by estimating vulnerability through a rigorous 
procedure and conducting sensitivity analyses. We calculate the data using more rigorous 
methods that suggest an appropriate level of country-specific public debt, beyond which fiscal 
vulnerability to crisis may arise. As part of this procedure, we attempt to reconcile the results 
of debt analysis with investment analysis—calculated through a net financial approach. In this 
framework, we propose a fiscal vulnerability selection procedure (Figure 5.2, Chapter 5), 
which helps us classify economies into vulnerable and non-vulnerable. 
We begin with Bohn’s (1998) model, which identifies 30 economies as vulnerable to fiscal 
crisis. However, it is expected that this model may produce biased results because of 
overlapping periods of vulnerability and non-vulnerability in some of the economies.18 We 
attempt to overcome this issue through estimating forward, backward and moving screening 
processes. Interestingly, we identify nine additional economies vulnerable to fiscal crisis at 
some time during the given period of analysis. Nevertheless, this process may not completely 
                                                 
17 These channels are discussed in Acharya et al. (2014), De Paoli et al. (2009), Gennaioli et al. (2014), Noyer 
(2010), Panetta et al. (2011) and IMF (2002). 
18 During the sample period, the vulnerability of an economy may vary because of changes in fiscal policy 
stance. Therefore, pooling a vulnerable period with non-vulnerable period is expected to provide misleading 
results. For more information on this topic, see the stability analysis (forward, backward and moving screening) 
provided in Chapter 5, Section 5.3. 
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avoid identification (vulnerable versus non-vulnerable) problems because some of the 
vulnerable periods can be nullified by non-vulnerable periods within the sample.19 
We argue that backward and forward screening process may provide several episodes of 
vulnerability, yet do not indicate the optimal level of debt to GDP necessary to determine the 
vulnerability of a country. Therefore, we finally use a threshold regression model to calculate 
the optimal level of debt to GDP that may cause a fiscal crisis in each country. We conduct 
threshold regression analysis for every country to calculate the country-specific threshold level 
of debt to GDP.20 The threshold model supposes that an economic time series can be modelled 
as belonging to a number of distinct regimes, where the regimes are characterised by different 
conditional distribution of the process. The threshold model identifies one more economy as 
vulnerable, in addition to the 39 economies specified through Bohn’s (1998) approach and the 
screening approach. Ultimately, we identify 40 economies as vulnerable to fiscal crisis out of 
a total sample of 53 economies. 
Finally, we employ the investment approach to reconcile the vulnerable economies identified 
through the debt approach. We use financial net worth in a value-at-risk and conditional value-
at-risk framework to identify the economies vulnerable to fiscal crises. This last step of the 
fiscal vulnerability selection procedure leaves us with 26 economies vulnerable to debt crisis. 
At the end, we apply alternative techniques available in the literature and compare these results 
with our main approach, as well as with the sovereign credit rating of different rating agencies. 
Our results are consistent with the credit rating agencies. The next section discusses the nexus 
of fiscal consolidation and banking stability. 
1.3 Concept of Fiscal Consolidation and Measurement Issues 
Fiscal consolidation is a policy stance or commitment to reduce budget deficit gradually. In 
particular, fiscal consolidation is defined as a deliberate attempt to reduce government budget 
deficit (Cimadomo et al., 2014). The literature has suggested different approaches that have 
been used to gauge fiscal consolidation. These methods are commonly known as narrative 
techniques (Devries et al., 2011) and CAPB processes (Alesina & Ardagna, 2010; Alesina & 
Perotti, 1995; Ardagna, 2009). Narrative techniques use historical records of governments’ 
intentions to reduce excessive public spending. Historical records can be observed from the 
                                                 
19 Section 5.2 (Chapter 5) provides complete details on the forward, backward and moving screening processes. 
20 Section 5.3 (Chapter 5) presents the empirical strategy of the threshold regression, while Section 6.1 (Chapter 
6) presents its results. 
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stability and convergence programs submitted by the authorities to the European Commission, 
from OECD and IMF reports, budget speeches and respective central bank reports. However, 
it is tedious to collect and process all information from the above sources to quantify the fiscal 
consolidation for an economy.21 Therefore, we mostly rely on CAPB to calculate the fiscal 
consolidation episodes for all 53 economies included in the sample.22 It may be relevant to note 
that CAPB is derived by computing the cyclical components of the primary balance by 
employing the Hodrick and Prescott (Hodrick & Prescott, 1997) filter and/or econometric 
techniques. In this thesis, we use the Hodrick and Prescott method to extract the cyclical 
component for all countries, except the Australian economy, for which we also use econometric 
techniques. In general, the fiscal consolidation is viewed with positive changes (improvements) 
in CAPB; however, the amount of changes remains largely unclear in the literature. 
Mirdala (2013) stated that fiscal consolidation (episode) occurs if the CAPB of a country 
improves by at least 1.5 per cent of GDP in one year (‘cold shower’) or does not drop by more 
than 0.5 per cent of GDP over a period of three years (referred to as gradual consolidation). 
Alternatively, Stephanie, Mike, Eckhard, and Christophe (2007) define fiscal consolidation 
(episode) as an improvement in CAPB by at least one per cent of potential GDP in one year or 
two consecutive years, with 0.5 per cent for two years at the beginning of the period. Ardagna 
(2009) defined fiscal consolidation (episode) as CAPB improving by at least 1.5 per cent of 
GDP, or a period of two consecutive years in which the CAPB improves by at least one per 
cent of GDP per year. In the rest of our financial stability analysis, we apply fiscal consolidation 
as defined by Ardagna (2009) because of its relatively longer duration. Ardagna’s definition of 
fiscal consolidation may reflect the serious efforts of fiscal authorities to reduce primary deficit. 
This is also because the financial sector may achieve confidence as a result of constant 
improvement in fiscal position, as also observed in Agnello et al. (2015a). 
1.4 Concept and Measures of Financial Stability 
The term ‘financial stability’ was initially used by the Bank of England in 1994. The Bank of 
England used this term to denote its objectives that were not related to the efficient functioning 
of the financial system and price stability (Allen & Wood, 2006). As stated by the Governor of 
Sveriges Riksbank, stability is a vague concept that is difficult to define (see Heikensten, 2004). 
                                                 
21 We collect these historical records only for the case of Australia and compare our fiscal consolidation 
episodes measured using CAPB. For further details on this comparison, see Section 6.3 (Chapter 6). 
22 See Table E3 (Appendix E) for the fiscal consolidation episodes of all economies. 
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There is still no widely accepted definition of financial stability. However, Allen and Wood 
(2006) and Schinasi (2004) proposed definitions of financial stability that have some 
operational and practical relevance. According to Allen and Wood (2006), the best approach is 
to first define the features of the episode of financial instability. One can then define financial 
stability as a state of affairs in which the episodes of financial instability are unlikely to occur. 
Schinasi (2004) defined financial stability in terms of its ability to facilitate the economic 
processes, absorb shocks and manage risks. 
The financial sector has many dimensions and subsequently can be evaluated with various 
measures of assessment. For example, Beck, Hesse, Kick, and von Westernhagen (2009) used 
the Z-score, non-performing loan (NPL) score and probability of default (PD) score to assess 
the financial stability of the banking sector in Germany. The Z-score measures the distance 
from insolvency, the NPL score measures the lending risk, and the PD score measures the 
actual insolvency risk. These approaches focus on the performance aspect of the banking sector. 
The IMF (2006) recommended a comprehensive measure with 12 core indicators categorised 
as asset-based, capital-based, and income- and expense-based financial stability indicators for 
the deposit takers of the financial sector. 23  The Bank for International Settlement (2017) 
provided a much broader measure of banking stability (commonly known as capital adequacy 
ratios) by incorporating credit risk, market risk and operational risk. The capital adequacy ratios 
are also known as risk-weighted capital ratios, which are termed ‘Tier-1’ and ‘Tier-2’ capital 
ratios, depending on the nature and composition of the assets of the banks. 
Tier-1 includes common equity Tier-1 and additional Tier-1. Common equity Tier-1 includes 
common shares, retained earnings and other reserves. Additional Tier-1 includes capital 
instruments with no fixed maturity. Tier-2 includes subordinated debt and general loan-loss 
reserves. Banks with more regulatory capital are better able to fund lending growth. Conversely, 
banks with a greater amount of risk-weighted assets require more capital to absorb any shocks. 
Along these lines, the Bank for International Settlement (2017) defined capital adequacy ratios 
as the amount of regulatory capital divided by the amount of risk-weighted assets. Relatively 
recently, Cimadomo et al. (2014), among others, used the above capital adequacy ratios (Tier-
1 and Tier-2) to assess the financial stability of the banking sector. We also apply the Tier-1 
                                                 
23 Swamy (2014) used a panel vector autoregressive (PVAR) model on bank-specific variables to investigate 
financial stability through banking sector performance. 
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and Tier-2 measures of capital adequacy ratios because of their close association with the fiscal 
sector to investigate the role of fiscal consolidation in financial sector stability. 
1.5 Linkages between Fiscal Consolidation and Financial Stability 
The interdependence between the public (in terms of primary balance) and bank balance sheet 
reflects important economic and financial implications. Therefore, frequent and persistent 
economic and financial crises may ultimately convert into a sovereign crisis. Correspondingly, 
abrupt changes in market perceptions of sovereign risk weaken the bank balance sheet, which 
creates an adverse feedback loop between sovereign and banking risk (Cimadomo et al., 2014; 
Panetta et al., 2011). More directly, sovereign risk that is closely related to the weak fiscal 
position of the economy transmits into the banking sector mainly because of the bank holdings 
of government securities.24 Similarly, Agnello et al. (2015b) observed that government defaults 
destroy the bank balance sheet, which further increases investors’ concerns. Therefore, it is 
widely understood that sustainable and sizable fiscal adjustments are required to restore sound 
fiscal positions and ease financial market pressure. 
The above discussion motivated this thesis to further investigate the role of fiscal consolidation 
subject to fiscal vulnerability in financial sector stability. Agnello et al. (2015a, 2015b) 
observed that debt crisis and consequent fiscal consolidation invite financial reforms, based on 
the experience of developing and developed countries. Cimadomo et al. (2014) sought to 
explore the connections between fiscal consolidation and financial sector stability through 
direct and indirect channels for 17 OECD countries. The direct channel operates through the 
demand and supply of government securities, while the indirect channel operates through the 
macroeconomic effects of fiscal consolidation. According to Cimadomo et al. (2014), if fiscal 
adjustments in the form of consolidation lead to an economic downturn, it is expected that 
NPLs and write-offs will increase. Further, if the effects are intense, investors will prefer to 
invest in government securities, particularly in periods of fiscal consolidations. Finally, 
Cimadomo et al. (2014) found that fiscal consolidation improved financial stability through 
improving capital adequacy (Tier-1) in a selected sample of OECD countries. 
However, the available studies—especially Cimadomo et al. (2014) and Agnello et al. (2015, 
2015a)—did not make any prior distinctions between vulnerable and non-vulnerable 
                                                 
24 This was observed in 25 countries by Akitoby and Stratmann (2008). Further, the above study reported that 
debt-financed spending results in higher sovereign risk, while tax-financed spending lowers the risk. Further, the 
above study observed that the reaction of financial markets to fiscal policy depends on political institutions. 
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economies in their sample of selected countries. This distinction is necessary to investigate the 
effective role of fiscal consolidation. A country can be identified as non-vulnerable to fiscal 
crisis because of prior fiscal consolidation. Conversely, a country can be identified as 
vulnerable because of insufficient or no fiscal consolidation. We attempt to address this issue 
and investigate the role of fiscal consolidation for a larger sample of selected countries. 
This thesis empirically investigates the effects of fiscal consolidation on the financial stability 
of the banking sector for the selected 53 countries, classified as vulnerable and non-vulnerable 
to fiscal crisis. We use a direct channel, which relates to the supply and demand effects on 
government bond markets, where the risk weights of securities play an important role in the 
empirical investigation. The Basel Accords allot zero per cent risk weight to government 
securities, and 20 to 100 per cent for other types of private securities (Bank for International 
Settlements, 2015). Therefore, the total risk-weighted assets change when banks shift their 
portfolio from one type of securities to other securities. Therefore, it is plausible to consider 
that banks will conduct their portfolio rebalancing as a result of fiscal consolidation, which will 
reduce risk-weighted assets because of lower risk weights allocated to public securities. 
Consequently, the increased capital adequacy ratio will warrant banking stability.25 
1.6 Research Questions, Objectives and Potential Contribution 
This thesis seeks to answer two main questions: (i) Does public debt reduce primary surplus? 
(ii) What is the effect of fiscal consolidation on financial sector stability? We set several 
objectives to investigate these questions empirically. These objectives are as follows: 
1. We estimate the vulnerability of fiscal crisis for a large sample of 53 developing and 
developed economies. We use a state-of-the-art methodology to calculate fiscal 
vulnerability, and then classify countries into vulnerable and non-vulnerable economies. 
2. As part of the fiscal vulnerability analysis, we aim to calculate the appropriate level of 
public debt to GDP for each country, which may be the tipping level to cause 
vulnerability to fiscal crisis. In this manner, we may determine whether public debt 
reduces the primary surplus in countries during periods of fiscal crises. 
3. We compute and identify episodes of fiscal consolidation for each economy based on 
the methods suggested in Ardagna (2009). 
                                                 
25 See Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1, for a detailed discussion on the construction and calculations of capital adequacy 




4. We incorporate all banks (subject to data availability) with their financial stability 
indicators (Tier-1 and Tier-2) from every country included in the sample. 
5. Finally, we estimate the effect of fiscal consolidation on the financial sector (Tier-1 and 
Tier-2) separately for the group of vulnerable and non-vulnerable economies. 
This thesis contributes to the literature in the following ways: 
• For a very large sample of countries, it calculates the threshold level of debt as a 
proportion of GDP, beyond which a country may fall into fiscal crisis. 
• It calculates the threshold level based on a special case of the regime switching model, 
which is used for the first time in the literature on this topic. 
• It reconciles the results of the debt approach with the investment approach to confirm 
the results of the debt approach to estimate vulnerability to fiscal crisis. 
• It successfully estimates and finds that fiscal consolidation performs an important role 
in banking sector stability, particularly during fiscal crises. 
1.7 Organisation of Thesis 
This thesis is organised into two parts with seven chapters. Chapter 2 presents detailed literature 
on fiscal vulnerability and linkages between fiscal consolidation and banking sector stability. 
Chapter 3 illustrates the framework of analysis by presenting details of debt and primary 
surplus, and the interdependence of fiscal consolidation and banking sector stability. Chapter 
4 elaborates the data sources, along with important definitions and construction of the variables 
used in empirical analysis. Chapter 5 explains some weaknesses of the various methods 
previously used in such analyses. As part of this chapter, we present and discuss the advantages 
of the threshold model used to estimate the fiscal vulnerability of a country. Further, this 
chapter presents some methodological notes on computing fiscal consolidation episodes. 
Chapter 6 presents the fiscal vulnerability analysis and compares our results with the available 
country rating conducted by different rating agencies. Chapter 7 first presents the analysis of 
fiscal consolidation and then discusses the role of fiscal consolidation in the financial stability 
of vulnerable and non-vulnerable economies. Chapter 8 extends the role of fiscal consolidation 
in the financial sector stability by conducting aggregated and disaggregated analysis, while the 
final Chapter 9 offers concluding remarks, the study contributions and the policy implications. 












This chapter presents detailed literature on fiscal vulnerability and the transmission channels 
through which sovereign defaults are transmitted into the banking sector. Further, this chapter 
presents the literature on the linkage between fiscal consolidation and the financial stability of 
the banking sector. This chapter is broadly organised into two parts: (i) fiscal vulnerability and 
(ii) fiscal consolidation and banking stability. We classify the fiscal vulnerability literature 
based on available techniques to classify an economy as vulnerable. We then classify the 
relevant literature on the linkage between fiscal consolidation and banking stability based on 
the costs associated with government defaults. These defaults are costly because they destroy 
the balance sheet of domestic banks. To discuss all of these aspects, the remainder of the 
chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the relevant literature on fiscal 
vulnerability. Section 2.3 presents the relevant literature on the linkages between fiscal 
consolidation and banking stability. Section 2.4 presents the literature gaps and remedies. 
Section 2.5 concludes the literature review on this topic. 
2.2 Fiscal Vulnerability 
The issue of fiscal vulnerability can be better understood in comparison with the approaches 
available in the literature. Table 2.1 presents a summary of these approaches, and broadly 
attempts to identify fiscal vulnerability in the relevant economies.26 Interestingly, most of the 
approaches suggest a single threshold level of public debt to GDP that applies to all countries 
included in the sample. 
                                                 
26 We did not include the early 1980s literature in this classification; however, its synthesised discussion is 
presented in this section. 
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Table 2.1: Literature Based on Quantitative Approaches   
Study Country/countries Timeframe Conclusion and comments 
Bohn’s (1998) model 
Bohn (1998) United States (US) 1916 to 1995 The study reported the US economy as non-vulnerable. 
Valderrama (2005) Korea and Thailand 1975 to 2003 The study reported only Thailand as a vulnerable 
economy, especially for 1990 to 2003 (the second period 
in the subsample analysis). 
Mauro, Romeu, Binder, 
and Zaman (2015) 
55 developed and emerging 
economies 
1800 to 2011 The study reported a significantly weaker policy response 
(increase in primary balance in response to debt) when 
inflation is high, sovereign borrowing cost is low, and 
potential economic growth deteriorates suddenly. 
Our concern with these types of studies is that 
vulnerability varies within the sample period, yet the debt 
coefficient provides a single estimate over the sample 
period. 
Single threshold 
Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2010) 
44 developed and emerging 
economies 
200 years By defining a single threshold of 90 per cent (public debt 
to GDP), this study reported a decrease of one per cent in 
the median growth rate of an economy when public debt 
increased to 90 per cent of GDP. 
Public debt overhang 
Cecchetti, Mohanty, and 
Zampolli (2011) 
A panel of 18 OECD 
economies 
1980 to 2010  The study reported a threshold of 86 per cent (public debt 
to GDP). Based on this finding, they suggested that 
countries with a higher level of debt must act quickly and 
decisively to address their fiscal issues. 
Reinhart, Reinhart, and 
Rogoff (2012) 
Advanced economies 1860 to 2011 The study identified 26 public debt overhang episodes 
since early 1800, where the public debt exceeded 90 per 
cent of GDP. They further reported that 10 out of 20 
episodes lasted for more than 10 years. 
   continued… 
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Table 2.1 (…continued): Literature Based on Quantitative Approaches 
Study Country/countries Timeframe Conclusion and comments 
Replicating single threshold 
Herndon, Ash, and 
Pollin (2014) 
44 developed and emerging 
economies 
200 years Replicating Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), this study 
indicated serious concerns, including: (i) coding errors, 
(ii) exclusion of available data in selective cases and (iii) 
inappropriate weighting. 
Égert (2015) 44 developed and emerging 
economies 
200 years This study validated the criticism that 90 per cent is not an 
appropriate threshold. The results suggested that a 
negative association between central government debt and 
growth may appear at a debt level as low as 20 per cent 
(central government debt to GDP). 
Comment: In a single-threshold framework, the main 
criticism is the assumption of debt–growth association 
across countries. 
Alternative approaches 
Financial net worth/balance sheet approach 
Barnhill Jr and Kopits 
(2004) 
Ecuador 1995 to 2002 This study examined the significant risk of government 
financial failure stemming from the volatility of the 
exchange rate, interest rates, oil prices and output. 
Comments: Empirical investigation issues: (i) increasing 
negative value, since the average value of financial net 
worth in OECD economies is recorded as ˗65 per cent of 
GDP in 2013, compared with the pre-crisis value of ˗38.1 
per cent (OECD, 2015, p. 60); and (ii) the data availability 
on financial assets and liabilities. 
Mellor (1996) Balance sheet measures of 
Australia 
When the Australian 
government changed 
its accounting base 
of fiscal policy 
measures—1996 
This study stated that the Australian government’s new 
proposed reporting (accrual reporting) should be 
complemented with an accrual planning and budgeting 
regime, which would ensure that financial performance is 
planned and assessed on similar bases. This study 
proposed using change in net worth to assess the fiscal 
policy of the Australian government. 
   continued… 
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Table 2.1 (…continued): Literature Based on Quantitative Approaches 
Study Country/countries Timeframe Conclusion and comments 
Makin and Pearce 
(2016) 
Descriptive analysis (of balance 
sheet items), along with 
providing stabilising federal 
government debt and required 
fiscal consolidation for the case 
of Australia 
Different time 
period used, ranging 
from 1971 to 2020 
(projected) 
This study proposed three possibilities as medium-term 
budgetary policies: (i) moving from negative net public 
worth to zero to restore the fiscal solvency, (ii) mitigating 
the level of foreign debt to zero and (iii) decreasing the 
level of net public debt to zero. 
Fiscal vulnerability index 
Baldacci, McHugh, and 
Petrova (2011) 
Selected advanced and 
emerging economies 
Spring and autumn 
of 2010 
This study found that the index is high for advanced 
economies; however, solvency risk is lower in emerging 
economies. 
Comments: Estimation issues—the z-score was 
constructed from the sample mean of public debt to GDP 
(across the country), while the behaviour of these fiscal 
variables was country specific. 
Classification and regression tree, and descriptive analysis 
Manasse and Roubini 
(2009) 
Emerging economies 1970 to 2002 The study reported the following rules of thumb: (i) total 
external debt above 49.7 per cent of GDP, (ii) short-term 
debt above 130 per cent of reserves and (iii) public 
external debt above 214 per cent of fiscal revenues. 
Further, they stated some thresholds for some risk factors. 
Robinson (2002) Discussion using a 
reconciliation of Australian 
general government operating 
balance, fiscal balance and cash 
balance measures 




and balance sheet 
This study explained and evaluated the new fiscal 
measure (fiscal balance) introduced under accrual 
accounting in the late 1990s. This study concluded that 
net financial liability is a more meaningful fiscal measure 
than fiscal balance, even though the new measure (fiscal 
balance) is superior to the cash budget balance measure. 
   continued… 
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Table 2.1 (…continued): Literature Based on Quantitative Approaches 
Study Country/countries Timeframe Conclusion and comments 
Gruen and Sayegh 
(2005) 
Descriptive analysis of 
Australia 
1980 to 2005 A sustained fiscal consolidation shifted the budget deficit 
of 3.50 per cent of GDP (1983 to 1984) into a budget 
surplus of 1.75 per cent of GDP within five years. 
However, severe recession in the early 1990s interrupted 
this process and the budget returned again to deficit. 
During this period, peak deficits were recorded in 1992 to 
1993 at 4.75 per cent of GDP. The second half of the 
1990s repeated the same experience, and the budget 
returned to surplus in 1997 to 1998. Further, this paper 
indicated two key motivating factors behind extended 
fiscal consolidation: (i) current account deficit and 
associated foreign build-up of net foreign liabilities, and 
(ii) the ageing of the population and the projected rising 





A single threshold does not appear to be a realistic policy option or explanation of fiscal 
vulnerability.27 There are many possible reasons for the presence of as many cut-off points of 
debt to GDP as there are countries under analysis. We categorised the existing literature on 
fiscal vulnerability into three main classes: (i) Bohn-type models, (ii) single-threshold 
approaches and (iii) alternative approaches. 28  In the early 1980s, the literature on fiscal 
sustainability was based on the present value budget constraint (solvency criteria), where fiscal 
sustainability required that today’s government debt should be equal to the excess of future 
primary surplus over primary deficits in present value terms (Hamilton & Flavin, 1986; 
McCallum, 1984). Along these lines, Hamilton and Flavin (1986) used historical data to test 
the present value borrowing constraint. They empirically tested two different views of the 
limitations of government borrowing. One view was that the government can run a permanent 
budget deficit if it pays its interest when it is due. The alternate view was that creditors will be 
reluctant to purchase government securities unless the government has made a commitment to 
balance its budget in present value terms. Hamilton and Flavin (1986) empirically tested these 
views of fiscal sustainability, and concluded that the post-war US deficits were consistent with 
the second alternate that the present value budget constraint must hold. Further, they suggested 
that the present value budget constraint holds if primary balance and debt are stationary. 
Nonetheless, this is a sufficient yet unnecessary condition for sustainability. In other words, 
the fiscal policy can be sustainable even if the public debt is nonstationary (also see Chalk & 
Hemming, 2000).29 
Trehan and Walsh (1988) suggested that the stationarity of net-of-interest deficit is neither a 
necessary nor sufficient condition for intertemporal budget balance. Moreover, Trehan and 
Walsh (1991) tested intertemporal budget constraints30 to the US federal budget and current 
account deficits. Through examining the federal budget, they extended the previous work of 
Trehan and Walsh (1988) by indicating that the existence of a stationary linear combination of 
government debt and net-of-interest deficit is a necessary and sufficient condition for the 
                                                 
27 The specific issues in this unique level of public debt to GDP are elaborated in a later part of this section. 
28 The studies using alternative approaches were further divided into three sub-classes: fiscal vulnerability index, 
financial net worth/balance sheet approach, and classification and regression tree. 
29 Trehan and Walsh (1988) tested the hypothesis that the present value budget constraint is shown to be 
equivalent to the condition that government debt and primary balances are cointegrated. Using US data from 
1890 to 1986, this study reported results consistent with the intertemporal budget constraint where the 
government debt was sustainable. 
30 The government’s intertemporal budget constraints at each date require that the present value of net tax 
payments of current and future generations should be sufficient to cover the present value of future government 
consumptions, as well as pay off the initial net indebtedness of the government. Failure to satisfy this constraint 
indicates that the government will default on its liabilities (Auerback, Gokhale, & Kolikoff, 1944). 
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intertemporal budget balance if: (i) expected real rates are constant and (ii) the quasi-difference 
of the net-of-interest deficit is stationary. Trehan and Walsh (1991) further reported that the 
deficit process is consistent with fiscal sustainability for post-war US data. Another strand of 
the literature used similar techniques and reported different results. For instance, Hakkio and 
Rush (1991) tested US fiscal policy using data from 1980, and could not find any cointegration 
between government spending (including interest payments) and revenue. Based on these 
results, they suggested that the then-recent taxation policies of the government violated the 
intertemporal budget constraint. 
Conversely, Tanner and Liu (1994) reinvestigated the long-term solvency of the US 
government and reported sustainability. They incorporated a break term for 1981 to capture the 
shift in the fiscal process during the first Ronald Reagan administration. The results with a 
significant break revealed that expenditure and debt were cointegrated. Consequently, the long-
term intertemporal budget constraint held. Similarly, Wilcox (1989) found mixed evidence on 
stationarity by indicating that the period of 1960 to 1984 could not be treated as a single sample 
because of a shift in the structure of fiscal policy. This study reported that the US fiscal policy 
at the time was unsustainable. Kremers (1989) further extended the constraint that the fiscal 
surplus cannot be larger than the output, and, in this case, the stationarity of government debt 
is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the present value budget constraint, as 
mentioned in Chalk and Hemming (2000). 
Bohn (1991) and Bohn (1995) raised an important point that sustainability in the above 
literature was examined in an environment with certainty. Sustainable policies will no longer 
be sustainable in an uncertain environment, and the present value budget constraints must be 
expressed in expected value terms.31 This distinction in two different versions of present value 
budget constraints is important because, with uncertainty, the discount factor is determined by 
the marginal rate of technical substitution between two different periods. In contrast, the 
discounting rate is the risk-free rate of return in a certain world. However, the marginal rate of 
technical substation between two periods (t and t + 1) differs considerably from the interest 
rate on government bonds. Therefore, the growth rate of debt above the risk-free rate of return 
does not necessarily imply uncertain behaviour. Based on these grounds, Bohn (1998) argued 
that some of the cointegration tests in the earlier literature (Hakkio & Rush, 1991; Trehan & 
                                                 
31 See the section on sustainability and uncertainty in Chalk and Hemming (2000) regarding the modification of 
present value budget constraints during uncertainty. 
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Walsh, 1988, 1991) were expected to give misleading results. Bohn (1998) further argued that, 
if the primary surplus responds positively to the increasing amount of government debt, the 
fiscal policy reaction function can be considered sustainable. Bohn (1998) estimated the fiscal 
sustainability of the US by employing data from 1916 to 1995, and reported the US to be a 
non-vulnerable economy. The main concern with this approach is that it provides a debt 
coefficient over the sample period to determine fiscal sustainability. The common criticism of 
Bohn’s approach is that it requires sufficiently large time series information to determine fiscal 
sustainability and provide a constant parameter of sustainability for that entire period. 
Moreover, the above model may be unable to determine vulnerability for a specific year. 
However, this model is frequently used in the empirical literature on this subject. 
Considering the second strand of literature, the single-threshold and public-debt-overhang 
approaches are mainly criticised because of the assumed homogenous association between debt 
and growth across countries.32 Among these, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) calculated the cut off 
of public debt to GDP to be 90 per cent, beyond which public debt may lead towards 
vulnerability to crisis. They used historical data information from 44 countries for 1800 to 2009, 
and assumed homogeneous debt–growth associations across countries. More precisely, based 
on descriptive evidence, they observed that the median GDP growth rate was 4.5 per cent when 
the public debt to GDP was below 90 per cent. However, the median growth fell markedly to 
2.9 per cent when public debt to GDP was above 90 per cent. However, there has been intense 
critique of the above study regarding the unique benchmark of debt to GDP, which diminished 
the growth rate in the selected economies. For example, Herndon et al. (2014) criticised the 
above findings by reproducing the results from the same dataset. Herndon et al. noted some 
serious concerns, including some coding errors in the data. Further, they noted that some data 
for the selected case were excluded from the analysis, which eventually led to misleading 
results because the threshold changed substantially by including these data. They further noted 
that Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) used inappropriate weights for their analysis. Therefore, the 
results of Reinhart and Rogoff could be biased and misleading. Similarly, Egert (2015) 
reinvestigated the above issue of unique threshold by using the same dataset that was employed 
in the above two studies. Egert validated this criticism by confirming the weighting and data 
                                                 
32 The studies using the public-debt-overhang approach (Cecchetti et al., 2011; Reinhart et al., 2012) were also 
categorised under single-threshold approaches because they provided a single threshold of 86 per cent and 90 
per cent, respectively. Further, this criticism was also indicated in Égert (2015). 
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exclusion issues. On this specific topic, we extend the literature by providing a fiscal 
vulnerability selection approach with an appropriate level of public debt as the threshold. 
Another strand of the literature (Barnhill Jr & Kopits, 2004; Makin & Pearce, 2016; Mellor, 
1996) uses the public sector balance sheet for fiscal vulnerability analysis.33 In this field, Eisner 
and Pieper (1984) stated that gross public debt ignores the accumulation effect of financial and 
real assets, which contribute to the growing net worth of a government. 34  Consequently, 
revenue and capital expenditures are not distinguished properly in the existing literature 
(Cecchetti et al., 2011; Mauro et al., 2015; Valderrama, 2005), which widely deviates from the 
prevailing accounting theory. In this setting, applying conventional fiscal vulnerability tools to 
the private sector classifies most non-vulnerable firms as vulnerable firms (Eisner & Pieper, 
1984). Therefore, these conventional fiscal vulnerability tools are biased towards vulnerability 
(Gruber, 2016), and this is consistent with the recent studies on the Australian context (Makin 
& Pearce, 2016; Mellor, 1996). Makin and Pearce (2016) recently evaluated the balance sheet 
implications of the growing level of Australian public debt, and suggested significant fiscal 
consolidations to mitigate future fiscal risks. Similarly, Abelson (2012) pointed out that public 
debt should not be analysed separately from net public worth and net financial liabilities. 
Net public worth and net financial liabilities incorporate capital investment aspects of the 
government balance sheet. Therefore, public debt and net worth analysis present a complete 
picture of government finances. For further details, see Chapter 24—‘Government Borrowing 
and Debt’— of Abelson (2012) on pages 427 and 428. Similarly, different measures of 
government financial position have been used in the existing literature. For instance, one strand 
of literature emphasises the net public worth of the government (Bohn, 1992; Buiter, 1985; 
Mellor, 1996). The Australian Government Treasury (1999) defines net worth as the residual 
interest in the assets of a reporting entity after the deduction of its liabilities. Mellor (1996) 
suggested using change in net worth to assess the fiscal policy of a government, while Di Marco 
et al. (2009) focused on incorporating offsetting accounts in the gross public debt to assess the 
fiscal sustainability of Australia. In particular, they reported the net public debt of the 
Australian general government as an accurate measure to assess its fiscal sustainability. 
Recently, Makin and Pearce (2016) examined the net worth and financial net worth of the 
                                                 
33 The public sector balance sheet measures the fiscal performance of a country since it revealed the aggregated 
effects of imbalance in historical budgets. Considering the growing importance of the public sector balance 
sheet, the IMF has created a special task force, which is working to harmonise public sector accounting. See 
Yescombe (2011), Chapter 5: ‘The Public-Sector Investment Decision’. 
34 For further details, see Eisner and Pieper (1984), Section 1, on actual budget deficits and debts. 
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government to assess the growing level of public debt in Australia. Further, Robinson (2002) 
and Abelson (2012) included net financial liability in the list of key measures for the 
government’s financial position. Despite all these suggestions from the Australian fiscal 
literature, to the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical evidence assessing the fiscal 
sustainability of Australia using balance sheet data. Thus, this study provides this empirical 
evidence, along with the threshold level at which government policy becomes unsustainable. 
Consistent with the existing literature, the Australian general government balance sheet reveals 
that its key measures are financial assets, non-financial assets and liabilities. During the past 
two decades, researchers have started to consider these measures in the evaluation of 
government budgets, including implicit measures of government budgets (Gruber, 2016). For 
instance, Gokhale and Smetters (2003) applied intertemporal budget constraint by calculating 
the present discounted value of fiscal imbalances. They reported a long-term fiscal imbalance 
of US$44.2 trillion for the US federal government as of the end of fiscal year 2002. Based on 
their recommendations, the social security trustee adopted these measures for future programs 
(Gokhale & Smetters, 2003, 2006). A wide range of literature (Bohn, 1992; Funnell, Cooper, 
& Lee, 2012; Robinson, 2002) has recommended that these new measures are more meaningful 
in fiscal sustainability testing when fiscal balances are measured using accrual accounting 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2002), compared with the traditional cash accounting system. 
Buiter (1985) provided the public sector’s intertemporal budget identity by using the expected 
rates of return on all assets of the public sector. Here, the present value of the exhaustive current 
spending programme provides complete detail of the net worth of the public sector. This 
includes public sector assets, the present value of taxes, the present value of seigniorage and 
the present value of public sector capital formation. However, two components should be 
excluded to determine the intertemporal budget identity. These two components are public 
sector debt and the present value of terminal net liabilities. This intertemporal budget identity 
of the public sector indicates that the growing public debt has two implications for the public 
sector balance sheet. These implications are channelled through changes in the public worth of 
the country. The public debt to finance budget deficits deteriorates the balance sheet of the 
country. Conversely, the public debt improves the balance sheet if it is used for public 
investment purposes. In the latter case, the government can repay the debt along with debt 
services through means other than taxation. This association between growing public debt and 
the government balance sheet needs to be incorporated in fiscal sustainability analysis (Abelson, 
2012; Mellor, 1996). 
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Similarly, Hemming and Partie (2002) stated that the structure of debt is important in assessing 
the fiscal sustainability of the government. They further emphasised that, if a government has 
some sizable financial assets, then net financial assets are more relevant than gross public 
debt.35 For these reasons, the public sector balance sheet—a much-neglected macro-fiscal 
measure (Makin & Pearce, 2016, p. 2)—should not be ignored in this analysis. We incorporated 
this aspect in the fourth step of our fiscal vulnerability selection procedure.36 The approach of 
financial net worth has two main issues.37  First, it is observed that the negative value of 
financial net worth is increasing substantially in developed economies, especially after the 
recent GFC. For example, the average value of financial net worth in OECD economies had 
increased to ˗65 per cent of GDP in 2013, compared with the pre-crisis value of ˗38.1 per cent. 
Second, most developing and emerging economies do not have relevant available data. In 
particular, data on non-financial assets and liabilities are not available for most developing and 
emerging economies.38 
Considering these issues, one possibility to incorporate non-financial assets in fiscal 
vulnerability analysis is to use the worst-case value of financial net worth (Barnhill Jr & Kopits, 
2004), since data on non-financial assets for most emerging and developing economies are 
unavailable. We could not find any study on this topic, except Barnhill Jr and Kopits (2004).39 
However, the recent data on financial net worth indicate that this technique cannot be applied 
as a standalone approach to identify public finance vulnerability. Among many concerns, one 
of the key issues is that the exact proportion of financial and non-financial assets cannot be 
                                                 
35 Hemming and Partie (2002) further stated that contingent liabilities should be included in fiscal vulnerability 
analysis. Contingent liabilities can be categorised into explicit and implicit. Explicit contingent liabilities 
include indemnities, guarantees and warranties of a government. Implicit contingent liabilities include any 
potential obligation of a government to bail out any insolvent units, including lower-level governments, 
financial institutions and public enterprises. 
36 See Figure 5.2 in Chapter 5. 
37 The financial net worth approach is also discussed as an alternative approach. We applied financial net worth 
in our fiscal vulnerability selection procedure to incorporate the investment aspect in debt analysis, which aligns 
with Abelson (2012) and Gruber (2016). As an alternative approach, financial net worth is used as a standalone 
technique. However, we used financial net worth (value at risk and conditional value at risk) in both cases. 
38 For further details on this aspect, see OECD (2015). 
39 Mellor (1996) and Makin and Pearce (2016) are two relevant studies. These studies used the balance sheet 
measures of the public sector. However, these studies did not discuss the use of value at risk or conditional value 
at risk in the public sector balance sheet. Mellor (1996) suggested that the Australian government new proposed 
reporting (accrual reporting) should be complemented with an accrual planning and budgeting regime, which 
would ensure that financial performance is planned and assessed on similar bases. This study proposed using 
change in net worth to assess the fiscal policy of the Australian government. Makin and Pearce (2016) evaluated 
the balance sheet implication of the growing level of Australian public debt and suggested significant fiscal 
consolidations to mitigate future fiscal risks. Theoretically, the public sector balance sheet measures the fiscal 




identified (Backus, Brainard, Smith, & Tobin, 1980). This proportion varies from country to 
country, and governments can use the income from non-financial assets—including land, 
public trading enterprises or other property—to pay their debt obligations (Abelson, 2012, p. 
427). Among the alternative approaches, the fiscal vulnerability index approach—as noted in 
Baldacci et al. (2011)—is also based on the homogeneous assumption, since the z-score is 
constructed from the sample mean of public debt to GDP across the country. Conversely, the 
behaviour of the fiscal variable of individual countries in the sample is country specific. 
Therefore, this approach provides inconsistent results in different samples. Classification and 
regression-tree approaches attempt to define a rule of thumb for each of the fiscal variables to 
assess fiscal vulnerability. However, the main problem with the above approaches is linked 
with general and single-value estimates for a group of emerging economies. 
In the current study, we initially used a Bohn-type model, assuming an uncertain environment 
in all 53 economies. However, previous studies exclusively relying on this approach were 
unable to correctly identify some vulnerable economies. For instance, Khan and Saqib (2007) 
reported that the fiscal balances of Pakistan had remained sustainable in the long term and in 
the recent past. Our results based on this approach were consistent with these findings. 
Nevertheless, this model presumes that economic time series can be modelled as belonging to 
a number of distinct regimes, where the regimes are characterised by different conditional 
distributions of the process. Hence, our proposed measure allowed for flexibility in model 
parameters through regime-switching behaviour, where the model assumed that the behaviour 
of the parameter of public debt changes once its series enters a different regime. Consequently, 
our proposed techniques identified the Pakistan economy as vulnerable to debt crisis at a 
critical level of 73.29 per cent of public debt to GDP. Applying a single threshold of 90 per 
cent of public debt to GDP, as proposed in Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), is also misleading 
because the public debt of Pakistan has never moved beyond 90 per cent over the last three 
decades. Thus, the results of the first approach, as given in Khan and Saqib (2007), can be 
misleading when the sample for the period of vulnerability is pooled with non-vulnerability. 
We addressed these issues in our proposed fiscal vulnerability approaches. The next section 




2.3 Fiscal Consolidation and Banking Stability 
This subsection presents the literature on the linkages between fiscal consolidation and banking 
stability. The effect of fiscal policy shocks on macroeconomic variables is well documented, 
especially for developed countries.40 For instance, Giuliodori and Beetsma (2004) used vector 
auto-regression (VAR) methodology to analyse the spillover effects of fiscal policy shocks in 
European countries using data from 1970 to 1998. They reported that fiscal expansion in some 
of these countries—such as France, Italy and Germany—led to a significant increase in imports 
from a number of other European countries. Perotti (2005) applied a structural VAR (SVAR) 
approach to analyse the effect of fiscal shocks on prices, interest rates and GDP in five OECD 
countries, using quarterly data from 1960 to 2003. This study reported the small effect of fiscal 
policy on these variables. Laxton, Mursula, Clinton, and Kumhof (2010) presented a view of 
short-term pain and long-term gain. This study evaluated the costs and benefits of fiscal 
consolidation using a simulation based on the Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal Model 
(GIMF—the IMF global dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model). This study suggested 
that a well-targeted permanent reduction in budget deficits leads to a considerable increase in 
both the level of output and growth rate. Likewise, the nexus between monetary policy and 
bank balance sheets is also well documented (Hosono & Miyakawa, 2014; Kashyap & Stein, 
2000). For instance, Kashyap and Stein (2000) analysed the effect of monetary policy on banks’ 
lending. They used quarterly data of US commercial banks from 1976 to 1993 and reported 
that the effect of monetary policy on banks’ lending was much stronger for the banks with less 
liquid balance sheets. 
However, the previous literature lacks an exploration of the channels through which fiscal 
consolidation affects banking stability. Angeloni, Faia, and Winkler (2011) analysed the 
influence of three alternative public debt consolidation policies on the stability of the banking 
sector. Their approach was based on debt consolidation policies, and the focus of the paper was 
on the composition and consequences of fiscal adjustment for banking stability. However, this 
paper did not propose any empirical test to determine the linkage between fiscal consolidation 
and banking stability. 
                                                 
40 See Blanchard and Perotti (2002); Mountford and Uhlig (2009); and Aghion, Hemous, and Kharroubi (2014). 
26 
 
Recently, Cimadomo et al. (2014) analysed the effect of fiscal consolidation on banking 
stability for 17 developed economies.41 Their analysis was limited to only those economies for 
which the newly compiled database on fiscal consolidation proposed by Devries et al. (2011) 
was available. Cimadomo et al. (2014) reported that Tier-1 capital ratio increased by 1.5 per 
cent as a result of one per cent of GDP fiscal consolidation in two years.42 Further, they reported 
that this improvement was due to portfolio rebalancing. In short, specific empirical evidence 
on the influence of fiscal consolidation on banking sector stability is only available in 
Cimadomo et al. (2014). Therefore, we located the relevant literature on the linkage between 
fiscal consolidation and banking stability, and classified this literature in three groups. This 
classification linked different parts of the literature, including higher banking cost through 
persistent fiscal vulnerability as a result of higher sovereign risks. 
Several studies have been conducted on the responses of GDP growth, private investment and 
private consumption to substantial changes in fiscal stance.43 However, the linkage between 
fiscal consolidation and financial markets has been overlooked in the existing fiscal literature, 
although a few studies have covered some of the related aspects. For instance, Adrangi and 
Allender (1998) empirically investigated the effect of high budget deficits on stock prices in 
the vector autoregressive framework. This study was conducted in some industrialised 
economies using monthly data from 1974 to 1995.44 A Granger causality test and impulse 
response functions reported inverse relations between budget deficit and stock return, 
especially in the US. Agca and Igan (2013) analysed the transmission of default risk premium 
in the corporate bond and stock market.45 
Ardagna (2009) studied the behaviour of financial markets against fiscal consolidation. This 
study used a panel of OECD countries from 1960 to 2002, and reported two key aspects: (i) a 
decline in stock market prices in the period of loose fiscal policy and (ii) a rise in stock market 
prices during the period of substantial fiscal tightening. This study further reported that these 
results depend on the initial fiscal position of each country, as well as the type of fiscal 
                                                 
41 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, the UK and the US. 
42 Tier-1 capital ratio is a widely used measure of banking stability. 
43 For example, Giavazzi and Pagano (1990); McDermott and Wescott (1996); Alesina and Perotti (1997); 
Alesina and Ardagna (1998); Giavazzi, Jappelli, and Pagano (2000); and Ardagna (2004). 
44 The US, France, Germany and Japan. 
45 They reported that, as a result of fiscal consolidation, the default risk premium arising from sovereign debt 
will be reduced. Consequently, the market will expect improved economic performance. This improvement in 
the lower cost of credit is transmitted to the corporate debt market and stock market. 
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consolidation.46 For instance, if fiscal consolidation occurs in a period of high public debt and 
causes a substantial and permanent decrease in debt level, then stock prices will rise because 
of the lower perceived risk premium. Ardagna (2009) provided the only study that documents 
the reaction of financial markets to fiscal consolidation. In this context, we attempted to classify 
the existing literature in a way that indicates the association between the different components 
of fiscal and financial sectors. This led us to the gaps in this literature. The existing literature 
can be classified into three distinct groups: (i) fiscal vulnerability, sovereign risks and bank 
costs; (ii) sovereign defaults and bank balance sheets; and (iii) fiscal consolidation and banking 
stability. Table 2.2 summarises the classified literature in these three distinct groups. 
Summarising Table 2.2, sovereign defaults are transmitted into the banking sector because of 
the bank holdings of the defaulted government. Further, this transmission mechanism operates 
through sovereign downgrades, stress between the public and financial sector, borrowing costs, 
the direct balance sheet effect, and asset channels. The existing literature describes capital 
adequacy ratios (Tier-1 capital ratio and total capital ratio) as the most suitable approach to 
measure banking stability (Bank for International Settlements, 2017). 
 
                                                 
46 Hemming and Petrie (2002) indicated the weak initial fiscal position as a key indicator of fiscal vulnerability. 
They further reported a set of fiscal position indicators of fiscal vulnerability. This set included insufficient 
balance sheet information, poor accounting and control, significant quasi-fiscal activities, and sizable uncovered 
contingent liabilities. Also see Hemming and Petrie (2000).  
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Table 2.2: Literature on Fiscal Consolidation and Banking Stability   
Study Technique Country/countries Context Conclusion/findings 










A panel of 25 emerging 
market economies, 
including Argentina (10), 
Brazil (10), Bulgaria 
(10), Chile (5), Colombia 
(7), Croatia (5), Ecuador 
(9), Egypt (3), El 
Salvador (2), Malaysia 
(8), Mexico (10), 
Morocco (6), Pakistan 
(1), Panama (8), Peru 
(7), the Philippines (6), 
Russia (6), South Africa 
(9), Thailand (7), Tunisia 
(2), Turkey (8), Ukraine 
(4), Uruguay (3) and 
Venezuela (10). 
The objectives of this 
study were to: (i) 
examine the effect of 
fiscal policy on the 
sovereign risk spread 
and (ii) investigate the 
effect of the 
interaction of fiscal 
variables with political 
institutions on 
financial markets. 
The study indicated that debt-financed spending 
results in higher sovereign risk, while tax-financed 
spending results in lower risk, indicating that 
international investors prefer tax-financed spending. 
Further, this study provided evidence that the 
reaction of financial markets to fiscal policy 
depends on the political institutions. 





the effect of 
sovereign risk on 
the cost of bank 
funding. 
A sample of 534 
unsecured fixed-rate 
senior bonds from a total 
116 banks from 
advanced economies. 
Sovereign debt has 
lost its risk-free status 
in some economies. In 
this context, this report 
evaluates the effect of 
sovereign risk 
concerns on the cost 





Investors’ concerns about sovereign risk have 
increased, especially in the Eurozone, and bank 
funding costs have subsequently risen sharply. 
Sovereign risk affects the cost and availability of 
bank funding through four key channels: (i) asset 
channel holding of sovereign debt and its derivative 
positions have direct effects on bank balance sheets 
and profitability, (ii) reduction in the value of 
collateral, (iii) sovereign downgrades tend to lower 
the rating of domestic banks and (iv) reduced 
benefits from explicit and implicit government 
guarantees. 
    continued…. 
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This study analysed 
the behaviour of the 
corporate borrowing 
costs of emerging 
markets against 
sovereign debt. 
This study reported that the yield spread increased 
by nine per cent as a result of one standard 
deviation increase in the public external debt. 
Sovereign defaults increased corporate borrowing 
costs; however, this cost was seven times higher in 
countries that had already experienced sovereign 
defaults in the past, compared with those that had 
not.  
Sovereign defaults and bank balance sheets 
IMF (2002) Descriptive using 
1/T = 1999 as the 
event for the case 
of Ecuador and 
Pakistan, and I/T 
= 1998 for the 
case of Russia and 
Ukraine. 
(i) Russia and Ecuador: 
the governments decided 
to default on all or part 
of their debts. (ii) 
Pakistan and Ukraine: 
the governments 
restructured terms with 
creditors under the 
shadow of default. 
This study provided 
evidence on the effect 
of sovereign debt 
restructuring on the 
domestic economy 
using four specific 
cases. 
Sovereign defaults first transmit into bank balance 
sheets and then spill over into corporations and 
households through: (i) general economic distress, 
(ii) reducing the net present value of the 
restructured debt and (iii) exchange rates. In this 
context, this study indicated the key role of the 
banking system in propagating these crises 
throughout the economy. The key concluding 
remark was that the ripple effect of sovereign debt 
crisis is higher if a significant portion of 
restructured debt is held with residents, particularly 
with banks. This study proposed an alternative to 
deal with sovereign default using swift 
recapitalisation to strengthen the bank’s balance 
sheet. This could prevent the defaults from 
propagating into other sectors of the economy. 
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study used a 
fixed-effects 
model. 




are costly because 
they destroy the 




increase their leverage, 
which makes them 
more vulnerable to 
sovereign defaults. 
This is most likely to 
be in economies where 
financial institutions 
are more developed 
and banks hold more 
government securities. 
Recent historical facts reveal a close linkage 
between sovereign defaults and private financial 
markets. 
Brutti (2011) Panel regression 




manufacturing sectors in 
a cross-section of 59 
developing economies.  
This study reported a 
direct linkage between 
sovereign debt crises 
and (i) liquidity crises 
and (ii) financial 
turmoil.  
In emerging markets, sovereign debt crises are 
usually associated with liquidity and banking crises. 
Along these lines, this study emphasised the direct 
linkage between sovereign defaults and liquidity 
crises based on two key assumptions: (i) 
government securities are the key source of 
liquidation for the domestic private sector and (ii) 
the government is unable to discriminate between 











This paper analysed 
the access of emerging 
markets’ private credit 
to international debt 
markets during 
sovereign debt crises. 
This study reported that sovereign defaults result in 
a statistically significant decline in foreign credit to 
the private sector: (i) during sovereign defaults and 
(ii) for over two years after restructuring the 
agreements. This study further reported that this 
effect is concentrated in the non-financial sector of  
    continued… 
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    emerging economies, where exporting and non-
exporting sectors behave differently. Further, the 







Thirty-seven economies. This study aimed to 
explore the joint effect 
of expected 
government support to 
banks and sovereign 
credit rating changes 
on bank stock returns. 
This study indicated that sovereign credit rating 
downgrades have a negative (large) effect on the 
stock returns of those banks that receive stronger 
support from their respective governments. In this 
context, the effect is stronger in advanced 
economies, since governments are in a better 
position to provide support. Further, this study 
suggested that stock market investors perceive a 
connection between domestic banks and sovereigns. 







data of 17 selected 
economies for which the 
IMF fiscal consolidation 
database constructed in 
Devries et al. (2011) was 
available. 
To empirically 
investigate the effect 
of fiscal consolidation 
on banking sector 
stability. 
This study indicated that fiscal consolidation is 
associated with improved banking sector stability, 
mainly driven by commercial banks. More directly, 
a fiscal consolidation of one percentage point 
results in an increase in Tier-1 capital ratio of 1.5 
percentage points for median banks in the selected 
17 economies. The results further suggested that 
improvement in the capital adequacy ratio is due to 
portfolio rebalancing from private securities to 
government securities. Specifically, the findings of 
this study suggest that fiscal consolidation of one 
per cent reduces the ratio of private to total 





A rare events 
logistic regression 
model, as well as 
the traditional 
probit and logit  
A panel of 17 
economies. 
This paper aimed to 
investigate the effect 
of fiscal consolidation 
on the likelihood of 
financial reforms. 
This study reported that large austerity plans 
(mainly implemented through cuts on spending, 
rather than tax hikes) are associated with promoting 
financial reforms. Specifically, banking sector 
reforms are mainly promoted during tax-driven 
    continued… 
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 models.   fiscal consolidation, while domestic finance reforms 
are promoted during spending cuts–driven 
consolidation. Further, this study reported that a 
lower degree of trade openness, higher inflation, 
deterioration of financial conditions and fall in 
degree of competitiveness enhance the probability 





Probit model and 
annual data for a 
panel of 
economies. 






This study indicated that debt crises trigger 
financial reforms where: (i) sovereign debt 
restructuring and IMF stabilisation programs favour 
the implementation of financial reforms, (ii) 
financial reforms are more likely to occur when 
general economic conditions deteriorate and (iii) 
financial reforms are positively associated with the 









This study aimed to 
analyse the spillover 
effects of sovereign 
rating news on the 
financial markets of 
Europe. 
The results of this study indicated that sovereign 
rating downgrades have significant (statistically and 
economically) spillover effects across financial 
markets, as well as economies. The sign and 
magnitude of the spillover effect depend on: (i) the 
type of announcement and (ii) the rating agency. 
Further, they observed that the downgrades near 
speculative grade rating have systematic spillover 
effects across the Eurozone economies. 
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Following our classification in Table 2.2, the synthesised discussion on the relationship 
between fiscal consolidation and banking stability was classified into three distinct subsections: 
(i) fiscal vulnerability, sovereign risks and banks cost; (ii) sovereign defaults and balance sheets; 
and (iii) the linkage between fiscal consolidation and banking stability. 
2.3.1 Fiscal Vulnerability, Sovereign Risks and Cost to the Banking Sector 
Investors’ concerns about sovereign risk have increased, especially in the Eurozone, and bank 
funding costs have subsequently risen sharply (see Panetta et al., 2011). On this topic, Akitoby 
and Stratmann (2008) evaluated that debt-financed spending is closely associated with 
sovereign risk, as compared with tax-financed spending. More specifically, this study 
examined the effect of fiscal policy on the sovereign risk spread through investigating the 
interaction of fiscal variables with political institutions on financial markets. However, this 
study only used a sample of emerging economies, which are expected to behave differently to 
developed economies. Moreover, in this classification, the initial fiscal position and type of 
fiscal consolidation is expected to be significant, as indicated in Ardagna (2009). There is a 
substantial lack of empirical literature on this topic, where specific study has been undertaken 
on classified economies based on fiscal vulnerability analysis. Ardagna (2009) is the only study 
with a specific focus on long-term interest rates and stock prices using a panel of OECD 
economies.47 The key findings in this study related to long-term interest rates, which are also 
used in the theoretical framework of our study. 
Ardagna (2009) stated that the long-term interest rates on public securities decrease if the fiscal 
position of a country improves. In particular, this effect is obvious if the economy was 
vulnerable before. Theoretically, the interest rates on government securities are expected to 
have a significant effect on the interest rates charges of other private securities (see Barr & 
Campbell, 1997). Ardagna (2009) estimated the expected future real interest rates and the 
inflation rates from the observed prices of government bonds in the United Kingdom (UK). 
Investigating this same topic, Barr and Campbell (1997) used index-linked bonds, and 
accounted for the imperfections in the indexation of UK index-linked bonds. They reported 
that the expected long-term returns on all types of bonds were almost equal, and the expected 
real interest rates and inflation were linked with the bond prices. This study provided sufficient 
evidence that interest rates on private securities are linked with government securities. 
                                                 
47 This panel included Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, the UK and the US.  
34 
 
However, these rates of returns on private and government securities are different where the 
return on private securities is more than for government securities because of the difference in 
return (Brealey, Myers, Allen, & Mohanty, 2012).48 On this topic, Akitoby and Stratmann 
(2008) evaluated whether vulnerability increases sovereign risk, which is the key reason for 
increasing long-term interest rates through a higher sovereign risk premium. This linkage has 
empirical evidence from Agca and Igan (2013). Specifically, Agca and Igan (2013) analysed 
the mediatory role of default risk premium as a result of fiscal consolidation episodes, which 
is closely related to the empirical investigation of our study (Chapter 6, Section 6.4). Further, 
Agca and Igan (2013) reported that the default risk premium arising from sovereign debt 
reduces as a result of fiscal consolidation. Consequently, the market will expect improved 
economic performance. This improvement of a lower cost of credit is transmitted to the 
corporate debt market and stock market. 
This general concern of investors focused on the banking sector particularly after the recent 
debt crises.49 Over the last couple of years, the major debt crises in European economies have 
increased investors’ concerns about sovereign risk, which has been transmitted into bank 
funding costs. Along these lines, we found the three most relevant studies on the transmission 
mechanism between sovereign risks and banking costs (Ağca & Celasun, 2012; Borensztein & 
Panizza, 2009; Panetta et al., 2011). Among these studies, Borensztein and Panizza (2009) 
applied regression analysis to evaluate the economic costs through financial systems associated 
with sovereign defaults. For this purpose, the study focused on banking costs using data from 
149 selected economies. Specifically, Borensztein and Panizza (2009) empirically evaluated 
the four key costs associated with sovereign defaults: (i) reputational costs, (ii) political costs, 
(iii) international trade exclusion costs and (iv) economic costs through the financial system. 
This regression analysis reported that the sovereign defaults increased the probability of a 
banking crisis by approximately 11 percentage points. Similarly, this study analysed indirect 
costs of sovereign defaults on other sectors of the economy.50 Similarly, credit rating and 
borrowing costs were affected in two distinct ways: (i) credit rating had a negative effect of 
about one notch in the three years after the default and (ii) borrowing costs increased by 250 to 
400 basis points in the two years after the default.  
                                                 
48 See the chapters on risk and return of Brealey, Myers, Allen, and Mohanty (2012) for more discussion on the 
topic.  
49 See Lane (2012) for more discussion on the European sovereign debt crisis and banking costs.  
50 For example, there was also a negative effect of sovereign defaults on GDP growth, ranging from 0.6 to 2.5 
percentage points. However, its effect disappeared in the next year of sovereign default. 
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Panetta et al. (2011) analysed a sample of 534 unsecured fixed-rate senior bonds from 116 
banks from advanced economies. This study first elaborated different channels of banking costs 
through descriptive statistics. Subsequently, the study evaluated the effect of sovereign risk on 
the cost of bank funding through regression analysis. Interestingly, it was observed over the 
last couple of years that sovereign debt has lost its risk-free status in some economies. 
Nonetheless, there have been a few studies on this aspect of sovereign debt. In this context, 
Panetta et al. (2011) evaluated the effect of sovereign risk concerns on the cost and availability 
of bank funding conditions.  
More directly, investors’ concerns about sovereign risk have increased particularly in the 
Eurozone, since sovereign debt has lost its risk-free status in different economies. 
Consequently, bank funding costs have risen sharply. Sovereign risk affects the cost and 
availability of bank funding through four key channels: 
1. the asset channel holding of sovereign debt and its derivative positions have direct 
effects on bank balance sheets and profitability 
2. sovereign downgrades tend to lower the rating of domestic banks 
3. sovereign risk has affected banking costs through reduction in the value of collateral 
4. sovereign risk has affected bank costs through reduced benefits from explicit and 
implicit government guarantees. 
This analysis further revealed that the economic costs of the banking sector are generally 
significant, yet short lived. 
Similarly, Ağca and Celasun (2012) analysed the borrowing costs behaviour of the overall 
corporate sector against sovereign debt. The portion of the banking sector in the overall 
corporate sector varies from country to country. For instance, this portion is significantly higher 
in India than in other emerging economies.51 Using data from 15 emerging economies, Agca 
and Celasun (2012) applied panel regression analysis with fixed effects, and empirically 
investigated the borrowing costs behaviour of the overall corporate sector against sovereign 
debt. The key finding of this study was that sovereign defaults have increased corporate 
borrowing costs. Nonetheless, corporate borrowing costs behave differently in different 
economies depending on their defaults in the past. For instance, Agca and Celasun (2012) 
indicated that this cost was seven times higher in countries that had already experienced 
                                                 
51 See Damji (2012) for further discussion on the banking sector of India.  
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sovereign defaults in the past, compared with those that had not. Further, this study reported 
that the yield spread increased by nine per cent as a result of one standard deviation increase in 
public external debt. In summary, fiscal vulnerability has transmitted into banks’ borrowing 
costs through higher sovereign risks. The next section of the classified literature presents a 
synthesised discussion on the extension of this link to bank balance sheets. 
2.3.2 Sovereign Defaults and Bank Balance Sheets 
Government defaults have associated costs, with the key costs based on the fact that these 
defaults destroy the balance sheets of domestic banks (Gennaioli et al., 2014, p. 819). Most of 
the studies in this field were conducted after the recent financial crisis of 2007 to 2009, except 
for the study by the IMF (2002).52 In this strand of literature, the IMF (2002) studied the four 
different cases of Russia, Ecuador, Pakistan and Ukraine. The governments of Russia and 
Ecuador decided to default on all or part of their debt, while the governments of Pakistan and 
Ukraine restructured the terms with creditors under the shadow of default. For this purpose, the 
IMF (2002) used the period of 1999 for the case of Ecuador and Pakistan, and 1998 for the 
case of Russia and Ukraine. 
The key findings of this study elaborated the linkage between sovereign defaults and bank 
balance sheets. For instance, this study evaluated whether sovereign defaults first transmit into 
bank balance sheets and then spill over into corporations and households. In this context, the 
IMF (2002) provided three channels of transmission: (i) exchange rates, (ii) general economic 
distress and (iii) reducing the net present value of the restructured debt. Among these channels, 
the third channel was expected to have a significant effect on bank balance sheets. This study 
further indicated the key role of the banking system in propagating crises throughout the 
economy. In this transmission mechanism, the holding of government securities affects bank 
balance sheets (see Dinç, 2005). Along these lines, the IMF (2002) further revealed that the 
effect of sovereign debt crises is higher if a significant portion of restructured debt is held by 
domestic banks. This study proposed an alternative to deal with sovereign default by using 
swift recapitalisation to strengthen the bank’s balance sheet. This could prevent the defaults 
from propagating into other sectors of the economy. 
Further on this transmission mechanism, bank-specific characteristics and fundamentals play a 
significant role in individual banks’ exposure to government default risk and currency, as 
                                                 
52 These studies included Arteta and Hale (2008); Barajas, Basco, Juan-Ramon, and Quarracino (2007); Brutti 
(2011); Correa et al. (2014); and Gennaioli et al. (2014). 
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indicated in Barajas et al. (2007, p. 621). In particular, Barajas et al. (2007) provided useful 
channels of transmission on sovereign defaults and bank balance sheets through analysing the 
Argentine crisis. This descriptive analysis was based on several factors, including: 
1. the balance sheet position of Argentine banks at different times, including January 1995 
and September 200153 
2. the bank financing of the government 
3. intermediation activities 
4. deposit growth 
5. cross-bank variations. 
Among these factors, the first component provides more information on our main theme for 
this subsection. Another key finding of Barajas et al. (2007) was the variation in behaviours of 
banks during crises. This variation is possible because of a few banking fundaments, including 
profitability ratio, liquidity ratio and efficiency ratio.54 This panel data estimation also revealed 
that depositors distinguish banks based on risks, which aligns with the theory of risk and return 
(see Brealey et al., 2012). In general, bank-specific characteristics and fundamentals play a 
significant role in individual banks’ exposure to government default risk and currency. 
Similarly, Arteta and Hale (2008) analysed the access of emerging markets’ private credit to 
international debt markets during sovereign debt crises. Using a sample of 30 emerging 
economies, this study applied panel regression analysis with fixed effects to empirically 
investigate the access of private credit to the international debt market.55 Arteta and Hale (2008) 
reported that sovereign defaults have a statistically significant negative effect on foreign credit 
extended to the private sector. More specifically, this study indicated the specific period of this 
negative effect. For instance, this effect was severe during sovereign defaults. Then, this effect 
vanished after two years because of restructuring the agreements.  Additionally, this analysis 
revealed that this effect was concentrated in the non-financial sector of emerging economies, 
where exporting and non-exporting sectors behave differently. In this relationship, debt 
restructuring agreements are important because the magnitude of the effect depends on these 
agreements.  
                                                 
53 January 1995 was the beginning of the sample period used in Barajas et al. (2007), while September 2001 was 
the period immediately after the Argentine crisis. 
54 See Nissim and Penman (2001) for more information on the accounting ratios.  
55 The focus of this study was the access of private credit by emerging economies during a crisis period. 
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Sovereign debt crisis, liquidity crisis and financial turmoil have some linkage because all these 
crises are related to banks. Brutti (2011) provided very specific empirical evidence on this 
linkage. Through using data from 28 manufacturing sectors in a cross-section of 59 developing 
economies, this study applied a panel regression analysis for this empirical investigation. The 
study focused on the direct channel through which sovereign defaults are transmitted into the 
banking sector.56 Brutti (2011) reported that the direct channel works because of two key 
assumptions. First, government securities are the key source of liquidation for the domestic 
private sector. Second, the government is unable to discriminate between domestic and foreign 
creditors in the case of default. In general, the holding of government securities is the key factor 
behind the direct channel through which government defaults are transmitted into bank balance 
sheets.57 
Another perspective on this linkage is sovereign credit rating and government support to banks. 
Sovereign defaults are less likely to transmit into the banking sector if the banking sector is 
supported by the government. In this regard, Correa et al. (2014) explored the joint effect of 
expected government support to banks and sovereign credit rating changes on bank stock 
returns using a traditional event study methodology for 37 economies. The results of this study 
indicated that sovereign credit rating downgrades have a large negative effect on the stock 
returns of those banks that receive stronger support from their respective governments. Further, 
the researchers analysed the difference between these effects on developing and developed 
economies, and the results suggested that this effect is stronger in advanced economies because 
governments are in a better position to provide support. Interestingly, one of the key findings 
of this study was that investors in the stock market used to perceive the linkage between 
sovereign defaults and domestic banks. 
Recently, Gennaioli et al. (2014) investigated the capital structure of banks and the reaction of 
banks to sovereign defaults in the presence of high leverage. For this purpose, the study applied 
a fixed-effects model on a panel of 20 emerging and developed economies. The results of this 
study revealed a close association between sovereign defaults and financial markets. Gennaioli 
et al. (2014) evaluated that banks with high leverage become more vulnerable, especially when 
                                                 
56 For a discussion on the indirect channel, see Cimadomo et al. (2014). Also see Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2012) for empirical evidence from the US treasury bills. 
57 Along these lines, Hemming et al. (2003) empirically investigated whether the change in the net claims of the 
banking sector from the government contributed significantly to past crises. 
39 
 
they hold more government securities. Summarising this discussion, government defaults are 
costly because they destroy the balance sheets of domestic banks. 
2.3.3 Fiscal Consolidation and Banking Stability 
The above literature review has determined that government defaults are costly because they 
destroy bank balance sheets. In this interaction, fiscal consolidation plays a significant role by 
mitigating sovereign risk. This subsection of the literature review presents a synthesised 
discussion of this topic. A few studies have investigated the transmission mechanism between 
sovereign defaults and bank balance sheets (Arteta & Hale, 2008; Barajas et al., 2007; Brutti, 
2011; Correa et al., 2014; Gennaioli et al., 2014). Both of these components are closely 
associated with fiscal consolidation and banking stability. For instance, fiscal consolidation is 
defined as any measure implemented with the intention to reduce the government budget deficit 
(Cimadomo et al., 2014, p. 79). Therefore, fiscal consolidation directly reduces sovereign risk 
and is transmitted into bank balance sheets. Despite this close linkage, there is a substantial 
lack of literature on the linkage between fiscal consolidation and the specific segment of the 
bank balance sheet, which is used as a key indicator of banking stability by financial regulatory 
bodies. These indicators are the key predictors of bank failures (Cimadomo et al., 2014, p. 76). 
Further, the Bank for International Settlements and other regulatory bodies use both of these 
key measures to measure banking stability.58 
In regard to this linkage, we found only five studies (Agnello et al., 2015a, 2015b; Ardagna, 
2009; Arezki et al., 2011; Cimadomo et al., 2014), and all these studies were conducted in 
developed economies. Ardagna (2009) was the first study to investigate the effect of large fiscal 
consolidation on financial market behaviour, using a traditional event study methodology on a 
panel of OECD economies. However, this study focused on the behaviour of stock prices. The 
key finding of Ardagna (2009) in relation to the current thesis was that the effect of fiscal 
consolidation depends on the initial fiscal position of the country. Similarly, Arezki et al. (2011) 
analysed the spillover effects of sovereign rating news on European financial markets. This 
study used credit default swaps and Greece credit rating announcements, along with VAR 
methodology. The relevant key finding was that sovereign rating downgrades have statistically 
significant spillover effects across financial markets and economies. Nonetheless, the 
magnitude of the spillover effect depends on the type of agency. 
                                                 




In line with Ardagna (2009), Agnello et al. (2015a) investigated the ‘crisis-induced reform’ 
hypothesis by applying a probit model on the annual data from a panel of non-OECD 
economies.59 This study indicated that debt crises trigger financial reforms depending on the 
initial fiscal conditions.60 This same group of researchers conducted a similar study (Agnello 
et al., 2015b) to investigate the effect of fiscal consolidation on the likelihood of financial 
reforms. By applying a rare events logistic regression model, as well as the traditional probit 
and logit models, on a panel of 17 economies, this study reported that large austerity plans are 
associated with promoting financial reforms. More directly, large austerity plans implemented 
through cuts on spending have significant effects, compared with tax hikes. The final study in 
this context (Cimadomo et al., 2014) analysed the influence of fiscal consolidation on banking 
stability in 17 developed economies, for which the newly compiled database on fiscal 
consolidation proposed by Devries et al. (2011) was available. The results of this study 
indicated that Tier-1 capital ratio increased by 1.5 per cent as a result of one per cent of GDP 
fiscal consolidation in two years. Additionally, the researchers reported that this improvement 
was due to portfolio rebalancing. 
2.4 Literature Gaps and Remedies 
We aimed to improve the existing literature in a few ways to overcome the issues in the fiscal 
vulnerability analysis literature and fiscal consolidation and banking stability literature. First, 
the available techniques are unable to identify the short-term episodes of fiscal vulnerability, 
especially when applied on a large sample of economies. We overcame this issue by extending 
the fiscal vulnerability analysis to a subsample through forward, backward and moving 
screening processes and threshold regression. 61  The single-threshold approach provides a 
straightforward cut-off of 90 per cent public debt to GDP, beyond which public debt may lead 
towards debt crises.62 In a single-threshold framework, the main criticism is the assumption of 
debt–growth association across countries. Therefore, we included a country-specific threshold 
in our proposed fiscal vulnerability selection approaches. The existing literature has not 
incorporated the investment aspect of public debt in the fiscal vulnerability analysis. We 
                                                 
59 We extended this analysis in Chapter 8 to empirically test this phenomenon in our setting. 
60 See the final section of Table 2.2 for details on these initial fiscal conditions.  
61 See Figure 5.1 (Chapter 5) for more details on these screening processes. 
62 Ninety per cent is a common threshold used in the literature. However, some studies provided 85 per cent as a 
common threshold.  
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attempted to overcome these issues by incorporating the value-at-risk and conditional-value-
at-risk financial net worth of the country in our proposed fiscal vulnerability selection approach. 
Despite the close linkage between fiscal consolidation and the banking sector, there is a 
substantial lack of literature on the linkage between fiscal consolidation and the specific 
segment of the bank balance sheet, which is used as the key indicator of banking stability by 
financial regulatory bodies. This linkage works through sovereign risk, whereby a higher 
amount of sovereign risk increases banking costs. We further conjectured that fiscal 
consolidation rebuilds market confidence and attracts institutional investors by including 
investment securities in their investment portfolio to achieve the required adequacy ratio for 
financial stability of the banking sector. Further, we contribute to the empirical literature by 
using the Bankscope database for a large sample of developing and developed economies. 
None of the previous studies provide evidence on the varying role of fiscal consolidation in the 
banking stability of vulnerable and non-vulnerable economies. This study fills this literature 
gap by providing evidence on the role of fiscal consolidation on the capital adequacy ratio of 
the banking sector from 53 selected economies. We further extend this evidence on vulnerable 
and non-vulnerable economies. 
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has classified the existing literature into two broader categories of: (i) fiscal 
vulnerability and (ii) the transmission mechanism for fiscal consolidation and banking stability. 
We first identified the problems in the existing fiscal vulnerability techniques. For instance, 
the debt coefficient provides a single estimate over a period of time, yet the vulnerability in 
economies varies. Moreover, single-threshold and other alternative measures have associated 
issues, including the assumption of debt–growth association across countries, the increasing 
negative value of financial net worth, and ignoring the country-specific behaviour of fiscal 
variables. This study overcomes these issues through proposing a multi-approach method of 
selecting vulnerable economies. 
The next section of this chapter revealed that fiscal vulnerability has transmitted into banks’ 
borrowing costs through higher sovereign risks. This affects banking stability through 
destroying the bank balance sheet. Despite this close linkage, this literature review indicates 
that there is a substantial lack of literature examining the relationship between fiscal 
consolidation and bank balance sheets. This research extends the literature by providing 
empirical evidence from 53 selected economies. Finally, this chapter also discussed the gaps 
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in the literature and their remedies in regard to the way in which fiscal stances are transmitted 












In this chapter, we first present a segment-wise analysis of fiscal vulnerability through public 
debt evolution. We then present the transmission mechanism through which fiscal 
consolidation increases the financial stability of the banking sector through mitigating 
sovereign risk. Fiscal vulnerability for a long period has associated consequences. For instance, 
the general public—especially the expected investors of government securities—recognise this 
situation and stop buying government securities. Among these institutional investors, banks 
are the major holders of government securities and are expected to shift their portfolio from 
government securities to private securities, which deteriorates their financial stability. In this 
interaction, fiscal consolidation rebuilds their confidence and plays a role in regaining their 
capital adequacy ratios—the key measures for banking stability. To cover all these aspects, the 
rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 discusses public debt evolution and 
fiscal vulnerability. Section 3.3 elaborates the mechanism of fiscal consolidation being 
transmitted into the banking sector, and Section 3.4 concludes this chapter. 
3.2 Public Debt Evolution and Fiscal Vulnerability 
The capital and revenue components of accumulated debt have different accounting treatments, 
whereby the capital component is classified as the liability in the balance sheet, and the revenue 
components are recorded in the trading and profit-and-loss account (income statement). This 
is the case for both individual and corporate agents. However, the debt analysis of an economy 
is different because an economy never retires and essentially lives forever. In this way, debt 
analysis differentiates economies from individuals. The debt of an individual is sustainable if 
it is feasible for that individual to repay the debt over her or his life. This is why large loans to 
individuals, such as mortgage loans, are always based on the financial health of the individual 
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and are extended after ensuring the individual’s ability to repay the principle, as well as the 
interest amount, by their retirement. The debt scenario of a country is slightly different because 
an economy never retires and essentially lives forever. In this context, there is no reason that 
an economy must pay off its debts entirely. In this context, what is important for an economy 
is fiscal sustainability. 63  Therefore, the remainder of this section focuses on the fiscal 
sustainability of an economy in the framework of its debt analysis.  
Ley (2009) found that the debt analysis of an economy can be better understood through the 
evolution process of public debt, where the stock of government debt at any time includes 
historical debt (plus interest), the overall balance and the ending stock of the high-power money. 
Mathematically, this can be expressed as: 
𝑃𝐷𝑡 = (𝑃𝐷𝑡−1)(1 + 𝑖𝑡) − 𝑃𝐵𝑡 − ∆ 𝐻𝑃𝑀𝑡                (3.2.1 
where PDt, it, PBt and HPMt indicate the ending period stock of government debt, nominal 
interest rate, primary government balance and end of period stock of high-power money, 
respectively. Important in the debt analysis of any economy is fiscal sustainability, which 
indicates whether the government can service its debt. Fiscal sustainability considers the 
fulfilment of intertemporal budget constraints—specifically, whether an economy is able to 
pay the interest on its debt and honour the capital repayments when these payments are due. 
For this to be the case, we separate the debt service component from the principle amount of 
historical public debt (Equation 3.2.1) as follows: 
𝑃𝐷𝑡 = 𝑃𝐷𝑡−1⏟  
𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
− (𝑃𝐵𝑡 − 𝑖𝑡𝑃𝐷𝑡−1)⏟          
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
− ∆ 𝐻𝑃𝑀𝑡⏟    
𝑆𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒
            (3.2.2 
In Equation 3.2.2, the overall or operating balance of the public sector is either budget deficit 
or surplus, where both of these possibilities of operating balance have different economic 
consequences.64 Starting our debt analysis with budget deficit, Fischer and Easterly (1990, p. 
130) discussed different ways of financing budget deficit for an economy, which can be 
categorised as: (i) issuing new debts, (ii) through monetised or (iii) using a mix of both of these 
options.65 In this manner, a budget deficit does not help in the loan amortisation process of an 
                                                 
63 See Mankiw and Taylor (2014) for further discussion on fiscal sustainability.  
64 We discussed cases where overall balance is either less than or greater than zero. The third case is a balanced 
budget, where the overall balance is zero. In this case, only the historical amount of public debt will be rolled 
over. 




economy; therefore, the amount of public debt is rolled over: [𝑃𝐵 + ∆𝐻𝑃𝑀 < 0⏟         
𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟
].66 Similarly, 
any gross amortisation due during the time will require a rollover, unless the government 
changes its fiscal policy to achieve budget surplus. As a result, the surplus component is used 
to amortise the public debt, where the stock of public debt is reduced: [𝑃𝐵 + ∆𝐻𝑃𝑀 > 0⏟         
𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
], 
which helps achieve the fiscal sustainability of an economy. In the third possibility of overall 
balance, if 𝑃𝑏 + ∆𝐻𝑃𝑀 = 0, then 𝑃𝐷 = (1 + 𝑖)𝑃𝐷−1. 
This process of gross amortisation depends on the government’s ability to service or repay the 
public debt. This ability is quantified through a few measures, including: (i) government 
revenue, (ii) GDP and (iii) exports in the case of external debt. In this context, it is useful to 
concentrate on the ratio of public debt to a measure of scale of the economy. For this purpose, 
Equation 3.2.1 can be normalised through any of these quantitative measures; however, the 



























               (3.2.4 
In the above equations, gt and πt indicate the real growth rate and inflation rate, respectively. 
Equation 3.2.4 can be rewritten as the law of motion of the government debt-to-GDP ratio, 




− (𝑝𝑏𝑡 + ∆ℎ𝑝𝑚𝑡)               (3.2.5 






− (𝑝𝑏𝑡 + ∆ℎ𝑝𝑚𝑡)67               (3.2.6 
                                                 
Here, the revenue generated from the money printing is treated as the source of financing. See the section on 
money printing in Fischer and Easterly (1990, p. 131).  
66 See Fischer and Easterly (1990) for more details on the interaction of printing money in this context.  
67 Here, 𝜏 is the discount factor, and is defined as [(1 + rt)/(1 + gt)]. 
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𝑝𝑑𝑡 = 𝜏𝑡(𝑝𝑑𝑡−1) − (𝑝𝑏𝑡 + ∆ℎ𝑝𝑚𝑡)                (3.2.7 
Equation 3.2.7 truly represents the fundamental fiscal sustainability identity, with two 
assumptions: (i) it must be derived from the accounting identities and (ii) no behavioural 
intervention is allowed. Further, it is assumed that any seigniorage ∆ hpmt will be added in the 
pbt.
68 Thus, starting from Time 0, as given in Ley (2009), the public debt will be as follows: 
𝑝𝑑1 = 𝜏1𝑝𝑑0 − 𝑝𝑏1                  (3.2.8 
𝑝𝑑2 = 𝜏2𝑝𝑑1 − 𝑝𝑏2                  (3.2.9 
⋯ = 𝜏2[𝜏1𝑝𝑑0 − 𝑝𝑏1] − 𝑝𝑏2               (3.2.10 
 ⋯ = 𝜏2𝜏1𝑝𝑑0 − 𝜏2𝑝𝑏1 − 𝑝𝑏2              (3.2.11 
𝑝𝑑3 = 𝜏3𝑝𝑑2 − 𝑝𝑏3                (3.2.12 
⋯ = 𝜏3[𝜏2𝜏1𝑝𝑑0 − 𝜏2𝑝𝑏1 − 𝑝𝑏2] − 𝑝𝑏3             (3.2.13 
⋯ = 𝜏3𝜏2𝜏1𝑝𝑑0 − 𝜏3𝜏2𝑝𝑏1 − 𝜏3𝑝𝑏2 − 𝑝𝑏3             (3.2.14 
𝑝𝑑4 = 𝜏4𝑝𝑑3 − 𝑝𝑏4                (3.2.15 
⋯ = 𝜏4[𝜏3𝜏2𝜏1𝑝𝑑0 − 𝜏3𝜏2𝑝𝑏1 − 𝜏3𝑝𝑏2 − 𝑝𝑏3] − 𝑝𝑏4           (3.2.16 
⋮ 
𝑝𝑑𝑡 = 𝑝𝑑0∏ 𝜏𝑗
𝑡




𝑖=𝑗+1              (3.2.17 
To use Equation 3.2.17 for an analysis of more than five years, we can assume the constant 
discount factor and the balances, where this simplified version of Equation 3.2.17 can be 
interpreted as an average. By dropping the time superscripts from τ and pb: 
𝑝𝑑𝑡 = 𝑝𝑑0𝜏
𝑡 − 𝑝𝑏∑ 𝜏𝑖𝑡−1𝑖=0                (3.2.18 
In public debt analysis, Equation 3.2.18 can be used for different purposes—for example, if a 
country wishes to achieve its target of debt ratio, ?̅?, over a specific period. Target debt helps 
analyse the level of fiscal sustainability. Specifically, it helps determine the required level of 
                                                 
68 See the section on money printing in Fischer and Easterly (1990, p. 131). Revenue from seigniorage varies 
from country to country and is relatively high in developing economies. Our set of economies includes 
developed, emerging and developing economies; therefore, we include seigniorage as a source of financing in 
the above discussion. 
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primary balance over a specific period. A lower required level of primary balance over a long 
period enhances the government’s ability to service its debt. Conversely, a higher required level 
of primary balance for a long period deteriorates the ability of the government to service its 
debts, and ultimately leads to fiscal vulnerability. By extending our debt analysis along these 
lines, a simple solution to Equation 3.2.18 for primary balance gives the required average 
primary balance. First, considering the case where real interest rate is equal to the growth rate 




                 (3.2.19 
Equation 3.2.19 indicates that the primary balance should cover the total gap (𝑝𝑑0 − ?̅?) over 
the period of T.69 However, the real interest rate and growth rate are not always equal in the 
real world. The dynamics of public debt and sustainability of primary balance (deficit in this 
case) are particularly affected by this difference between the growth rate and interest rate 
(Anand & Van Wijnbergen, 1989; Fischer & Easterly, 1990). Thus, it is preferable to consider 
cases where the real interest rate is different from the growth rate. 
First, assume that the real interest rate is less than the growth rate (τ < 1), where the public debt 
dynamics are stable. In this scenario, the required primary balance will be lower than the 








               (3.2.20 
In case of a greater growth rate, the amount of public debt will deteriorate and the primary 
deficits more than seigniorage revenue will be sustainable. A so-called ‘Ponzi’ finance or 
scheme of borrowing to serve the debt is possible.70 This is normally the case in economies 
that are growing rapidly, such as China. The case of real interest rates being lower than growth 
rates provides an escape from public debt crisis for these economies. However, this is not true 
for all economies. For instance, there is no substantial difference between the current growth 
rate and interest rates in Australia. 
                                                 
69 Alternatively, the primary balance should fill one Tth of the differential amount each year. 
70 Italian Charles Ponzi was a resident in Boston who made a substantial amount of money through pyramid 
investment schemes in 1920; however, he ended up in jail and later penniless. See Mankiw and Taylor (2014, p. 
528) and Fischer and Easterly (1990) for further details. 
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Market forces tend to prevent real interest rates from remaining below the growth rate for a 
long period. A higher amount of public debt places pressure on the bond markets, which 
transmits into higher real interest rates and lower growth rates. If a faster growing economy 
exploits these favourable debt dynamics by borrowing excessively, the growth rate will 
eventually decline. Considering the world economy, the normal situation should be thought of 
as one in which real interest rates are higher than growth rates. It might be argued that a 
government can continue a Ponzi scheme through controlling domestic interest rates. However, 
the differential amount of controlled interest rates and long-term equilibrium rate will be a type 
of tax on bondholders. These investors will respond by investing their money elsewhere. As a 
result, the government will face difficulty in gaining new debt. Different economies, including 
Mexico and Argentina, have experienced this type of situation, along with capital flight 
(Cuddington, 1986). Venezuela is currently facing this situation. Given that Australian bonds 
are not exchange traded (exchange-traded treasury bonds and exchange-traded treasury 
indexed bonds), investors are expected to respond to this tax on bondholders.71 
Conversely, if the real interest rate is greater than the growth rate (τ > 1), the public debt 
dynamics will be unstable. In this scenario, the required primary balance will be greater than 








               (3.2.21 
In this case, it is impossible for an economy to run permanent primary deficits where this 
amount exceeds the government revenue through seigniorage. This scenario requires the 
attention of policy makers, where: (i) the government is running primary deficits greater than 
the seigniorage revenue and (ii) real interest rates are greater than the growth rate. Under these 
fiscal conditions, the public debt to GDP ratio will continue to rise without limits. At some 
point, it will be difficult for the government to gain new debt and, ultimately, the government 
will have to cut the budget deficit. However, the ending point of this process depends on 
bondholders’ expectations (Özatay, 2000). When the general public—especially the expected 
investors of bondholders’ markets—recognise this situation, they will stop buying government 
securities and subsequently force the fiscal policy to change. Banks are the major holders of 
                                                 
71 See the bonds section under ‘Products’ on the official website of the Australian Stock Exchange: 
http://www.asx.com.au/products/bonds/exchange-traded-agbs.htm. A recent phenomenon of exchange-traded 




government securities and will shift their portfolio from government securities to private 
securities, which deteriorates banking stability. The next section elaborates this transmission 
mechanism in detail. 
3.3 Fiscal Consolidation and Banking Stability—Transmission Mechanism 
Under these fiscal conditions, fiscal consolidation mitigates sovereign risk because government 
securities are perceived to be a safer investment. As a result, investors and banks have restored 
market confidence, and banks make changes to their investment portfolios. Theoretically, 
banks make changes to their portfolio for two main reasons: (i) investors’ perception of 
sovereign risk and (ii) the probability of default in the interbank lending market. Dib (2010) 
explained the second type of change relevant to the probability of default.72  In a typical 
economy, there are several investment projects that require initial investment. Those projects 
require funds that are usually provided by banks. Banks consist of all of the financial 
intermediaries that provide net credits in the interbank market. The most important function of 
banks (j) is to collect fully insured deposits (𝐷𝑗,𝑡) from households and businesses. To use 
these deposits, banks (j) pay the interest on the deposits’ interest rate (𝑅𝑗,𝑡
𝐷 ) to these households 
and businesses. These deposit interest rates should align with the cost of capital. Therefore, 
banks normally set these rates as a markdown of the required return on bank assets. Looking 
at investing activities, banks allocate this deposited money into two main categories. One 
portion of these deposits (𝑠𝑗,𝑡) is lent in the interbank market—interbank lending. The second 
portion of these deposits (1 −  𝑠𝑗,𝑡) is allocated to government bonds. In this allocation, the 
portfolio of the 𝐽𝑡ℎ bank consists of the following two categories: 
Interbank lending: 𝐷𝑗,𝑡=
𝐼𝐵 𝑠𝑗,𝑡. 𝐷𝑗,𝑡 
Government bonds: 𝐵𝑡
𝑠𝑏 = (1 −  𝑠𝑗,𝑡 ) . 𝐷𝑗,𝑡  
Therefore, the total deposits received, interbank lending and government bonds are three 
imperative components of the balance sheets of saving banks. Here, the gross nominal 
interbank lending rate (𝑅𝑡
𝐼𝐵) is the rate paid on the interbank lending (𝐷𝑗,𝑡=
𝐼𝐵 𝑆𝑗,𝑡.  𝐷𝑗,𝑡 ). This 
lending rate is subject to a default probability of the interbank lending market (𝛿𝑡
𝐷) , as 
                                                 
72 This section is extracted from Section 2.2.1 of Dib (2010). 
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discussed in Angbazo (1997).73 The interbank lending rate clears the interbank market and is 
determined endogenously.74 However, default probability operates as a key driver for portfolio 
rebalancing. A higher default probability in any of the investment categories encourages banks 
to rebalance their portfolios.75 This requires investigating the drivers of the optimal allocation 
of deposits between these investment classes (interbank lending and government bonds). 
Depending on the nature of operations, saving banks and lending banks behave differently 
against these default probabilities. Therefore, both of these cases are discussed below. 
Following Gerali, Neri, Sessa, and Signoretti (2010), the 𝑗𝑡ℎ saving bank faces the following 







. 𝐷𝑡                  (3.3.1 
where: 
𝐷𝑗,𝑡 denotes the deposits provided to 𝑗
𝑡ℎ saving bank 
𝐷𝑡 denotes the total deposits  
𝜗𝐷 denotes the elasticity of substitution between the deposits of different types. 
While adjusting the 𝑅𝑗,𝑡
𝐷 , saving banks face the following quadratic adjustment costs, as given 











. 𝐷𝑡       (3.3.2 
where 𝐴𝑑𝑗,𝑡
𝑅𝐷 is the adjustment cost and 𝜑𝑅𝐷 is the adjustment cost parameter, which is 
greater than zero. 
As indicated in Equation 3.3.2, the adjustment cost is the spread between the policy rate (cash 
rate in Australia) and the deposit interest rate. Apart from this adjustment cost, it is further 
assumed that saving banks pay monitoring costs against their lending activities.76 Moreover, 
                                                 
73 At times, central bank liquidity facilities also affect the interbank lending rates. See Christensen, Lopez, and 
Rudebusch (2014) for further details. 
74 Interested readers can see Goodhart, Sunirand, and Tsomocos (2005), which provides the detailed risk 
assessment model for banks.  
75 These investment categories include interbank lending and government securities. 
76 See Chen (2001) for further details on monitoring costs. 
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this monitory cost depends on their deviation of the portion of total deposits lend in the 
interbank market from the target level, ?̅?. Equation 3.3.3 provides the individual monitoring 





 ((𝑠𝑗,𝑡 − ?̅?). 𝐷𝑗,𝑡)
2
                  (3.3.3 
where: 
𝜒𝑠 denotes the steady-state value of monitory cost. 








𝑏  {[𝑠𝑗,𝑡. 𝑅𝑡
𝐼𝐵(1 − 𝛿𝑡
𝐷) + (1 −  𝑠𝑗,𝑡 )𝑅𝑡 − 𝑅𝑗,𝑡
𝐷 ]𝐷𝑗,𝑡 − 𝐴𝑑𝑗,𝑡
𝑅𝐷 − ∆𝑗,𝑡
𝑠 } 
                   (3.3.4 
The above Equation 3.3.4 is subject to Equations 3.3.2 and 3.3.3. 
The term sj,t. 𝑅𝑡
𝐼𝐵(1 − 𝛿𝑡
𝐷) + (1 −  𝑠𝑗,𝑡 )𝑅𝑡 denotes the gross nominal return on the assets of 
the 𝑗𝑡ℎ saving bank. The discount factor is the stochastic process, where λt
b is the marginal 
utility of the consumption function of bankers. 
The first-order conditions of this optimisation problem, in symmetric equilibrium, where 
sj,t = S𝑡 and Rj,t
D = Rt
D for all t > 0, with respect to st and Rt
D, are given as follows: 
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𝐷                (3.3.6 
𝑅𝑡
𝐼𝐵 is defined as 𝑅𝑡(1 + 𝛿𝑡
𝐷) + 𝜒𝑠(𝑠𝑡 − ?̅?)𝐷𝑡. It is important to note that the interbank lending 
rate (𝑅𝑡
𝐼𝐵) includes a risk-free rate of return, which is a theoretical rate of return on any 
investment with no risk. Considering our total deposits, this risk-free rate of return is the 
opportunity cost of saving banks for not investing their deposits in risk-less securities—
government bonds. Therefore, the interbank rate, 𝑅𝑡
𝐼𝐵, recompenses these saving banks against 
the default risk prevailing in this interbank market. Further, it also covers the average marginal 
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monitory cost of the interbank market. This interbank rate is linked with the financial 
conditions of an economy—for example, financial stress increases this rate through higher 
default risk.77 The spread between the interbank rate and policy rate, 𝑅𝑡
𝐼𝐵 − 𝑅𝑡, depends on two 
components: (i) the probability of default in the interbank market and (ii) the monitory cost. 
This spread is higher in the case of higher probability of defaults in the interbank market. In 
contrast, this spread is constant during normal periods.78 
The condition given in Equation 3.3.6 elaborates the portion of total deposits allocated to 
interbank lending. This portion increases because of decreases in the probability of default in 
the interbank market. This increase in the portion of interbank lending will indirectly cause an 
expansion of credit supply in the interbank lending market. The higher amount of default 
probability, 𝛿𝑡
𝐷, in the interbank market will encourage saving banks to invest in government 
bonds and reduce the portion of 𝑠𝑡, the interbank lending. Equation 3.3.5 defines the deposit 
interest rate, which is the markdown of the average return on the assets of saving banks. 
The second type of banks in the banking industry—lending banks (j)—refer to the borrower 
banks in the interbank market. These banks borrow from saving banks and raise their equity 
capital from these bankers to meet capital requirements. Recently, these banks have been more 
concerned about the regulatory capital, where risk-weighted assets play a significant role.79 
Therefore, we assume that these banks hold government securities against the capital valued at 
the capital price (𝑄𝑡
𝑍). Under certain financial conditions, these lending banks can gain benefits 
from a quantitative monetary easing policy, where they can receive money from the central 
bank. Further, lending banks have access to central banks to swap a fraction of these risky loans, 
extended to the firms, for government bonds from the central bank. 
To provide loans to the firms, each lending bank, j, combines funds from the following sources: 
1. loans from the saving banks in the interbank market—𝐷𝑗,𝑡 
𝐼𝐵  
2. any injection of money from the central bank—𝑚𝑗,𝑡 
3. bank capital—𝑄𝑡
𝑍. 𝑍𝑗,𝑡 
                                                 
77 See Arellano (2008) and Illing and Liu (2006) for further details on financial stress, default risk and their 
linkages with different income streams. 
78 Interested readers can see Huang, Zhou, and Zhu (2009) for a framework to assess the systemic risk of major 
financial institutions. 
79 Regulators are concerned about corporate social responsibility, especially after the GFC. They are asking for 




4. swapping of assets with the central bank—𝑥𝑗,𝑡. 
The balance sheet of lending banks will then be as follows (Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1: Balance Sheet of Lending Banks 
Assets Liabilities 
Loans Interbank borrowing: 𝐷𝑗,𝑡 
𝐼𝐵   
Government bonds: 𝐵𝑗,𝑡
𝑙𝑏 Bank equity: 𝑄𝑡
𝑍.  𝑍𝑗,𝑡 
  Money injection by central banks: 𝑚𝑗,𝑡 
  Swapping of assets with central banks: 𝑥𝑗,𝑡  
 
According to Dib (2010), we assume that banks adopt Leontief technology to produce loans: 
𝐿𝑗,𝑡 = min{𝐷𝑗,𝑡 
𝐼𝐵 + 𝑚𝑗,𝑡; 𝑘𝑗,𝑡 (𝑄𝑡
𝑍. 𝑍𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑥𝑗,𝑡 )} 𝜏𝑡              (3.3.7 
where 𝑘𝑗,𝑡 < 𝑘, and, in this case, 𝑘𝑗,𝑡 indicates the lending bank’s optimum leverage ratio, 
while 𝑘 denotes the regulatory leverage ratio (Prudential Standard APS 110-120 and Basel 
Framework III for the case of Australia)80 and 𝜏𝑡 is the shock to the financial 
intermediation—any of the exogenous factors affecting the supply of credit and banks’ 
balance sheets in the interbank market. 
Equation 3.3.7 assumes that 𝑚𝑡, 𝑥𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜏𝑡 follow the AR (1) process. A positive shock will 
increase the demand for loans and investment. Banks must increase the leverage ratio and the 
bank capital; however, these tasks are costly for lending banks and will result in a higher 
lending rate to firms. In this framework, swapping the fraction of loans from risky to 
government bonds changes the composition of banks’ assets. 
Interbank borrowing, central bank money injection and financial intermediation shocks will 
result in the contraction or expansion of a bank’s balance sheet. As observed above, banks shift 
the composition of their portfolio from private securities to government bonds as a result of 
fiscal consolidation. 
                                                 
80 See Figure B1 (Appendix B) for Basel III phase-in arrangements. 
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Financial stability in terms of the banking sector implies that capital adequacy ratios (Tier-1 
capital ratio and Tier-2 capital ratio) are improving by observing portfolio rebalancing. 
Consider these ratios as: 








             (3.3.8 
Tier − 2 Capital Ratiot =
 







            (3.3.9 
where 𝐷𝑡
𝑓
 denotes the loans extended to firms at any particular time, 𝐷𝑡
𝑐  denotes the loans 
extended to consumers (such as mortgages), 𝑆𝑡
𝑖  denotes the investment securities at any 
particular time t, 𝑆𝑡
𝑔
 denotes the government securities at any particular time t, and 𝜌𝑖 denotes 
the risk weights allotted to different items. These risk weights will be given on the basis of 
implementation of the Basel Accords, which differs slightly from country to country. Generally, 
the Basel Accords allocate the risk weights of 100 per cent for investment securities, 50 per 
cent to mortgage loans, 20 per cent to the loans extended to firms and zero per cent to 
government securities (Bank for International Settlement, 2017).  
In Equations 3.3.8 and 3.3.9, portfolio rebalancing as a result of fiscal consolidation will reduce 
risk-weighted assets because of the lower risk weights allocated to government securities by 
the Basel Accords. Accordingly, an increased capital adequacy ratio will bring financial 
stability to the banking sector. Similarly, Cimadomo et al. (2014) described two channels 
(direct and indirect channels) through which fiscal consolidation is transmitted into banking 
stability. The direct channel applies demand and supply rules on government bonds, while the 
indirect channel works through the macroeconomic effect. The direct channel establishes the 
link between fiscal vulnerability and the financial stability of the banking sector. This channel 
works through the demand and supply effects of government securities. During a period of 
fiscal adjustments, the supply of new government bonds is affected. More directly, fiscal 
consolidation decreases the supply of new government bonds. We call this the ‘supply effect’ 
in the direct channel. 
At the same time, institutional investors consider fiscal consolidation a structural policy that 
helps avoid fiscal vulnerability and reinforces banking stability through mitigating sovereign 
risks. Therefore, institutional investors demand more government securities relative to other 
asset classes (the loans extended to firms, consumers and investment securities). We call this 
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the ‘demand effect’ in the direct channel. The demand effect prevails in most cases for the 
following reasons:  
1. government securities are the key source of liquidation for the domestic private sector 
(Brutti, 2011) 
2. safety and liquidity are two key determinants of the demand for government securities 
(Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012) 
3. the government is unable to discriminate between domestic and foreign creditors in 
case of default (Brutti, 2011). 
In general, the holding of government securities is the key factor behind the direct channel.  
Fiscal consolidation affects the supply and demand of government securities. Focusing on the 
composition of capital adequacy ratios, institutional investors make changes to their investment 
portfolio in response to structural changes in fiscal policy. These investors are expected to 
decrease (increase) the share of government securities over total assets if the supply (demand) 
effect prevails. Considering the supply side of government securities, fiscal consolidation 
deteriorates the supply of new government bonds, which decreases the share of government 
securities over total assets. This increases the risk-weighted assets because the Basel Accords 
allocate higher weights (ρ0, ρ1, ρ2) to other asset classes. These risk-weighted assets are the 
denominators of the capital adequacy ratios (Tier-1 and Tier-2). Therefore, higher risk-
weighted assets deteriorate the capital adequacy ratios of the banking sector. However, the 
demand effect prevails in most cases. Considering the demand side, institutional investors 
demand more government securities during periods of fiscal consolidation. The increased 
demand of government securities lowers the risk-weighted assets because the Basel Accords 
allocate lower risk weights, 𝜌3, to government securities. These risk-weighted assets are the 
denominators of the capital adequacy ratios. Therefore, lower risk-weighted assets enhance the 
capital adequacy ratios of the banking sector. The method described in Equations 3.3.8 and 
3.3.9 is similar to the direct method, where shifting from private securities to government 





3.4 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter first discussed fiscal vulnerability through public debt evolution. An economy is 
fiscally vulnerable if it is unable to pay the interest on its debt and honour the capital 
repayments when these payments are due. After netting off these payments, the overall or 
operating balance of the public sector is either a budget deficit or surplus. Both of these 
possibilities of overall balance have different economic consequences. In this context, the debt 
analysis of a budget deficit is more relevant81 as compared to the accounting deficit, where 
different ways to finance the budget deficit of an economy can be categorised as: (i) issuing 
new debts, (ii) through monitised or (iii) using a mix of both of these options. Further, the 
differences between interest rates and growth rates play a significant role in public debt 
dynamics. For instance, if the real interest rates are greater than the growth rates, the public 
debt dynamics are unstable. In this case, it is impossible for an economy to run permanent 
primary deficits and, at some point, it will be difficult for the government to gain new debt. 
Ultimately, the government will have to cut the budget deficit. The end point of this process 
depends on the bondholders’ expectations. When the general public—especially the expected 
investors of government securities—recognise this situation, they will stop buying government 
securities and subsequently force the fiscal policy to change.  
Banks are the major holders of government securities and will shift their portfolio from 
government securities to private securities, which deteriorates their financial stability. Under 
these fiscal conditions, the government must adopt fiscal consolidation, which mitigates the 
sovereign risk because government securities are perceived to be a safer investment after fiscal 
consolidation. Consequently, investors and banks will gain restored market confidence and 
banks will make changes to their investment portfolios. Banks make changes to their portfolios 
for two main reasons: (i) investors’ perception of sovereign risk and (ii) the probability of 
default in the interbank lending market. Considering the risk weights allocated by the Basel 
Accords and the respective regulatory bodies of different economies (such as the Australian 
Prudential Regulatory Authority for the case of Australia), the capital adequacy ratio will 
improve by lower risk-weighted assets. In this framework, fiscal consolidation increases 
banking stability by mitigating sovereign risk. 
  
                                                 











In this chapter, we discuss the potential issues in the components of fiscal and financial 
variables, alongside the data sources used for this study’s data collection. We used annual data 
from 1960 to 2015 for all 53 economies in the fiscal vulnerability analysis. This dataset was 
collected from different sources. The first part of this chapter elaborates these data sources and 
their relevant issues. We began the banking stability analysis by using aggregated level data 
from The Global Economy (TGE) from 1960 to 2017. We then extended our analysis by using 
bank-wise disaggregated data from the Bankscope database (Van Dijk & Fitch, 2014).82 The 
Bankscope database provides consolidated and unconsolidated balance sheet data for all the 
individual banks. Consolidated balance sheet data were used for most of the analysis. However, 
using consolidated balance sheet data creates difficulty in differentiating the domestic effect of 
fiscal consolidation on parent companies. Therefore, we used unconsolidated balance sheet 
data in our banking stability analysis. Considering all this, we present all the relevant issues of 
these databases in this chapter. In the final part of this chapter, we provide the construction of 
variables, focusing on public debt and financial net worth. 
Overall, the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 presents the data sources and relevant 
issues related to the fiscal variables. Section 4.3 elaborates the country-specific data issues 
related to the fiscal variables. Section 4.4 presents different components of the public sector 
balance sheet data for all the selected economies. Section 4.5 provides a discussion on the 
disaggregated and aggregated datasets. Section 4.6 presents the construction of variables, 
                                                 
82 Bankscope is a unique collection of bank-level data of 31,121 banks from different countries. This database is 
managed by the Bureau van Dijk, which is a private institution, and IBCA—an international rating agency.  
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including the fiscal and financial variables of the banking sector. Section 4.7 concludes this 
chapter. 
4.2 Data Sources and Related Issues in Fiscal Variables 
We collected annual data for fiscal variables from 1960 to 2011 using the database created by 
Mauro et al. (2013). This database includes an unbalanced panel of 55 economies from 1800 
to 2011. 83  We could not include Bolivia and Iran because of an insufficient number of 
observations from 1960 onwards. However, we included the remaining 53 countries in our 
sample. These data contain government revenue, government expenditure, government 
primary expenditure, interest paid on public debt, government primary balance, gross public 
debt (all variables as a per cent of real GDP), real GDP growth rate and real long-term interest 
rates on government debt.84 We further updated this dataset from the relevant data issues of the 
IMF Fiscal Monitor database for April 2016 (IMF, 2016), and World Economic Outlook online 
sources (IMF, 2015). Using these sources, we collected data from 2012 to 2015 on government 
revenue, government expenditure, government primary expenditure, interest paid on public 
debt, government primary balance, gross public debt (all variables as percentages to real GDP), 
real GDP growth rate and real long-term interest rates on government debt. It is important to 
note that government expenditure (per cent of GDP) given in Mauro (2013) are net of interest 
paid on public debt (per cent of GDP) while the general government total expenditure provided 
by the IMF (2015) includes interest payments. Therefore, data on government expenditures 
and revenues (both as a per cent of GDP) for the remaining period of 2012 to 2015 were 
collected from the IMF (2015).85 During the period of data collection, the database from Mauro 
et al. (2013) provided information up to 2011. This database is updated at irregular intervals; 
however, we checked the frequency of the data updates and, as a result of the irregularity of 
these updates, we did not wait for the next release. 
                                                 
83 These 55 economies included Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, 
Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, 
Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, South Korea, 
Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, the UK, the 
US, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
84 See the section on data sources and basic statistics in Mauro et al. (2013) for the complete details of these 
variables and their sources. 
85 The measures of these data used in Mauro et al. (2013) and Mauro et al. (2015) are the same. 
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Therefore, we updated the Mauro et al. (2013) dataset by using other data sources, including 
the IMF, World Bank and World Economic Outlook data.86 First, we updated government 
revenue, government expenditure and gross public debt (all as a percentage of GDP). However, 
different datasets have different treatments of interest paid on public debt in government 
expenditure. Specifically, the ‘Data Sources and Basic Statistics’ section of Mauro et al. (2013) 
indicates that data are extracted from the IMF (2015) where the government expenditure 
percentage of GDP is the net of interest paid on public debt as a percentage of GDP, while the 
general government total expenditure provided in the IMF (2015) includes interest payments 
(interest paid on public debt as a percentage of GDP). Therefore, subtracting government 
expenditure from the government revenue (percentage of GDP) from 2011 to 2015 gave the 
government primary balance (as a percentage of GDP) from 2011 to 2015. We used these data 
(primary balance) to compute the CAPB by applying the Hodrick–Prescott (Hodrick & Prescott, 
1997) filter and econometric techniques.87 We noticed some country-specific data issues in the 
fiscal variables, which are discussed in Section 4.3. 
4.3 Country-specific Data Issues in Fiscal Variables 
We noticed some inconsistencies in the names of countries and ensured that the data in both of 
the databases were for the same territory. For instance, the IMF (2015) provides fiscal variable 
data for Korea, while Mauro et al. (2013) provides fiscal variables for South Korea. We 
compared and observed that these values were almost similar. Therefore, we used the data from 
the IMF (2015) to update our dataset for the case of South Korea. We extracted the data on real 
GDP growth rate from 2012 to 2014 from World Bank data. 88  Some of the values were 
unavailable from the IMF, World Bank or World Economic Outlook (IMF, 2015). For example, 
the GDP of Argentina for 1960 and 1961 was unavailable in the World Bank database. Thus, 
we extracted the GDP of Argentina (constant 2005 US$) for 1960 to 1962 from IndexMundi 
(2015), and accordingly calculated the GDP (current US$) for 1960 and 1961. For the case of 
Bolivia, we could not find the value of the government primary balance for 1967. Therefore, 
we calculated this value using moving average. Similarly, data were unavailable until 1990 for 
China and Bulgaria. Consequently, we customised the sample range for China and Bulgaria 
from 1990 to 2014 to determine its vulnerability, while performing regression analysis for 
                                                 
86 World bank data is available from 1960 onwards. Therefore, we restrict time period from 1960 to 2016 (the 
latest available). 
87 See Section 5.6 (Chapter 5) for these econometric techniques.  




China and Bulgaria. For the case of Australia, we used the Australian System of National 
Accounts (ASNA) 1993 and 2008 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2018) for the guidelines on 
the components of public debt. We used the Maastricht definition of public debt as given in the 
System of National Accounts (SNA) 2008 (United Nations Statistics Division, 2018), and 
Government Finance Statistics Manual (GFSM) 2001 (IMF, 2001).     
The Australian Government Finance Statistics (GFS) system, ASNA 1993 and ASNA 2008 
include the net debt and two additional components, titled ‘Unfunded Superannuation Liability’ 
and ‘Other Employee Entitlements and Provisions’, to determine the net financial liabilities of 
Australia. These additional components are not incorporated in the IMF Manual or SNA 1993. 
Therefore, these components are irrelevant for the fiscal vulnerability analysis of other 
countries. There is a difference of opinion between the IMF Manual/SNA 1993 for the rest of 
the economies and the Australian GFS system (ASNA 1993 and 2008). The first two manuals 
recommend that these two components should not be included as liabilities and should be 
reported as memorandum items in the balance sheets, as there is no pool of accumulated assets 
against these components to pay the benefits. In contrast, the Australian GFS system, ASNA 93 
and ASNA 2008 treat these components on the liabilities side of balance sheets. Their relevant 
information is readily available in the public sector accounts (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
2005). Therefore, net financial liabilities are an appropriate measure of fiscal balance for the 
case of Australia. 
To calculate net financial liabilities, we subtracted financial assets (cash and deposits, 
investment loans and placements, other non-equity assets, equity and advanced paid) from the 
Australian government liabilities (deposits held, advanced received, borrowing, unfunded 
superannuation liability, other employment entitlement and provisions, and other non-equity 
liabilities) (Australia Bureau of Statistics, 2005). We used the resultant series of net financial 
liabilities as an alternative measure of debt for the case of Australia only. All these changes are 
the result of the transition of the Australian government from cash accounting to accrual 
accounting. Accrual accounting records the revenues and expenses when they are incurred, 
irrespective of when the cash is exchanged (Funnell et al., 2012). The Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (2002) elaborated on the implementation of accrual accounting in the Australian GFS 
and national accounts. The Australian Bureau of Statistics (2002) is based on the OECD 
meeting of national account experts, which was held at Chateau de la Muette, Paris, from 8 to 
11 October 2002. The Australian system for producing GFS was changed in the late 1990s 
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from a cash base to an accrual base of recording. However, its implementation issues of accrual 
base accounting were in process until 2002 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2002). 
4.4 Public Sector Balance Sheet Data of All Selected Economies 
This subsection discusses the data issues related to the public sector balance sheets of all 53 
economies. We collected annual data on the variable of financial net worth from the OECD 
(2014, 2018), which calculated the net financial worth by subtracting financial liabilities from 
the financial assets. 89  Here, financial assets are classified into six major categories: (i) 
monetary gold and special drawing rights, (ii) currency and deposits, (iii) loans, (iv) shares and 
other equity, (v) insurance technical reserves and (vi) other accounts receivables. Among these 
financial assets, currency and deposits, securities and other shares, shares and other equity, and 
insurance technical reserves are further categorised into different financial components, as 
follows: 
1. Currency and deposits consist of three main components: (i) currency, (ii) transferable 
deposits and (iii) deposits with others. 
2. Securities other than shares include: (i) securities other than shares, except financial 
derivatives (short-term and long-term) and (ii) financial derivatives. 
3. Loans extended to others are categorised into short- and long-term loans. 
4. Shares and other equity consist of: (i) shares and other equity, except mutual funds 
shares (quoted shares, unquoted shares and other equity), and (ii) mutual funds shares. 
                                                 
89 This dataset includes different sectors of the Australian economy, including: (i) financial corporations, (ii) 
non-financial corporations, (iii) household and non-profit institutions and (iv) the general government. We used 
the consolidated data from the general government financial balance sheet, which include all three segments of 
local, state and central government. Therefore, we use the term ‘Australian general government’ in this chapter. 
The Australian Government Treasury (1999) defines the ‘general government’ as the resident public entities that 
are mainly engaged in the production of goods and services outside the normal market mechanism for 
consumption by the government and general public. Here, the cost of production is mainly financed from tax 
revenue. Australian Government (2018) indicates that the six states and Northern Territory have established one 
further level of government, which is known as local government or local councils. This level of government 
handles community needs, such as waste collection, public recreation facilities and town planning. The social 
security fund (Sector S1314) is included in the general government balance sheets. Nevertheless, S1314 is not 
relevant for the case of Australia. Unfunded superannuation claims are included as liabilities under the 
Australian GFS, ASNA 1993 and ASNA 2008, even though these components are mentioned only as a 
memorandum item in the IMF Manual and SNA 1993. These components are classified under ‘New Equity of 
Household in Pension Funds’, which represents the liabilities of the Australian general government to 
employees of the public sector as unfunded retirement benefits. The Australian Bureau of Statistics (2005) 
provides a complete classification of all the components of the Australian general government consolidated 
balance sheet. Further, mutual funds instruments (quoted and unquoted shares) are included under the 
subheading ‘Share and Equity’ on financial assets. Australian financial accounts were based on the SNA 1993 
until 31 December 2010. Since then, these accounts have been based on SNA 2008 (United Nations Statistics 
Division, 2018). These data are compiled by the national statistical office, the Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
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5. Insurance technical reserves include: (i) net equity of households in life insurance and 
pension funds reserves, (ii) net equity of households in life insurance and pension funds 
reserves (net equity of households in life insurance reserves and net equity of 
households in pension funds) and (iii) prepayments of premiums and reserves against 
outstanding claims. 
The second component in calculating financial net worth is financial liabilities, which are 
further classified into six major categories: (i) currency and deposits, (ii) securities other than 
shares, (iii) loans taken from other parties, (iv) shares and other equity, (v) insurance technical 
reserves and (vi) other accounts payables. Among these financial liabilities, currency and 
deposits, securities other than shares, shares and other equity, and insurance technical reserves 
are further categorised into five financial components.90 In the cases of Argentina, Bulgaria 
and Ghana, because of unavailable data, the financial net worth was calculated using data on 
financial asset and liabilities from international financial statistics. Details of all the financial 
assets and liabilities used in this calculation are provided in Table C1 (Appendix C). 
4.5 Issues Related to Aggregated (TGE) and Disaggregated (Bankscope) Datasets 
We used aggregated and disaggregated data to analyse the effects of fiscal consolidation on 
financial stability. We collected annual data on the individual bank balance sheet items, 
including retained earnings, equity, preferred stock, subordinated bonds, government securities, 
loans extended to firms, investment securities, loans extended to consumers, total assets, return 
on total assets, and Tier-1 and Tier-2 capital ratios. We collected these annual data from 1990 
to 2016 from the Bankscope database (Van Dijk & Fitch, 2014). However, we could not use 
the data for 2016 in the banking stability analysis because of the unavailability of some 
observations. Therefore, we used data from 1990 to 2015 in this analysis. We observed that the 
data on the financial variables, including Tier-1 and Tier-2 ratios, for some key Australian 
banks were not available in the Bankscope database. Thus, we relied on Bloomberg to extract 
these financial variables (Bloomberg, 2016). The Bankscope database is a unique collection of 
bank-level data of 31,121 banks from different countries. We collected the bank-level data for 
our selected countries. However, we could not use the data of all the banks for our selected 
countries because of the unavailability of capital adequacy ratios. Therefore, we were left with 
                                                 
90 These financial components are the same as given above for the case of financial assets, except the third one, 
in which loans payable to others are categorised into short- and long-term loans. 
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the 739 banks from our selected countries, where 41 per cent of the banks were commercial 
banks. The other categories of banks included: 
1. commercial banks (309)91 
2. investment banks (37) 
3. saving banks (22) 
4. private banking and asset management companies (36) 
5. investment and trust corporations (five) 
6. bank holdings and holding companies (249) 
7. specialised governmental credit institutions (10) 
8. real estate and mortgage banks (31) 
9. finance companies (10)92 
10. clearing institutions and custody (two) 
11. group finance companies (two) 
12. securities firms (four) 
13. micro-finance institutions (one) 
14. multilateral government banks (one) 
15. cooperative banks (14) 
16. others (still to be classified as per Bankscope classification) (six). 
In our sample, 75 per cent of the banks fell under two categories: (i) commercial banks and (ii) 
bank holdings and holdings companies. The complete details of all banks are provided in Table 
C2 (Appendix C). The parent companies or subsidiaries in some cases might have their 
branches in different countries, while their figures are included in a consolidated balance sheet, 
which makes it very difficult to differentiate the domestic effect of fiscal consolidation on the 
parent company. The Bankscope database includes the consolidated and unconsolidated 
individual bank balance sheet data. Generally, the consolidated balance sheet data are used for 
different financial analysis. However, no previous study has used the branch-level balance 
sheet data of Bankscope in a fiscal analysis. We use these data for the first time to analyse the 
effects of fiscal consolidation on the financial stability of the banking sector. 93  The 
consolidated balance sheets of multinational banks include the consolidated values of assets 
                                                 
91 The number in brackets indicates the number of banks included in the sample. 
92 Bankscope further classifies finance companies as credit card, factoring and leasing companies. 
93 Favero, Giavazzi, and Flabbi (1999) used the unconsolidated bank balance sheet data for the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy in Europe. 
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and liabilities for all subsidiaries. Similarly, the consolidated income statements include the 
consolidated values of all income and expenses for all subsidiaries. Our concern was to analyse 
the domestic effect of fiscal consolidation on banking stability. The domestic effect cannot be 
analysed from the consolidated financial statements of multinational banks. Therefore, we used 
the unconsolidated individual bank balance sheet data. As a result of some consolidation issues 
in the financial statements of parent companies, we decided to use the unconsolidated 
individual bank balance sheet data. In summary, to analyse the domestic effects of fiscal 
consolidation episodes on banking stability, we used the unconsolidated bank balance sheets 
for all 53 economies. 
However, Table C2 (Appendix C) indicates that the disaggregated dataset for 34 of 47 
economies covered less than 20 per cent of their banking sectors. Therefore, we also decided 
to use country-wise aggregated data of banking stability indicators. TGE provides these 
aggregate data from 1960 to 2017. We collected these aggregated data on the capital adequacy 
ratios, z-scores and stock market capital (alternate measure of financial stability). TGE 
provides a composite measure of capital adequacy ratio under the umbrella of banking system 
stability. This composite measure is named the ‘banking system regulatory capital to risk-
weighted assets’ in TGE database. TGE defines this as the ratio of total regulatory capital to 
risk-weighted assets. The z-score measures the probability of default of the banking system of 
any country. More specifically, this index compares the buffer of the banking system with the 
volatility of its return on assets. The banking system buffer includes the return on assets and 
ratio of equity to assets. Here, return on assets and equity and assets are the country-wise 
aggregated values calculated from the bank-by-bank unconsolidated financial statement data 
of Bankscope. Stock market capitalisation is taken as a per cent of GDP. Stock market 
capitalisation—sometimes known as market value—is the market price of shares multiplied by 
the outstanding shares of listed domestic firms. Here, it might be important to note that the 
primary business of some unit trusts, investment funds and companies is to invest in the shares 
of other listed companies. These businesses were excluded from the list of domestic companies. 
4.6 Construction of Variables 
We categorised all variables used in this thesis into: (i) fiscal variables used in the fiscal 
vulnerability analysis and (ii) financial variables of the banking sector used in the banking 
stability analysis. Therefore, the remainder of this section is categorised into two parts to 
discuss the fiscal variables and financial variables of the banking sector. 
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4.6.1 Fiscal Variables 
Gross public debt (per cent of GDP) was used in the fiscal vulnerability analysis of all 53 
economies. The concept of gross debt is defined in Chapter 7, Section F on Memorandum Items, 
and Subsection 1 on Debt of the IMF GFS94 (IMF, 2001) as follows: 
Debt consists of all liabilities that require payment or payments of interest and/or 
principal by the debtor to the creditor at a date or dates in the future. Thus, all liabilities 
in the GFS system are debt except for shares and other equity and financial derivatives. 
(Paragraph 7.142) 
We calculated primary balance, which is the government revenue minus government 
expenditure (without the amount of interest paid on public debt). Further, we calculated GVAR 
and YVAR by following Mauro et al. (2015): 
GVARt = (G − G
tr)/y               (4.6.1.1 
YVARt = (1 − (Y
tr/Y))(Gtr/y)             (4.6.1.2 
where G is the government expenditure, Gtr is the trend in government expenditure, Y is the 
GDP, Ytr is the trend in GDP and y is the real GDP growth rate. We used Hodrick and Prescott’s 
(1997) filter to determine the trends in government expenditures and GDP. These trended 
values were then used in the above equations to determine GVAR and YVAR for all 53 
economies. Data on the output gap for OECD economies were collected from Economic 
Outlook Number 99, June 2016. For the rest of the economies, the output gap was calculated 
as the deviation of actual GDP from potential GDP as a per cent of potential GDP. For this 
purpose, we used the data already applied in the fiscal vulnerability analysis. For interest rates, 
the data on the real long-term interest rate on government debt were used, which were initially 
extracted for the period up to 2011 from the database created by Mauro, Romeu, Binder, and 
Zaman (2013). These data were further updated from the relevant data issues of the IMF Fiscal 
Monitor database from April 2016 (IMF, 2016) and World Economic Outlook online sources 
(IMF, 2015). 
                                                 
94 The GFS refers to the statistical system that collects, compiles, processes and disseminates the government 
finance statistics (Australian Government Treasury, 1999). 
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4.6.2 Financial Variables 
We applied total assets, Tier-1 and Tier-2 capital ratios, and return on assets as the financial 
variables of the banking sector. Tier-1 and Tier-2 capital ratios were already discussed in 
Chapter 3 (see Equations 3.3.8 and 3.3.9, respectively). The Bankscope database provided the 
details of total assets as constructed for this database purpose. In this classification, total assets 
were broadly classified into loans, other earning assets and non-earning assets. Table 4.1 
provides the complete details of the components included in the total assets of the individual 
banks for all 53 economies. Next, the total return on assets was calculated as follows. 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡𝑎𝑥
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 (𝑎𝑠 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 4.3 )
          (4.6.2.1 
Return on assets for the individual banks of all 53 economies was provided in the Bankscope 
database (Van Dijk & Fitch, 2014). We used these data for our banking stability analysis of all 
economies. Some variables were not available in the Bankscope database; therefore, we 
extracted those banking variables from Bloomberg database (Bloomberg, 2016). The details of 




Table 4.1: Total Assets as Used in the Bankscope Database 
Assets   
Loans Other earning assets (continued) 
Residential mortgage loans At-equity investments in associates 
Other mortgage loans Other securities 
Other consumer/retail loans Total securities 
Corporate and commercial loans Memo: Government securities included 
above 
Other loans Memo: Total securities pledged 
Less: Reserves for impaired loans/NPLs Investments in property 
Net loans Insurance assets 
Gross loans Other earning assets 
Memo: Impaired loans and advances to 
customers included above 
Total earning assets 
Memo: Loans at fair value included above Non-earning assets 
Memo: Loans to the public sector Cash and due from banks 
Memo: Total impaired loans and assets Memo: Mandatory reserves included 
above 
Memo: Total impaired loans 
 
Foreclosed real estate 
Other earning assets Fixed assets 
Loans and advances to banks Goodwill 
Memo: Impaired loans and advances to banks Other intangibles 
Reverse repos and cash collateral Current tax assets 
Trading securities and at face value through 
income 
Deferred tax assets 
Derivatives Discontinued operations 
Available for sale securities Other assets 
Held to maturity securities Total assets 
Source: Extracted from the Bankscope database (Van Dijk & Fitch, 2014). 
 
4.7 Concluding Remarks 
For this empirical investigation, we used fiscal, financial and banking variables for all 53 
economies. We used country-wise annual data for the fiscal vulnerability analysis, and bank-
wise annual data for the banking stability analysis. We used different databases, including the 
IMF Fiscal Monitor database for April 2016 (IMF, 2016), World Economic Outlook (IMF, 
2015), a database created by Mauro et al. (2013), the Bankscope database (Van Dijk & Fitch, 
2014) and Bloomberg database (Bloomberg, 2016). First, we updated the dataset on the fiscal 
variables created by Mauro et al. (2013). For this purpose, we used the data from their original 
source (IMF, World Bank and World Economic Outlook data), as mentioned in Mauro et al. 
(2013). Later, we used data on primary balance to calculate the CAPB using the HP filter. We 
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then observed and resolved some country-specific issues using data from the IMF (2015).95 
We used these datasets in the fiscal vulnerability analysis. Our proposed fiscal vulnerability 
selection approach used the country-wise data from the countries’ respective public sector 
balance sheets. We collected these annual data from the OECD (2014, 2018). 
For the banking stability analysis, we used annual data from different financial and banking 
variables, including retained earnings, equity, preferred stock, subordinated bonds, government 
securities, loans extended to firms, investment securities, loans extended to consumers, total 
assets, return on total assets, and Tier-1 and Tier-2. The annual data from 1990 to 2016 were 
extracted from the Bankscope database. This database provides both consolidated and 
unconsolidated bank balance sheets. In most cases, consolidated data are used for different 
analyses. However, it is very difficult to differentiate the domestic effect of fiscal consolidation 
on a parent company. Therefore, we decided to use the unconsolidated balance sheet data for 
this analysis. We further noted some sampling issues with the disaggregated level data from 






                                                 











The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, this chapter proposes the methodology to assess 
the fiscal vulnerability among the selected countries, and introduces the techniques to 
investigate the role of fiscal consolidation in the financial stability of the banking sector. To 
identify the countries that are vulnerable to debt crisis, we introduce a fiscal vulnerability 
selection procedure for the sample of 53 selected economies. Second, we extend the empirical 
strategy to determine the fiscal consolidation episodes by applying the CAPB approach. These 
cyclical components are computed through two different approaches: (i) HP filter and (ii) 
econometric techniques. Finally, this chapter presents an empirical strategy to determine the 
role of these fiscal consolidation episodes for the banking stability of all 53 economies. The 
rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Sections 5.2 to 5.4 provide the empirical strategy 
for our proposed fiscal vulnerability selection procedure. Section 5.5 discusses the empirical 
strategies for the alternative approaches of fiscal vulnerability used in this analysis. Section 5.6 
presents the methodological notes on the fiscal consolidation episodes, while Section 5.7 
elaborates on the empirical strategy to measure the influence of fiscal consolidation episodes 
on banking sector stability. Finally, Section 5.8 presents the concluding remarks on the 
empirical strategy discussed in this chapter. 
5.2 Assessing Fiscal Vulnerability 
The evolution process of public debt (Section 3.2) provides the debt determinants of primary 
surplus (public debt to GDP), where the regression results provide sufficient information on 
the long-term fiscal sustainability of an economy. However, the regression of primary surplus 
exclusively on debt determinants will produce inconsistent estimators because of omitted 
70 
 
variable bias.96 To avoid potential omitted variable problems, the tax smoothing model of Barro 
(1979) captures the non-debt determinants of primary surplus (level of temporary government 
spending and business cycle indicator).97 Thus, we first applied the model proposed by Bohn 
(1998), which incorporates both the debt and non-debt determinants of the primary balance. 
We also incorporated the appropriate dummy variables in Bohn’s (1998) model to account for 
possible structural breaks: 
S𝑡 = β0 + β1 dt + β2GVARt + β3YVARt + β4D𝑖 + εt             (5.2.1 
where St is the ratio of primary surplus to GDP, dt is the ratio of public debt to GDP, GVAR is 
the level of temporary government spending, YVAR is the business cycle indicator, Di refers to 
the vector of break dummies and εt refers to the error term.
98 The non-debt determinants of 
primary surplus (GVAR and YVAR) capture any unusual variations in government spending 
and output, respectively. From the above model, as in Bohn (1998), a significant negative value 
of β1 indicates that public debt to GDP is unsustainable over the specified period; hence, the 
economy is vulnerable to debt crisis. 
To examine the time series property of the key variables in the presence of structural breaks, 
we used breakpoint unit root tests (innovative outlier and additive outliers), alongside three 
conventional unit root tests (Augmented Dickey–Fuller, Phillips–Perron and Kwiatkowski–
Phillips–Schmidt–Shin). The Chow breakpoint test was performed on Equation 5.2.1 to 
identify the common breaks in the model. Based on these identified breaks, the appropriate 
break dummies, Di, were subsequently introduced in the model. The estimated β1 (negative and 
significant) from Equation 5.2.1 was used as a first step to determine the fiscal vulnerability. 
5.3 Forward, Backward and Moving Screening Processes 
The degree of vulnerability measured by β1 in Equation 5.2.1 was assumed to remain constant 
over the sample period (annual observations from 1960 to 2014). The statistical significance of 
β1 may be misleading when the sample for the period of vulnerability is pooled with the non-
vulnerability period. To overcome this problem, the model was systematically estimated for 
subsample (window) periods of at least 20 observations through forward, backward and 
                                                 
96 The non-debt determinants of the primary balances are omitted from the analysis. 
97 The key feature of this policy is that tax rates should depend on the level of debt and permanent government 
spending only. 
98 See Section 4.6.1 for the construction of GVAR and YVAR. 
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moving screening processes. In each of these three processes, 33 different regressions were 
estimated for each country.  
The first regression in the forward screening process was estimated with the subsample of the 
first 20 observations (1960 to 1979). The second regression covered the estimation window for 
the period from 1960 to 1980 (subsample of first 21 observations). In the subsequent 
regressions, we added one observation at a time until the estimation window covered the full 
sample (1960 to 2017). For the backward screening process, the first regression was based on 
the full sample. The second regression was estimated by removing the first observation 
(estimation window covered the observations from 1961 to 2017). The subsequent regressions 
were estimated by removing one initial observation at a time until the final 20 observations 
were used in the estimation window (1992 to 2017). In the moving screening process, the first 
20 observations were used in the first regression, and then the initial observation in the 
subsample was replaced with the subsequent observation until the thirty-ninth regression. 
Figure 5.1 summarises the forward, backward and moving screening processes. These results 
enabled us to identify the period of vulnerability in the subsamples. These three screening 
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5.4 Threshold Regression 
To some extent, the three screening processes discussed above eliminate the problem of 
detecting a vulnerable economy as non-vulnerable. However, the above procedure may not 
completely avoid the identification problem (vulnerable versus non-vulnerable) because some 
of the vulnerable period can be nullified by a non-vulnerable period within the subsample. To 
overcome this problem, we extended our analysis to a country-specific threshold regression 
model for the specification in Equation 5.2.1. The model supposed that economic time series 
can be modelled as belonging to a number of distinct regimes, where the regimes are 
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characterised by different conditional distributions of the process. Accordingly, this allows for 
flexibility in the model parameters through regime-switching behaviour. In the present case, 
the model assumed that the behaviour of 1 changes once a series enters a different regime. 
The parameters in Equation 5.2.1 are expected to vary depending on a country-specific debt-
to-GDP ratio. This approach eliminates the problem of assuming a single threshold, regardless 
of the size of the economy. 
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 +  𝛿𝑚𝑑𝑡  + 𝑚𝑡,          if 𝑟𝑚−1 < 𝑑𝑡 ≤< 𝑟𝑚
            (5.4.1 
The delay parameter, denoted by dt, and the thresholds, 𝑟1 , 𝑟2, … 𝑟𝑚−1, are the parameters that 
yield the nonlinear structure of the model. Using the sequential procedure developed by 
Strikholm and Teräsvirta (2006), the model had a maximum of two regimes for the sample of 
countries in our analysis. Moreover, threshold regression was performed with an ordinary 
coefficient covariance matrix using the threshold specification of Bai–Perron tests of L + 1 
versus L, which sequentially determined the threshold at 15 per cent trimming percentage. 
Hence, the model is: 
𝑆𝑡 = 𝛽11𝑋𝑡
′
 + 𝛿1𝑑𝑡  + 1𝑡                                 𝑖𝑓 𝑑𝑡 < 𝑟1                         (5.4.2 
𝑆𝑡 = 𝛽12𝑋𝑡
′
 + 𝛿2𝑑𝑡  + 2𝑡                                 𝑖𝑓 𝑑𝑡 ≥ 𝑟1                        (5.4.3 
where St is the ratio of primary surplus to GDP, dt is the ratio of public debt to GDP, Xt is the 
vector of the control variables (GVAR and YVAR) and 𝑟1 is the threshold value of public debt 
to GDP. Since threshold is a piecewise and locally linear model, ordinary least squares (OLS) 
can be used to estimate Equations 5.4.2 and 5.4.3 as long as the threshold parameters are known. 
Hansen (2000) noted that the OLS estimator is also the maximum likelihood estimator when 𝜖 
is independent and identically distributed. The results from the threshold model provide the 
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country-wise threshold level of public debt to GDP, beyond which increasing public debt may 
significantly diminish primary surplus, leading towards fiscal crisis. 
We were able to identify the economies vulnerable to debt crisis by applying all three 
techniques: Bohn (1998) with dummies (the first step in our proposed fiscal vulnerability 
selection procedure), stability analysis (forward, backward and moving screening—the second 
step in our proposed fiscal vulnerability selection procedure) and threshold regression (the third 
step in our proposed fiscal vulnerability selection procedure). The existing literature has 
focused on the single threshold level of public debt to GDP to be 90 per cent (Reinhart & 
Rogoff, 2010) and 86 per cent (Cecchetti et al., 2011) for fiscal vulnerability. However, our 
procedure provides a country-specific threshold level of public debt to GDP. We incorporated 
the investment components of the public sector in the fourth step because gross public debt has 
not dealt with the investment aspects of rising debt. In particular, gross public debt ignores the 
accumulation effect of financial and real assets, which contributes to the growing net worth of 
a government. These investment aspects improve the balance sheet of a government. For this 
purpose, we calculated the financial net worth in value at risk (VaR) and conditional value at 
risk (CVaR) (see Appendix D and Figure D1) for all countries, and tested the individual 
economies against these values. Finally, if financial net worth in this framework for any 
country was positive, then this economy could finance future interest and debt payments in 
many ways other than taxation. Therefore, we categorised these economies as non-vulnerable 
to debt crisis. Conversely, if the financial net worth (VaR or CVaR) was negative, we 
categorised this economy as vulnerable. 99  This fiscal vulnerability selection procedure is 
provided in Figure 5.2 below. 
                                                 
99 For example, if the financial net worth in this framework is greater than ˗10 per cent, the capital investment 
cannot generate enough revenue to finance the interest on debt in the long term. For further details on this 
benchmark of ˗10 per cent, see Section 6.3 (Chapter 6). 
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5.5 Alternative Approaches to Fiscal Vulnerability 
In addition to the above approaches, we used some alternative measures, including the fiscal 
vulnerability index and financial net worth/balance sheet approach. We aimed to compare the 
results of these alternative approaches with the results of our fiscal vulnerability selection 
procedure. This comparison aimed to determine whether these alternative approaches can be 
applied as standalone techniques in fiscal vulnerability analysis. 
5.5.1 Fiscal Vulnerability Index 
The fiscal vulnerability index transforms public debt (per cent of GDP) into a standardised z-
score by subtracting the group average of public debt from an individual country’s value, and 
then standardising the value by dividing its corresponding standard deviation, as suggested in 
Baldacci et al. (2011). It can be shown as follows: 
𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 =
𝑑𝑡− 𝜇
𝛿
           (5.5.1.1 
where dt is the public debt to GDP at time t, μ is the sample mean of public debt to GDP, and 
σ represents the corresponding standard deviation. A positive value for the fiscal vulnerability 
index for a country indicates that this economy is vulnerable to debt crisis and its public debt 
reduces primary balance. As expected, we observed some conflicting results from this approach 
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in comparison with the above-mentioned approach of threshold regression in our proposed 
setup. These conflicting results were mainly due to the assumed homogenous association 
between debt and growth across the countries, as pointed out in Égert (2015). 
5.5.2 Financial Net Worth/Balance Sheet Approach 
Conventional approaches to fiscal vulnerability emphasise the stock of public debt outstanding; 
however, Barnhill Jr and Kopits (2004) reported that outstanding public debt is a less obvious 
indicator of fiscal risk for the following reasons100: 
1. contingent liabilities 
2. nature and magnitude of quasi-fiscal operations 
3. government guarantees 
4. revenue structure. 
Following Barnhill Jr and Kopits (2004), we applied the financial net worth approach by 
incorporating yearly public sector balance sheets, which is a widely neglected macro-fiscal 
measure, as given in Makin and Pearce (2016, p. 2).101 Theoretically, the use of government 
borrowing can be broadly classified into revenue expenditure and capital expenditure. Revenue 
expenditures are incurred to finance budget deficits or for running expenditures. Capital 
expenditures are incurred to finance public investment in the form of productive infrastructure. 
In this context, government borrowing to finance deficit increases public debt and worsens the 
balance sheet of the public sector. Conversely, government borrowing for public investment 
increases assets and improves the government balance sheet (Makin & Pearce, 2016). Under 
these fiscal conditions, a government with a higher net public worth can convert some of its 
non-financial assets into financial assets to pay any obligation from the debt position. 
Alternatively, the government can use the income from non-financial assets—including land, 
public trading enterprises or other property—to pay its debt obligations.102 
Different measures of government financial position have been used in the existing literature.103 
These measures can be broadly categorised as net public worth and net financial worth. We 
                                                 
100 See Hemming and Petrie (2002) for further discussion on the fiscal risk analysis.  
101 For details on net financial worth, see ‘Appendix D: Investment Aspect of Public Debt’. 
102 See Makin and Pearce (2016, pp. 1–2) and Abelson (2012, p. 427) for a discussion on net public worth 
policies in fiscal vulnerability analysis. 
103 For example, the net public worth of the government is a preferred measure by some researchers (Bohn, 
1992; Buiter, 1985; Mellor, 1996). Mellor (1996) further suggested using change in net worth to assess the fiscal 
policy of a government. Makin and Pearce (2016) also examined net worth and the financial net worth of the 
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used net financial worth104 instead of net public worth because the data on net public worth for 
most of the developing economies were unavailable. However, the financial net worth of 
OECD economies changed significantly as a result of the recent global financial crises of 2007 
to 2009 (OECD, 2015, p. 60).105 Therefore, it was preferable to use the worst-case value of 
financial net worth to identify an economy as vulnerable to debt crisis. Barnhill Jr and Kopits 
(2004) applied similar worst values to assess the fiscal sustainability of Ecuador, using its 
balance sheet data from 1995 to 2002. Complete details on the VaR and CVaR approaches and 
their applicability for financial net worth are discussed below. 
5.5.3 Financial Net Worth under VaR and CVaR—Approaches and Measurement 
Determining the worst value over a time horizon is a common phenomenon for financial risk 
managers. The history of determining the worst-case value dates back to Till M Guldimann 
(head of global research at JP Morgan) in the late 1980s, when he created the term ‘value at 
risk’. His team needed to decide whether to invest in long bonds or cash. Investing in long 
bonds generates stable income, while investing in cash keeps the market value constant. The 
JP Morgan group ultimately decided that value risk was better than earning risk, which led to 
the use of VaR (Jorion, 2007, p. 18). In the current study, we calculated financial net worth in 
VaR and CVaR using historical simulation, and used these values to identify vulnerable 
economies. 
Following Jorion (2007, p. viii), VaR identifies the worst loss over a target horizon that will 
not be expected with a given level of confidence. The VaR of a complex portfolio can be 
measured through: (i) the delta-normal approach and (ii) the full valuation method. The delta-
normal approach computes the variance and correlation between the securities for all risk 
factors, assuming that all assets returns are normally distributed. The full valuation method, 
such as historical simulation or Monte Carlo simulation, should be used for nonlinear 
instruments (Jorion, 2007, p. 14). Historical simulation uses a historical time series to calculate 
the variance and covariance of the risky variables. The Monte Carlo simulation uses analytical 
models, where these models specify the manner in which variables change over time. Over the 
                                                 
government to assess the growing level of public debt. Further, Robinson (2002) and Abelson (2012) included 
net financial liability in the list of key measures for the government’s financial position. 
104 These values of financial net worth were calculated from the public sector balance sheets of each country.  
105 For example, the average value of financial net worth decreased to ˗65 per cent of GDP in 2013, compared 
with the pre-crisis value of ˗38.1 per cent of GDP. 
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last decade, VaR has been used to measure and manage different types of risk, including 
operational, credit, liquidity and natural disaster risks. 
As well as financial institutions, different regulators—including the US Federal Reserve, US 
Securities and Exchange Commission, regulator of the European Union and Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision—use VaR as the benchmark risk measure to evaluate financial risk in 
different institutions (Huisman, Koedijk, & Pownall, 1998). Further, non-financial 
corporations and asset managers use VaR as a risk management technique (Jorion, 2007, p. 10). 
Barnhill Jr and Kopits (2004) were the first to use VaR and CVaR techniques to assess the 
fiscal sustainability of Ecuador. Using data from 1995 to 2002, this study reported that a 
significant risk of government financial failure stems from volatility in the exchange rate, 
interest rates, oil prices and output. The selection of Ecuador among emerging economies was 
primarily because of the availability of balance sheet data (Barnhill Jr & Kopits, 2004, p. 38). 
This study calculated the VaR of the portfolio or balance sheet data of Ecuador using the full 
valuation method in the form of Monte Carlo simulation, rather than local valuation method.106 
The objective of applying VaR and CVaR in our study was different from Barnhill Jr and 
Kopits (2004). Our objective was to calculate the worst possible value of financial net worth 
for each economy to identify vulnerable economies. We then compared these results with our 
main approach, including threshold regression. Given that we did not use complete government 
balance sheet data, the full valuation method in the form of Monte Carlo simulation was not 
required. Therefore, the simulation was performed on the historical time series of financial net 
worth from 1960 to 2014 to determine the VaR and CVaR. 
For computational purposes, the financial net worth was arranged in descending order because 
our objective was to determine the worst value of financial net worth over the horizon, 
following the definition by Jorion (2007, p. 8). The financial net worth VaR at a 90 per cent 
confidence interval is the nth value of the sorted financial net worth.107 This nth value is 
calculated as follows: 
𝑛𝑡ℎ 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = [(1 − 0.90)(number of observations of financial net worth)]       (5.5.3.1 
For example, if the number of observations (financial net worth) is 100, then the tenth value 
[(1 − 0.90)(100)] will be the financial net worth at VaR 90 per cent. Similarly, CVaR is the 
                                                 
106 Monte Carlo simulation is appropriate for the balance sheet or portfolio of the public sector. 
107 We also calculated the VaR and CVaR at 95 per cent and 99 per cent, and compared the results with 90 per 
cent. There was no significant difference in the results. 
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average amount of loss in the worst 10 per cent of cases. This is the average of the first value 
to the nth value of financial net worth, where the nth value is calculated using Equation 5.5.3.1. 
From the above example, CVaR 90 per cent will be the average of the first 10 values of 
financial net worth, keeping in mind that financial net worth series is arranged in descending 
order. Figure D1 in Appendix D presents a graphical explanation of VaR and CVaR. The results 
indicated that the maximum loss of 90 per cent VaR and 90 per cent CVaR on this portfolio 
was ˗0.40 and ˗0.45, respectively. The financial net worth at VaR and CVaR (90 per cent) was 
calculated for all 53 economies included in the sample. Positive values of the calculated 
financial net worth indicated the financial health of the economy. We categorised an economy 
as vulnerable if its calculated value was less than ˗10.108 It might be argued that an economy 
with any negative financial net worth should be categorised as vulnerable. We extended this 
range because non-financial assets were not included in the value of financial net worth. 
5.6 Methodological Notes to Fiscal Consolidation Episodes 
This subsection presents the methodological note to determine fiscal consolidation episodes, 
which were further used in the panel regression analysis to investigate the role of fiscal 
consolidation in the banking stability for the panel of all sample countries and subsamples of 
vulnerable and non-vulnerable economies. Fiscal consolidation is measured through CAPB. In 
the empirical literature, different approaches are available to calculate CAPB. Following 
Mirdala (2013), CAPB can be calculated by eliminating the cyclical components (Cc) of each 
budgetary category (revenue and expenses) from the primary government balance (PGB)109 as 
follows:110 
CAPBt = PGBt − Ct
c = PGBt − ∑ Ci,j
cn
i=1                (5.6.1 
In addition, 𝐶𝑖,𝑗
𝑐  is the cyclical component of each budgetary category (revenue and expenses) 
which can be calculated through two different approaches. One is based on a simple HP filter, 
and the second is based on an econometric approach, where the cyclical component, 𝐶𝑖,𝑗
𝑐 , of 
each budget category will be calculated as follows: 
Ci,j
c = AGBi,j . ei . 𝑂𝑢𝑡t
p
                 (5.6.2 
                                                 
108 See Section 6.3 (Chapter 6) for further details on the benchmark of ˗10. 
109 Primary government balance is the net of interest payable.  
110 This section is extracted from Section 4, Fiscal Consolidation of Mirdala (2013).  
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where AGBi,j is the actual government balance, ei indicates the elasticity of each budget 
category on an individual basis. Normally, these budget categories include gross expenditure 
and revenue of general government. Outp in the 5.6.2 represents the output gap (per cent of 
GDP). Existing literature has frequently used the econometrics techniques to measure the 
elasticities of these budgetary categories (Bouthevillain et al., 2001; Altar, Necula, and Bobeica, 
2010). Gunaydın and Ulku (2002) applied the vector error correction model (VECM) to 
estimate income elasticities. A similar methodology was applied by Mirdala (2013). Both of 
these approaches are elaborated below. 
Following Hodrick and Prescott (1997) 111, the basic idea is to decompose the fiscal variables 
into the following components: 
1. trend—a slowly-evolving secular trend 
2. cycle—a transitory deviation from the trend, classified as a cycle. 
In this framework, any time series is the sum of growth and cyclical component.112 Hodrick 
and Prescott (1997) used the sum of the square of its second difference as a measure of 
smoothness of growth. In this framework, a cycle is a deviation from growth, where its average 
is zero over a long period. The researchers presented the following programming problem to 










𝑡=1 }             (5.6.3 
When 𝐶𝑐𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑔𝑡, the solution series will be smoother in the case of a higher value of 𝜆.
113 
We used these cyclical components in Equation 5.6.1 to measure CAPB. 
Under econometric techniques, the cyclical component of each budget category is calculated 
using Equation 5.6.2. In this setup, the individual elasticities of the budgetary categories are 
calculated with econometric techniques following Mirdala (2013). Here, it is expected that each 
individual fiscal variable and real output are cointegrated, with the methods of Johansen (1988, 
1991) and Johansen and Juselius (1990) used to estimate the long-term equilibrium relationship 
                                                 
111 HP is still the most frequently used filter in the latest empirical literature, despite its two main issues: (i) poor 
estimation at the end of the series and (ii) spurious cycle in the case of time series analysis (Mirdala, 2013, p. 9). 
112 Growth component and trend are referred to interchangeably in this discussion. 
113 Historically, this approach was used to construct mortality tables. Further, the actuarial scientists has been 




between individual fiscal variables and real output. The method introduced by Johansen is 
based on the unrestricted VAR: 
𝑋𝑡 = 𝜂 + 𝐴1𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝐴2𝑋𝑡−2 +⋯+ 𝐴𝑝𝑋𝑡−𝑝 + 𝜇𝑡               (5.6.4 
where:  
𝜂 = the 𝑛 𝑥 1 vector of constants 
𝑋𝑡 = the 𝑛 𝑥 1 vector of variables (individual fiscal variable and real output) 
𝐴𝑖 = the 𝑛 𝑥 𝑛 coefficient matrix 
𝜇𝑡 = 𝜇𝑡~ 𝑁𝑛(0, Σ𝜇) is 𝑛 𝑥 1, the vector of exogenous shock to the model. 
The VECM can be obtained by rearranging the VAR representation given in Equation 5.6.4: 
∆𝑋𝑡 = 𝜂 + 𝜋𝑋𝑡−1 + ∑ Γ𝑖∆𝑋𝑡−𝑖 +
𝑝−1
𝑖=1 𝜇𝑡               (5.6.5 
where:  
𝜋 =  ∑ 𝐴𝑖 − 𝐼
𝑝
𝑖=1 , and I is 𝑛 𝑥 𝑛 identity matrix 
Γ𝑖 = −∑ 𝐴𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=𝑖+1   
∆𝑋𝑡: the 𝑛 𝑥 1 vector of 1
st difference.  
The estimated 𝛤 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜋 from the VECM are 𝑛 𝑥 𝑛 matrices consisting of coefficients that hold 
short- and long-term dynamic adjustment to the changes in 𝑋𝑡, respectively. 
The elasticities for the fiscal variables were calculated using the coefficients derived from 
Equation 5.6.5. The resulting CAPB was used to estimate the fiscal consolidation episode. The 
existing literature defines fiscal consolidation as: (i) cold shower when CAPB improves by at 
least 1.5 per cent in one year and (ii) gradual consolidation that occurs over a period of three 
years if CAPB is not deteriorated by more than 0.5 per cent of GDP in each and every year 
(Alesina & Perotti, 1995). 
Alesina and Ardagna (2010) suggested using one benchmark year to identify multiple year 
consolidation episodes, and further identified that there is no reason to consider one definition 
superior to others if the results remain broadly the same in both cases. Alternatively, there are 
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some other definitions of fiscal consolidation.114 Alesina and Ardagna (2010) identified three 
types of fiscal adjustment episodes. Mirdala (2013) used two of these measures, slightly revised 
by Barrios, Langedijk, and Pench (2010): (i) cold shower where CAPB improves by at 1.5 per 
cent of GDP and (ii) gradual consolidation where CAPB will not deteriorate by more than 0.5 
per cent of GDP (Mirdala, 2013). For this research, we decided to define fiscal consolidation 
episodes as a period in which the CAPB improves by at least 1.5 per cent of GDP, or a period 
of two consecutive years in which the CAPB improves by at least one per cent of GDP per year. 
5.7 Measuring the Influence of Fiscal Consolidation on Banking Stability 
After identifying the episodes of fiscal consolidation, their influence on banking stability was 
analysed through the estimation model of Cimadomo et al. (2014): 
Wij,t = ∑ βsWij,t−s + 
k




s=0            (5.7.1 
where i, j, t denotes the country, bank and time, respectively, and Wij,t indicates the measures 
used for the financial stability of the banking sector. Following the guidelines of the Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) and the Basel framework, these measures are the 
Tier-1 and Tier-2 capital ratios introduced in Chapter 3 in Equations 3.3.8 and 3.3.9. Zt 
indicates the bank-specific controls (total assets and return on assets) and country-specific 
macroeconomic controls (output gap, debt to GDP and long-term interest rates) at time t. FCi 
is an indicator variable used for fiscal consolidation episodes, and 𝜌𝑡is the time-specific fixed 
effect. Further, we used the alternative aggregated measures of financial stability (banking 
system regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets and z-scores) alongside stock market 
capitalisation in the aggregated analysis. For this purpose, we used the following model: 
W𝑡 = ρ0a + β𝑎Wt−1 + γaFCi,t + δaZt + εt               (5.7.2 
A positive sign for 𝛾 indicates financial stability as a result of fiscal consolidation through 
portfolio rebalancing. Our empirical model defined by Equation 5.7.1 includes the lagged 
dependent variable, which is due to the adoptive expectations of investors. For the case of 
adoptive expectations, forecasts of future events are imperfect and have some systematic errors 
                                                 
114 Alternatively, there are other definitions of fiscal episodes. For example, the OECD defines the episode as an 
improvement in CAPB by at least one per cent of potential GDP either in one year or in two consecutive years, 
where at least 0.5 per cent of this improvement occurs during the first of these two years (Stephanie, Mike, 
Eckhard, & Christophe, 2007). Fiscal consolidation is associated with improvement in CAPB. The episode stops 
if there is no further improvement in CAPB or if the CAPB is less than the 0.2 per cent of GDP during one 
period, and then begins deteriorating. 
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(Eyler, 2009, p. 148). In this case, the standard fixed-effects panel regression might be subject 
to the Nickell (1981) bias. 
Anderson and Hsiao (1981) proposed the instrumented variable estimation using the second 
lag of the dependent variable as an instrument, which is uncorrelated with the error term. 
Similarly, the other lags of dependent variables (financial stability in this case) can be used as 
an instrument. Additionally, other regressors can be used as an instrument for themselves if 
these regressors are strictly exogenous.115 We used the Arellano and Bond estimators that use 
lagged values of the variables to construct large number of instruments, which is consistent in 
this framework (see Cimadomo et al., 2014). However, we estimated Equation 5.7.1 in two 
distinct ways. First, we estimated the equation for the case of different panels of the economies 
for: (i) all economies, (ii) all vulnerable economies and (iii) all non-vulnerable economies.116 
Second, we estimated Equation 5.7.1 for each economy using bank-wise financial statement 
data. There was variation in the number of observations across countries. Roodman (2009, p. 
128) provided guidelines to collapse all instruments into a few instruments within the 
Arellano–Bond framework to achieve robust efficient estimates. Our time period was fixed 
over the sample, ranging from 1990 to 2015 (T = 25).117 However, the cross-sectional unit, N, 
varied from 1 to 739. For instance, there are 739 banks in the case of the US, yet only one 
bank in a few cases, such as Venezuela. For such cases, Roodman (2009) suggested that, if T 
is larger than N, the dynamic panel estimation bias becomes insignificant, and the standard 
fixed-effects estimator is appropriate. For these cases, the number of instruments in system 
generalised method of moments (GMM) in differences tends to explode with the time. As a 
result of the smaller N, the autocorrelation and cluster-robust standard errors may be unreliable 
(Roodman, 2009, p. 128). To overcome this problem, we used standard fixed effects for cases 
where N was less than 25 (Roodman, 2009). The difference and system GMM models were 
applied in all other cases where appropriate. To ensure the robustness of our findings, we 
applied the fixed-effects estimation for the models by: (i) including the lagged dependent 
variable and (ii) excluding the lagged dependent variable. 
                                                 
115 These regressors can also be used in other cases. See Section 9.4, Chapter 9, from Cameron and Trivedi 
(2010). Also see Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988) for further discussion.  
116 These economies are classified as vulnerable and non-vulnerable using any fiscal vulnerability analysis.  
117 We could not use the data for 2016 because of the unavailability of some observations. 
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5.8 Concluding Remarks 
We first applied a fiscal vulnerability selection procedure (Figure 5.2) to identify the 
vulnerable economies among the sample of 53 selected economies. Further, we identified the 
fiscal consolidation episodes as a period in which the CAPB improved by at least 1.5 per cent 
of GDP per year, or a period of two consecutive years in which the CAPB improved by at least 
one per cent of GDP per year. These fiscal consolidation episodes were used in the following 
section to examine their influence on banking stability for all economies. In this setting, our 
baseline equation included the lagged dependent variable to incorporate the adoptive 
expectations of the investors, as the financial stability in the previous period was expected to 
have a significant effect on the financial stability in the current period. In the presence of 
adoptive expectations, the standard fixed-effects panel regression could be subject to Nickell 
bias. To overcome this problem, we used the GMM estimation procedure proposed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991). We observed higher variation in years (T) and the number of banks 
(N) in our large sample of 53 economies. In particular, the number of banks (N) varied from 
one to 739 for each country. If T was larger than N during the analysis, the dynamic panel bias 
became insignificant and standard fixed-effects models could be used. In the next chapter, we 
follow these guidelines and procedures to: (i) identify the economies that are vulnerable to 
crisis, (ii) identify the fiscal consolidation episodes and (iii) examine the effect of fiscal 











In continuation of the public debt evolution (Section 3.2, Chapter 3) and empirical strategy for 
assessing fiscal vulnerability (Section 5.2, Chapter 5), this chapter presents the fiscal 
vulnerability analysis for the 53 economies. Fiscal vulnerability is a situation in which the 
government is exposed to the possibility of failing to achieve the aggregate objectives of the 
fiscal policy (Hemming & Petrie, 2002, p. 161). The existing literature follows debt analysis 
to quantify fiscal vulnerability.118 We propose a fiscal vulnerability selection procedure by 
incorporating investment components in the traditional debt analysis of fiscal vulnerability. 
Using this proposed selection procedure, we categorise the selected economies into vulnerable 
and non-vulnerable. We compare the results of our proposed fiscal vulnerability selection 
procedure with the results of other alternative techniques (fiscal vulnerability index and 
financial net worth VaR and CVaR). We also compare our results with the available country 
ratings conducted by different rating agencies, including Standard & Poor’s Financial Services 
(S&P), Moody’s Corporation and Fitch Group. 
This empirical analysis contributes to the existing literature in a few ways. First, we propose 
the fiscal vulnerability selection procedure (Figure 5.2, Chapter 5) by incorporating the 
investment component of public debt that can be applied to a large sample of developing, 
emerging and developed economies. Second, using our proposed procedure, we categorise a 
large set of 53 economies into vulnerable and non-vulnerable. Third, we provide the 
appropriate level of public debt to GDP for each country, which may be the tipping point to 
cause fiscal vulnerability to fiscal crisis. The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. 
                                                 




Section 6.2 presents a debt analysis of fiscal vulnerability, which is further bifurcated into the 
traditional approach, stability analysis and country-specific threshold. Section 6.3 presents the 
investment components analysis of fiscal vulnerability, while Section 6.4 discusses the results 
of alternative approaches, and presents a comparison of our results with the country rating 
announced by different rating agencies. Finally, Section 6.5 concludes this chapter. 
6.2 Debt Analysis of Fiscal Vulnerability 
6.2.1 Traditional Approach 
In this section, we classify the sample of 53 economies into vulnerable and non-vulnerable 
using our fiscal vulnerability selection procedure. Prior to estimating Equation 5.2.1 (Section 
5.2, Chapter 5), we tested and ensured that all variables were either stationary or transformed 
into stationary series if they were nonstationary. For this purpose, we applied the three most 
commonly used unit root tests on the relevant variables—the Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF), 
Phillips–Perron (PP) and Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin (KPSS) tests. These three tests 
are differentiated by the fact that the null hypothesis for ADF and PP is the alternative 
hypothesis for KPSS. In particular, the former are derived under the null hypothesis of unit 
roots, while the latter is derived under the stationarity null hypothesis. We report the unit test 
results of these three tests in Table E1 (Appendix E). 
Perron (1989) revealed that unit root and structural changes are closely associated. Similarly, 
Martin, Hurn, and Harris (2013) indicated that there is a strong tendency not to reject the null 
hypothesis of the unit root by ignoring structural changes in the data.119 Therefore, researchers 
should keep in mind that conventional unit root tests, including ADF, PP and KPSS, are biased 
towards the false unit root in the presence of structural breaks. We expected structural breaks 
in our data; therefore, we applied the breakpoint unit root tests (innovative outlier) on the 
relevant variables for all countries included in the sample.120 We present the results of the 
breakpoint unit root tests in Table E2 (Appendix E). Columns 1 and 2 of Table E2 present the 
country and variable names, respectively. Column 3 presents the test statistics of innovative 
outliers. Columns 4 and 8 provide the one-time break date of the breakpoint unit root tests in 
                                                 
119 See Section 17.8 on structural breaks in Martin et al. (2013) for further details. 
120 We consider four basic models for our data with a one-time break, as suggested in Perron (1989). These 
models include: (i) a model with a one-time change in level for non-trending data, (ii) a model with a one-time 
change in level for trending data, (iii) a model with a change in both level and trend and (iv) a model with a 
change in trend. Further, we consider the innovational outlier version of the four models. The innovational 
outlier model assumes that the break occurs gradually. 
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the level and first difference, respectively. Columns 5 and 6 provide the trend and break 
specification of the innovation outliers in the level, respectively. Similarly, Columns 9 and 10 
provide the trend and break specification of the innovation outliers in the first difference, 
respectively. 
The identified breaks in the breakpoint unit root tests were further investigated to incorporate 
the breaks in Equation 5.2.1 (Section 5.2, Chapter 5). Tests for structural changes and 
parameter instability in regression models derive from Chow (1960), who used F-statistics to 
test for regime change at a priori known dates. Later, Quandt (1960) and Andrews (1993) 
modified the Chow framework to incorporate all possible breakdates. Bai (1997) and Bai and 
Perron (1998) further extended the Quandt–Andrews framework to allow multiple unknown 
breakpoints.121 We applied the Bai and Bai–Perron approach of the multiple-breakpoint test for 
Equation 5.2.1 (Section 5.2, Chapter 5). We estimated a maximum of five breakdates for each 
country where breakdates were applicable. We report the results of the multiple-breakpoint test 
in Table E3 (Appendix E). Columns 2 and 3 of Table E3 present the country name and 
maximum number of estimated breaks, respectively. Columns 4 and 5 present the test 
specification method and selected breaks criterion, respectively.122 In some cases, different 
criteria gave different break years. We report only the maximum number of breaks in Column 
3 of Table E3. However, we included dummies in Equation 5.2.1 (Section 5.2, Chapter 5) for 
all break years identified using the multiple-breakpoint test. However, we excluded the 
statistically insignificant dummies from Equation 5.2.1 for further analysis. 
To identify vulnerable economies, Table 6.1 presents the parameter estimates from the 
empirical Equation 5.2.1 (Section 5.2, Chapter 5). In particular, we present the result of the 
debt coefficient (public debt to GDP) based on Bohn’s (1998) approach for all economies in 
Column 2 of Table 6.1. A negative and significant coefficient implies that the economy is 
vulnerable to debt crisis. For example, Canada is vulnerable to crisis because the estimated 
coefficient for Canada is negative and significant (˗0.20). Based on Bohn’s (1998) approach, 
                                                 
121 The Bai (1997) and Bai and Perron (1998) approach to structure break testing was implemented as a 
multiple-breakpoint test in EViews 10. 
122 We applied all five test specifications, including: (i) Bai–Perron tests of L + 1 versus L sequentially 
determined breaks, (ii) Bai tests of breaks in all recursively determined partitions, (iii) Bai–Perron tests of 1 to 
M globally determined breaks, (iv) Bai–Perron tests of L + 1 versus L globally determined breaks and (v) 
comparing information criteria for 0 to M globally determined breaks. Further, we applied six break selection 
criteria, including: (i) sequential F-statistic determined breaks, (ii) significant F-statistic largest breaks, (iii) 
UDmax determined breaks, (iv) WDmax determined breaks, (v) Schwarz criterion selected breaks and (vi) 
significant F-statistic largest breaks. We included the dummies in Equation 5.2.1 (Section 5.2, Chapter 5) 
against all breaks identified through these test specification methods and break selection criteria. We applied 
residual and stability diagnostics for all cases and ensured that none of the time series properties is violated.  
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we identified 30 of 53 economies as vulnerable to debt crisis.123 This approach was the first 
step of our fiscal vulnerability selection procedure (Figure 5.2, Chapter 5). The result implied 
that public debt to GDP significantly decreased the primary balances of these countries. 
6.2.2 Stability Analysis (Forward, Backward and Moving Screening) 
It is important to note that the above results were for the entire period of analysis. However, it 
is likely that an economy could be vulnerable for a specific subsample. In such cases, the results 
based on the full sample period of a specific country could be misleading when the subsample 
of the vulnerable period is combined with the non-vulnerable period. To overcome this problem, 
we proposed employing stability analysis using forward, backward and moving screening 
processes, as displayed in Figure 5.1 (Chapter 5). This was the second step in our proposed 
fiscal vulnerability selection procedure (Figure 5.2, Chapter 5). For this purpose, as discussed 
in Chapter 5, we estimated 39 different regressions for each country and for each screening 
method to identify specific episodes of fiscal vulnerability.  
Figure E1 in Appendix E plots the test statistics corresponding to the coefficient of debt to GDP 
rate for the above proposed screening processes. These screening processes successfully 
identified the years in which economies appeared vulnerable, when the downward spike was 
below the lower bound (from 95 per cent confidence interval). Interestingly, the results of these 
screening process indicated that 39 (nine additional) economies were vulnerable at some point 
in time.124 It is clear from these analyses that the Bohn (1998) model based on the full sample 
period is misleading because the period of vulnerability is nullified by the period of non-
vulnerability when they are merged. It is important to note that Pakistan was identified as a 
non-vulnerable economy by Khan and Saqib (2007) using Bohn’s (1998) model. Interestingly, 
our results based on Bohn (1998) are consistent with their findings. However, the results based 
on the forward, backward and moving screening processes are controversial and add additional 
insight to this problem. In these screening processes, the model was systematically estimated 
for the subsample periods of at least 20 observations through forward, backward and moving 
processes. For the case of Pakistan, all three screening processes identified episodes of 
vulnerability (see Figure E1, Appendix E). However, the results based on screening processes 
                                                 
123 These were Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Portugal, 
South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the UK and the US. 
124 The nine additional economies identified through the forward, backward and moving screening processes 




could be misleading if the subsample itself had both vulnerable and non-vulnerable periods. 
To overcome this problem, we used a threshold regression approach to help identify the 
threshold level at which the public debt to GDP decreases the primary balances, which 
eventually leads towards fiscal crisis. This also enabled us to achieve the second objective of 
our study.125 This was the third step in our proposed fiscal vulnerability selection procedure 
(Figure 5.2, Chapter 5). 
                                                 
125 See Section 1.6 (Chapter 1) for details of the research objectives.  
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Threshold Regression (Public Debt % of GDP) 
Financial Net Worth in 




















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Argentina 0.01  0.01       -2.92 -2.97 76.46 
Australia -0.09*  22.38 -0.16  21 -0.1127 35 -19.86 -34.31 34.44 
Austria -0.21***      31 -47.03 -69.63 71.83 
Belgium -0.12***  84.06 -0.00  21 -0.31*** 35 -101.51 -147.19 126.92 
Brazil  0.07  0.07      -6.7 -6.91 68.06 
Bulgaria 0.03  0.03       -4.67 -4.88 104.33 
Canada -0.20***      19 -72.29 -109.29 95.16 
Chile  0.17  14.97 1.60** 17 2.88*** 25 -0.19 -11.57 51.9 
China 0.04**       -1.87 -1.94 25.84 
Colombia -0.11**       -88.38 -132.36 38.54 
Costa Rica -0.01  38.61 0.02 27 -0.00 22 -36.09 -36.09 114.01 
Denmark -0.12*  27.54 -0.16 19 -0.17** 36 -26.17 -40.03 67.98 
Dominican Republic 0.01   38.47 -0.03  29 -0.05  8 -0.49 -0.64 62.53 
Finland -0.26***  33.94 0.13 31 -0.34*** 25 29.22 42.49 55.73 
France -0.24***  21.16 -0.06 16 -0.29*** 40 -67.18 -99.63 82.32 
Germany -0.39***       -50.31 -71.98 73.11 
Ghana -            0.01   33.59 -0.06 27 -0.01 27 -10.89 -10.9 86.47 
Greece -0.09**  71.68 -0.16 29 -0.05 26 -108.32 -153.47 144.89 
Haiti 0.04        -6.75 -6.84 133.15 
Honduras -0.09**       -14.5 -18.28 96.46 
Hungary -0.40**       -63.52 -90.19 101.82 
          continued… 
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Threshold Regression (Public Debt % of GDP) 
Financial Net Worth in 





















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Iceland -0.14***       -57.38 -81.95 82.07 
India -0.01  70.12 -0.09 42 -0.02 14 -9.63 -10.16 77.85 
Indonesia -0.01  34.38 0.01 20 -0.04 25 107.35 142.91 60.52 
Ireland -0.12**       -73.36 -114.24 107.75 
Israel -0.08***       -76.9 -137.78 154.32 
Italy -0.17***       -107.76 -158.69 121.55 
Japan -0.24***  195 -0.07* 47 -0.32*** 9 -118.86 -188.95 220 
Mexico 0.02  53.98 -0.05 48 0.01 8 -34.26 -60.84 56.8 
Netherlands -0.06  75.5 -0.08 46 0.27 8 -42.76 -61.85 75.74 
New Zealand -0.19***       5.53 5.52 68.05 
Nicaragua -0.01*       -0.17 -0.27 225.39 
Norway -0.05  49.08 -0.04 46 0.07 10 80.63 102.44 52.74 
Pakistan -0.02  72.92 0.05 34 0.01 14 -10.08 -16.6 78.77 
Panama -0.14*  26.21 -0.43 10 -0.23*** 37 2.84 2.97 99.48 
Paraguay  -0.03  45.49 -0.04 31 -0.02 11 18.68 19.85 57.11 
Peru  -0.06**  34.51 -0.07 18 -0.02 28 0.69 0.64 49.93 
Philippines  -0.00  15.87 -0.23 11 -0.01 43 -1.54 -2.08 66.34 
Poland -0.08       -33.91 -49.15 61.95 
Portugal -0.24***  44.45 -0.31 21 -0.22*** 34 -70.7 -108.11 93.32 
Romania  -0.06 -0.06      -2.55 -2.71 31.04 
Russian Federation 0.06       -1.21 -1.27 59.86 
          continued… 
   















Threshold Regression (Public Debt % of GDP) 
Financial Net Worth in 





















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
South Africa  -0.15***  30.61 0.12 7 -0.16** 45 -4.55 -4.69 45.93 
South Korea  -0.22***  21.62 -0.18 42 -0.44*** 14 33.15 58.51 33.44 
Spain  -0.30***      15 -58.59 -87.54 67.48 
Sweden -0.33***  42.74 -0.08 29 -0.18*** 24 -6.18 -13.49 69.85 
Switzerland  -0.15***  60.52 0.01 26 -0.07 10 -13.35 -20.79 63.72 
Thailand -0.05**       -2.32 -2.36 47.53 
Turkey -0.10   32.69 0.22 15 -0.14** 26 -1.51 -1.53 52.09 
UK -0.45***  51.63 -0.09 33 -0.45*** 22 -74.24 -104.62 94.61 
Uruguay  -0.01 -0.01      -3.58 -3.64 90.14 
USA -0.47***       -106.46 -150.15 95.19 
Venezuela  -0.03  46.45 -0.03 39 -0.03 15 -14.71 -14.79 64.78 
Note: This table presents the estimates of five approaches used to identify the vulnerable economies. Column 2 presents the result of Bohn’s (1998) approach, where the coefficient of public 
debt to GDP in Equation 5.2.1 (Section 5.2, Chapter 5) is reported. Columns 3 to 8 present the results of threshold regression. For the case of five economies, we could not identify the threshold 
of public debt to GDP. Column 3 reports the results for these cases. The results of these cases are identical to those reported in Column 2 of this table. Column 4 presents the threshold value. 
Columns 5 and 7 report the parameter estimates at the threshold values (before and after the threshold values), respectively. Columns 9 and 10 present the results of financial net worth in VaR 
and CVaR. Likewise, Columns 11 and 12 provide the results of public debt overhang in VaR and CVaR. Column 13 provides the value of the fiscal vulnerability index calculated using Equation 
5.5.1.1 (Section 5.5.1, Chapter 5). *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10, five and one per cent, respectively.             
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6.2.3 Country-specific Threshold 
Threshold regression analysis allows the parameter estimates to vary across different regimes. 
For the cases with no identified significant thresholds, the model collapsed down to the 
traditional Bohn (1998) model. We present the results of the threshold regression in Columns 
3 to 8 of Table 6.1. For some cases, we could not capture any threshold, and the parameter 
estimates were identical to those reported in Column 2 of Table 6.1. We report these estimates 
in Column 3 of Table 6.1. For the remaining cases, the optimal number of regimes was 
identified as two, and the parameter estimates were expected to be different across two regimes. 
These regimes were driven from a specific threshold value of debt-to-GDP ratios. Column 4 
reports these threshold values where the parameter estimates were expected to be different. The 
parameter estimates at these threshold values (before and after the threshold values) are 
reported in Columns 5 and 6 of Table 6.1. 
We estimated the threshold regression for all countries included in the sample. The threshold 
regression identified different thresholds for 11 economies, beyond which the economy may 
slip into fiscal crisis. These 11 economies were Denmark, Finland, France, Japan, Panama, 
Portugal, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, Turkey and the UK. These thresholds ranged 
from a minimum of 21.16 per cent to a maximum of 84.06 per cent of public debt to GDP for 
the case of France and Belgium, respectively. We noted that eight of these 11 economies were 
commonly identified as vulnerable economies by all three approaches.126 We also noted that 
10 of these 11 economies were commonly identified as vulnerable by Bohn’s approach and 
threshold regression.127 Interestingly, we identified Turkey as a vulnerable economy using only 
threshold regression. Given that the threshold regression allows flexibility in model parameters 
through regime-switching behaviour, it identified Turkey as vulnerable to debt crisis when the 
debt level exceeded 30.69 per cent of GDP. By adding Turkey, we identified a total of 40 
economies as vulnerable to debt crisis using the first three procedures of our fiscal vulnerable 
selection procedure. These economies were Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Colombia, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, 
Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, South Africa, South 
                                                 
126 These eight economies were Denmark, Finland, France, Panama, Portugal, South Africa, Sweden and the 
UK. 
127 These 10 economies were Denmark, Finland, France, Japan, Panama, Portugal, South Africa, South Korea, 
Sweden and the UK. 
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Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, the UK and the US. Our proposed 
approaches add additional insight to the problem, and indicate that policies based on the single 
threshold of 90 percentage of debt to GDP can be critically substituted with a country-specific 
threshold level of debt to GDP ratio. 
6.3 Investment Component Analysis of Fiscal Vulnerability 
In the fourth step, we analysed the financial net worth (VaR and CVaR) of all 40 vulnerable 
economies to incorporate the investment component of the public sector balance sheet.128 We 
present the values of financial net worth (VaR and CVaR) in Columns 9 and 10 of Table 6.1. 
It was interesting to note that the values of financial net worth (VaR and CVaR) for 26 out of 
40 vulnerable economies were negative.129 These negative values of financial net worth (VaR 
and CVaR) reconfirmed the fiscal vulnerability of these economies. However, the remaining 
14 economies were expected to be able to finance future interest and debt payments in many 
ways other than taxation. For this purpose, Section 5.5.3 (Chapter 5) provides a benchmark 
value of financial net worth (VaR and CVaR) to identify an economy as vulnerable to debt 
crisis. We observed in Section 5.5.3 (Chapter 5) that an economy is categorised as vulnerable 
if its calculated value is less than ˗10.130 Columns 9 and 10 of Table 6.1 indicate that the 
financial net worth (VaR) of Argentina, the Dominican Republic, Finland, Indonesia, New 
Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand 
and Turkey was ˗2.92, ˗0.49, 29.22, 107.35, 5.53, ˗0.17, 80.63, 2.84, 18.68, 0.69, ˗4.55, 33.15, 
˗2.32 and ˗1.51, respectively. Similarly, the financial net worth (CVaR) of Argentina, the 
Dominican Republic, Finland, Indonesia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand and Turkey was ˗2.97, ˗0.64, 42.49, 
                                                 
128 Incorporating an investment component is more relevant to economies identified as vulnerable under debt 
analysis. Debt analysis ignores the appropriate classification of rising debt, where the investment aspect of 
public debt improves the government balance sheet. Therefore, the higher financial net worth of these 
economies indicates that they are able to finance future interest and debt payments in many ways other than 
taxation. Further, the investment aspect of public debt is more relevant in fiscal vulnerability analysis for 
countries using accrual accounting for the fiscal policy measure. For instance, Marti (2006) identified that the 
fiscal framework of New Zealand has been purely based on accrual budgeting since the fiscal year 1993 to 1994 
(also see Khan & Mayes, 2009). This framework is prepared under generally accepted accounting principles. In 
this framework, net worth is one of the key fiscal aggregates calculated from the consolidated financial 
statements for the central government. By 2009, 16 countries shifted from cash accounting to accrual base. 
Except for Colombia, the rest of the economies had shifted towards accrual base accounting (Khan & Mayes, 
2009).  
129 These 26 economies included Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Pakistan, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US. 
130 This benchmark value is also elaborated in the next Section 6.4 (‘Alternative Approaches and Comparison 
with Country Rating’). 
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142.91, 5.52, ̠ 0.27, 102.44, 2.97, 19.85, 0.64, ̠ 4.69, 58.51, ̠ 2.36 and ̠ 1.53, respectively. These 
results indicate that the governments of these economies can use non-taxation approaches—
including selling financial assets—to finance future interest and debt payments. Therefore, we 
categorised these economies as non-vulnerable. Overall, we classified a total of 26 economies 
as vulnerable economies based on our proposed fiscal vulnerability selection procedure.131 
6.4 Alternative Approaches and Comparison with Country Rating 
We further analysed the results of alternative techniques of fiscal vulnerability available in the 
literature. We present the values of financial net worth (VaR and CVaR) in Columns 9 and 10 
in Table 6.1, respectively. We present the fiscal vulnerability index calculated using Equation 
5.5.1.1 (Section 5.5.1, Chapter 5) in Column 11 of Table 6.1. The alternative measure, financial 
net worth or balance sheet approach identified 29 of 53 economies as vulnerable to debt 
crisis.132 At this stage of analysis, we considered two aspects. First, non-financial assets were 
not included in the financial net worth calculation. Second, we used the worst value of financial 
net worth by employing VaR and CVaR. As a result of these two factors, we had some leverage 
to determine the benchmark for financial net worth. To search for this benchmark of financial 
                                                 
131 These 26 economies included Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Pakistan, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US. Australia was included in these 26 vulnerable 
economies using our fiscal vulnerability analysis. For the case of Australia, we incorporated country-specific 
aspects. For this purpose, we used two other measures of public debt in consideration of the Australian GFS 
system: ASNA 1993 and ASNA 2008. Based on the criticism of Eisner and Pieper (1984) and Soos (2016), it is 
important to review the results of Australian general government public debt after incorporating offsetting 
accounts. For this purpose, we used data on net debt from 1970 to 2016. We used net debt as an alternative 
measure of public debt in Equation 5.2.1 (Section 5.2, Chapter 5). The debt coefficient of net public debt (β2 = 
˗0.86, p < 0.01) was highly significant, which revealed that the Australian economy was vulnerable to debt 
crisis, even after adjusting offsetting accounts from gross public debt. The key criticism of Soos (2016) of 
Australian public debt is invalid. Soos (2016) identified two periods when the Australian general government 
was a net creditor. The key problem with this explanation is that the net debt of Australia started increasing 
during both periods. For instance, the Australian general government became a net debtor from 1976, and its 
level increased to the level of 18.10 per cent in 1995. Similarly, the Australian general government became a net 
debtor from 2009, and its level of net debt increased to the level of 17.30 per cent in 2015. Therefore, the rising 
level of Australian public debt cannot be justified through offsetting accounts. Our results based on net public 
debt indicate that the current level of net public debt is vulnerable to sovereign debt crisis. We also analysed the 
results of another alternate approach of net financial liabilities of the Australian general government. We used 
data of net financial liabilities from 1990 to 2016. We employed net financial liabilities as an alternative 
measure of public debt in Equation 5.2.1 (Section 5.2, Chapter 5). The value of the net financial liabilities 
coefficient (β2 = ˗0.29, p < 0.01) was significant, which revealed that the Australian general government net 
financial liabilities—including unfunded superannuation liabilities—are also vulnerable to sovereign debt crisis. 
In summary, the Australian economy is vulnerable to debt crisis using all three measures when its public debt to 
GDP reaches its optimal level of 23.41. 
132 Using the financial net worth approach, the following economies were found to be vulnerable to debt crisis: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, 
Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Poland, 
Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, the UK, the US and Venezuela. Specifically, the financial net worth (VaR) of 
these economies was less than the benchmark of ˗10.00. 
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net worth, we used our fiscal vulnerability selection procedure as the main approach. We 
compared the financial net worth (VaR and CVaR) of all 53 economies with the results of the 
fiscal vulnerability selection procedure. We attempted to identify the maximum number of 
economies that were either identified as vulnerable or non-vulnerable under financial net worth 
(VaR) and our main approach. Maximum economies as correctly identified when financial net 
worth of a country is ˗10.00. Here, a correctly identified economy means that this economy 
was identified as vulnerable or non-vulnerable using financial net worth and our main approach. 
This gave us a benchmark of ˗10.00 for financial net worth (VaR). Using this benchmark, an 
economy was vulnerable if its financial net worth (VaR) was less than ˗10.00, and an economy 
was non-vulnerable if its financial net worth was greater than ˗10.00. 133  However, this 
benchmark should be used carefully. We recommend using it in a similar way as applied in the 
fourth step of our fiscal vulnerability selection procedure (Figure 5.2, Chapter 5). For example, 
if an economy is identified as vulnerable using the first three steps of our fiscal vulnerability 
selection procedure (debt analysis), then compare its financial net worth (VaR) with our 
benchmark of ˗10.00. If the financial net worth of this economy is less than ˗10.00, then 
categorise this economy as vulnerable. In this manner, an economy is considered vulnerable 
after incorporating public investment in the public debt analysis, as suggested in the existing 
literature (Abelson, 2012; Gruber, 2016; Makin & Pearce, 2016; Mellor, 1996). Conversely, if 
the financial net worth of an economy is greater than ˗10.00, then categorise this economy as 
non-vulnerable. For example, in our case, this included Argentina, the Dominican Republic, 
Finland, Indonesia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, South Africa, 
South Korea, Thailand and Turkey. Conversely, 24 economies were non-vulnerable because 
their financial net worth (VaR) was either positive or greater than ˗10.00.134 Comparing these 
results with the results of our proposed fiscal vulnerability selection approach indicated that 34 
economies were correctly identified and the remaining 19 economies were incorrectly 
identified.135 
                                                 
133 Contradictory results for a few economies are elaborated at the end of this section. 
134 The 24 non-vulnerable economies were Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, the Dominican Republic, 
Finland, Haiti, Indonesia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, 
Romania, the Russian Federation, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey and Uruguay. 
135 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, 
Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, the 
UK and the US were correctly identified as vulnerable economies using all approaches. Similarly, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Chile, China, Haiti, the Philippines, Romania, the Russian Federation and Uruguay were correctly 
identified as non-vulnerable economies using the financial net worth approach and our fiscal vulnerability 
selection criteria. Conversely, Argentina, the Dominican Republic, Finland, Indonesia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, 
Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, Thailand and Turkey were incorrectly 
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We further extended the analysis to the fiscal vulnerability index, where a positive value for a 
country indicated that this economy was vulnerable to debt crisis. We identified 22 of 53 
economies as vulnerable using the results of the fiscal vulnerability index.136 We compared 
these results with the results of our proposed fiscal vulnerability selection approach, and 35 
economies were correctly identified. 137  Table 6.1 summarises the complete results of all 
techniques for all economies. This table reveals some controversies between the results of our 
fiscal vulnerability selection approach and the alternative techniques. For instance, the fiscal 
vulnerability index identified seven (Austria, Denmark, France, Honduras, Iceland, Mexico 
and Sweden) of 26 vulnerable economies as non-vulnerable economies. This may be because 
the fiscal vulnerability index is based on the sample mean, which is sensitive to the inclusion 
of the sample selection of countries. Theoretically, the public finance variables of each 
economy in a large sample of developing, emerging and developed economies behave 
differently (Alesina & Ardagna, 2010). Nonetheless, in the fiscal vulnerability index technique, 
the public debt is compared with the sample mean, rather than a country-specific fiscal variable, 
such as fiscal balance. The public debt of these seven economies was less than the sample mean, 
yet not necessarily unsustainable. 138  Consequently, we recommend that these alternative 
approaches cannot be applied as standalone approaches to assess the fiscal vulnerability of a 
large sample. This finding aligns with Égert (2015). 
Then, we compared the results of the two alternative approaches with each other. For instance, 
comparing the results of the fiscal vulnerability index and the financial net worth indicated that 
the financial net worth results incorrectly identified 11 economies as non-vulnerable (Chile, 
                                                 
identified as non-vulnerable under this approach. Likewise, Costa Rica, Ghana, Poland and Venezuela were 
incorrectly identified as vulnerable under this approach. Here, an incorrectly identified economy means that 
either this economy was vulnerable in the financial net worth approach and non-vulnerable in our main 
approach, or non-vulnerable in the financial net worth approach and vulnerable in our main approach. 
136 A positive value of the fiscal vulnerability index indicates that the debt of the country is higher than the 
average debt of the countries included in the sample. Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, Greece, Haiti, 
Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, 
Poland, Portugal, the UK, Uruguay and the US were identified as vulnerable by the fiscal vulnerability index 
technique. 
137 Correctly identified: (i) Argentina, Belgium, Greece, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Pakistan, Portugal, the UK and the US as vulnerable; (ii) Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, the 
Dominican Republic, Finland, Ghana, Indonesia, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Romania, the 
Russian Federation, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand, Turkey and Venezuela as non-vulnerable. Incorrectly 
identified: (i) Australia, Austria, Colombia, Denmark, France, Germany, Honduras, Iceland, Mexico, Spain, 
Sweden, and Switzerland as non-vulnerable; (ii) Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Haiti, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Poland and Uruguay as vulnerable. 
138 If the fiscal vulnerability index of a country is negative, the country is vulnerable under this technique (as a 
standalone technique). However, this negative value of the fiscal vulnerability index only indicates that the 
public debt of the country is less than the sample mean of public debt. Therefore, this technique (as a standalone 
technique) cannot be exclusively used for fiscal vulnerability analysis. 
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China, Finland, Haiti, India, New Zealand, Nicaragua, the Russian Federation, Sweden, 
Thailand and Turkey).139 The financial net worth (VaR) of these economies was as follows: 
Chile (˗0.19), China (˗1.87), Finland (29.22), Haiti (˗6.75), India (˗9.63), New Zealand (5.53), 
Nicaragua (˗0.17), the Russian Federation (˗1.21), Sweden (˗6.18), Thailand (˗2.32) and 
Turkey (˗1.51). Interestingly, the financial net worth of all these economies was negative, 
except for Finland and New Zealand, yet greater than our benchmark of ˗10.00. Following our 
benchmark of ˗10.00, all these economies had a financial net worth (VaR) greater than 
˗10.00.140 These results indicate that our benchmark of ˗10.00 for financial net worth (VaR) 
also works for the standalone approach; however, we recommend using it with care.141 
Next, we also compared our results with the available country ratings conducted by different 
rating agencies, including S&P, Moody’s and Fitch Group. We present the country rating by 
Moody’s, Fitch and S&P in Columns 2 to 4 of Table 6.2, respectively. We also present the 
country outlook by Moody’s, Fitch and S&P in Columns 5 to 7 of Table 6.2, respectively. In 
contrast with our findings, we observed that Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, Sweden and the 
UK had a stable outlook.142 This was mainly because of other factors considered in determining 
the sovereign credit rating by Fitch Group, Moody’s and S&P (Mellios & Paget-Blanc, 
2006).143 Chile and Denmark were highlighted in the forward and moving screening process 
                                                 
139 Here, financial net worth (VaR and CVaR) is used as a standalone approach. 
140 One possible reason for this controversy could be that the non-financial assets of these economies are not 
generating sufficient revenue to cover their fiscal expenses. In these cases, negative financial net worth provides 
enough information to categorise these economies as vulnerable. We also analysed the contradictory results for 
the case of non-vulnerable economies using the fiscal vulnerability index. In this panel, six (Bulgaria, Costa 
Rica, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Panama and Uruguay) of 23 non-vulnerable economies were identified as 
vulnerable using the fiscal vulnerability index. In these cases, the public debt was higher than the sample mean, 
which does not necessarily indicate that this amount of public debt is unsustainable. Further, we compared these 
results with the results of all other techniques. In four of these six cases, the results were consistent and non-
vulnerable. Consequently, the fiscal vulnerability index was unable to correctly identify these economies. 
Nonetheless, in the other two cases (Costa Rica and the Netherlands), the fiscal vulnerability index identified 
both economies as vulnerable and their financial net worth as negative. In this panel, the financial net worth (in 
the VaR and CVaR framework) of 24 economies was either positive or greater then ˗10, which could safely 
identify the non-vulnerable economies because non-financial assets were not included in financial net worth. 
However, the financial net worth for 10 economies (Australia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Germany, Ghana, 
Indonesia, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland and Venezuela) of 23 non-vulnerable economies was worse than 
˗10. A possible reason for a negative financial net worth worse than ˗10 is a scenario in which these economies 
have a higher portion of public investment in non-financial assets than in financial assets. As a result, the returns 
from these non-financial assets—such as land, property and public enterprises—will be higher. The government 
is using these returns to pay off the debts, along with debt services. Net public worth (which includes all 
financial and non-financial assets) is expected to be positive for these economies. However, data on net public 
worth for all 53 economies were not available. Consequently, we recommend using this approach with care, 
especially for a large sample. 
141 See discussion on the use of benchmark in Section 6.3 (‘Investment Component Analysis of Fiscal 
Vulnerability’). 
142 Only Chile and China had a positive outlook according to S&P and Moody’s, respectively. 




as vulnerable for the period 1983 and 1990; however, these years were not covered by the 
above rating agencies.  
The discussion above indicates that any of the standalone approaches may not correctly help 
distinguish between vulnerable and non-vulnerable economies. Therefore, we emphasise the 
use of our proposed fiscal vulnerability selection procedure (Figure 5.2, Chapter 5) to 
investigate fiscal vulnerability in economies. By applying our proposed fiscal vulnerability 
selection procedure, we identified 26 out of 53 economies as vulnerable to debt crisis (see Table 
6.1) with different threshold levels where public debt reduced the primary balance. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Austria Aaa AAA AAA STABLE STABLE 
WATCH 
NEGATIVE 
Belgium Aa1 AA+ AA RUR- NEGATIVE 
WATCH 
NEGATIVE 
Canada Aaa AAA AAA STABLE STABLE STABLE 
Chile Aa3 A+ A+ STABLE STABLE POSITIVE 
China Aa3 A+ AA- POSITIVE STABLE STABLE 
Denmark Aaa AAA AAA STABLE STABLE STABLE 
France Aaa AAA AAA STABLE STABLE 
WATCH 
NEGATIVE 




Hungary Baa3 BBB- BBB- NEGATIVE NEGATIVE 
WATCH 
NEGATIVE 
Iceland Baa3 BB+ BBB- NEGATIVE STABLE STABLE 
India Baa3 BBB- BBB- STABLE STABLE STABLE 
Ireland Ba1 BBB+ BBB+ NEGATIVE NEGATIVE 
WATCH 
NEGATIVE 
Israel A1 A A+ STABLE STABLE STABLE 
Italy A2 A+ A NEGATIVE NEGATIVE 
WATCH 
NEGATIVE 
Japan Aa3 AA AA- STABLE NEGATIVE NEGATIVE 
Mexico Baa1 BBB BBB STABLE STABLE STABLE 
Pakistan B3 -- B- STABLE  STABLE 
Portugal Ba2 BBB- BBB- NEGATIVE NEGATIVE 
WATCH 
NEGATIVE 
Russia Baa1 BBB BBB STABLE POSITIVE STABLE 
Sweden Aaa AAA AAA STABLE STABLE STABLE 
Thailand Baa1 BBB BBB+ STABLE STABLE STABLE 
Turkey Ba2 BB+ BB POSITIVE POSITIVE POSITIVE 
UK Aaa AAA AAA STABLE STABLE STABLE 













Austria Aaa AAA AAA STABLE STABLE 
WATCH 
NEGATIVE 
Note: This sovereign credit rating is as of December 2011, since the data used for the vulnerability analysis were available up to 
December 2011. This ranking was extracted and arranged for the countries identified as vulnerable. AAA and Aaa indicate top 
notch. Ba1, Ba2, BB, BB+, B-, B2, B3, Ca, CC and CCC indicate junk bonds. A, A-, A+, A1, A2, AA, AA-, AA+, Aa1, Aa3, Baa1, 




6.5 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, we first classified the sample of 53 economies as vulnerable and non-vulnerable 
using our fiscal vulnerability selection procedure (Figure 5.2, Chapter 5). In particular, we 
extended our analysis from the conventional debt approach to the investment approach, and 
selected countries commonly identified by both approaches as vulnerable to fiscal crisis. For 
this purpose, we initially used Bohn’s (1998) model, which identified 30 economies as 
vulnerable to debt crisis (the first step of our fiscal vulnerability selection procedure). However, 
these results could be misleading when the sample for the period of vulnerability is pooled with 
the non-vulnerability sample, as one sample would nullify the effects of the other. Therefore, 
studies exclusively relying on this approach are unable to correctly identify some vulnerable 
economies. To overcome this problem, we systematically extended these estimates to 
subsample through forward, backward and moving screening processes. These results revealed 
that 39 (nine additional) of 53 economies were identified as vulnerable to debt crisis at some 
point in time (second step). It could be argued that these screening processes may not 
completely avoid the identification problem because some vulnerable periods can be nullified 
by non-vulnerable periods within the subsample. Therefore, we extended our analysis to 
country-specific threshold regression, which can endogenously determine the period at which 
a country is vulnerable to crisis. This analysis provided 11 country-specific thresholds beyond 
which an economy becomes vulnerable to debt crisis. However, 10 of these economies were 
also commonly identified as vulnerable during the first and third steps of our fiscal 
vulnerability selection criteria. The results of the threshold regression identified an additional 
one economy as vulnerable (third step). Consequently, a total of 40 out of 53 economies were 
identified as vulnerable. In addition to the econometrics results of the debt analysis, we 
analysed the financial net worth (VaR and CVaR) of these 40 vulnerable economies to 
incorporate the investment component of the public sector balance sheet. Finally, we classified 
a total of 26 economies as vulnerable, in which public debt reduced primary surplus. The results 
also confirmed that none of the alternative approaches (fiscal vulnerability index and financial 
net worth/balance sheet approach) may be considered reliable for gauging the fiscal 
vulnerability of an economy. However, our fiscal vulnerability selection procedure may be an 
appropriate methodology to investigate fiscal vulnerability alongside a country-specific 












Following methodological notes to fiscal consolidation (Section 5.6, Chapter 5), this chapter 
first presents the analysis of fiscal consolidation for 53 economies. Fiscal consolidation is 
defined as a deliberate attempt to reduce government budget deficit (Cimadomo et al., 2014). 
The existing literature suggests two approaches to analyse fiscal consolidation: narrative 
techniques (Devries et al., 2011) and quantitative measures using CAPB. 144  Narrative 
techniques use historical records of governments’ intentions to reduce excessive public 
spending. As a result of the unavailability of source documents of narrative technique (Devries 
et al., 2011) for all 53 economies, we relied on the CAPB measure to calculate fiscal 
consolidation episodes. However, we used narrative technique for reconciliation purposes 
where the source data were available on: (i) convergence and stability programs submitted by 
the authorities to the European Commission, (ii) OECD and IMF reports, (iii) budget speeches 
and (iv) central bank reports. Based on this rigorous reconciliation, we decided to use 
quantitative measures to gauge fiscal consolidation episodes. Using CAPB, we further applied 
broader and narrow definitions to determine the fiscal consolidation episodes. We defined 
fiscal consolidation as a period in which CAPB improves by at least 1.5 per cent of GDP in a 
year, or improves by at least one per cent of GDP per year in a period of two consecutive years 
(Ardagna, 2009). Using this definition, we defined fiscal consolidation episodes for all 53 
economies.  
We then used these identified episodes in the banking stability analysis. For this purpose, we 
followed the transmission mechanism of fiscal consolidation and banking stability (Section 3.3, 
                                                 
144 See Alesina and Ardagna (2010), Alesina and Perotti (1995) and Ardagna (2009) for further details. 
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Chapter 3) and empirical strategy of measuring the influence of fiscal consolidation on banking 
stability (Section 5.7, Chapter 5). In particular, we applied Equation 5.7.1 (Section 5.7, Chapter 
5) on three different panels for: (i) all economies, (ii) vulnerable economies and (iii) non-
vulnerable economies. This analysis indicated that fiscal consolidation improves capital 
adequacy ratios, particularly for vulnerable economies. The remainder of this chapter is 
organised as follows. Section 7.2 provides the analysis of fiscal consolidation for the 53 
economies. Section 7.3 discusses the role of fiscal consolidation in the financial stability of 
vulnerable and non-vulnerable economies. Section 7.4 concludes the chapter. 
7.2 Fiscal Consolidation Analysis 
In this section, we calculate fiscal consolidation episodes to analyse their role in banking sector 
stability. We determined the fiscal consolidation episodes from 1990 to 2017 because data on 
banking stability were available from 1990 onwards. We used these fiscal consolidation 
episodes in the banking stability analysis. To calculate fiscal consolidation episodes, we 
required CAPB. We calculated CAPB from 1988 to 2017 for all 53 economies using Hodrick 
and Prescott’s (1997) filter and econometric techniques (Section 5.6, Chapter 5). We compared 
these CAPB with the results of the narrative technique (Devries et al., 2011). Fiscal 
consolidation episodes measured through narrative technique were available for the selected 
countries up to 2007 in Devries et al. (2011). In this comparison, we compared the fiscal 
consolidation episodes (calculated using Hodrick and Prescott’s [1997] filter and econometric 
techniques] with the episodes of narrative technique. This comparison indicated that fiscal 
consolidation episodes calculated using Hodrick and Prescott’s (1997) filter were more 
consistent with the fiscal consolidation episodes of the narrative technique (Devries et al., 
2011). This narrative technique is sometimes known as a descriptive approach or narrative 
approach. Based on the results from the comparison, we used cyclical components measured 
through Hodrick and Prescott (1997) for the rest of the analysis. 
We used broader and narrow approaches to calculate fiscal consolidation episodes. Using the 
values of CAPB measured using Hodrick and Prescott (1997), we calculated fiscal 
consolidation episodes through a broader approach and a narrow approach. In the broader 
approach, we analysed the changes in CAPB by taking the first and second differences of 
CAPB. If the first or second difference of CAPB was positive for a specific time, we classified 
that period as the fiscal consolidation episode. In the narrow approach, a fiscal consolidation 
episode was a period in which the CAPB improved by at least 1.5 per cent of GDP in a year, 
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or a period of two consecutive years in which the CAPB improved by at least one per cent of 
GDP per year. We compared these periods of fiscal consolidation episodes (under the broader 
approach) for some specific countries with the fiscal consolidation episodes measured through 
narrative technique (Devries et al., 2011). For this purpose, we considered the Australian case 
where data for the narrative technique were available. These source data included: (i) 
convergence and stability programs submitted by the authorities to the European Commission, 
(ii) OECD and IMF reports, (iii) budget speeches and (iv) central bank reports. Table F1 
(Appendix F) provides the first and second differences of CAPB for the period from 1986 to 
2015 for the case of Australia. We found 14 episodes of fiscal consolidation from 1988 to 2015 
where the first or second difference of CAPB was positive. 
We compared these episodes with the fiscal consolidation episodes defined under the narrative 
technique proposed by Devries et al. (2011). Interestingly, our broader approach identified all 
the episodes identified under the narrative technique. However, we could not compare fiscal 
consolidation episodes from 2008 onwards because Devries et al. (2011) only provided fiscal 
consolidation episodes until 2007. Contradictory findings were observed in 1989, 1992, 1993, 
2002, 2004 and 2007, where there was a positive change in the CAPB by 7.61, 66.00, 21.78, 
11.76, 8.73 and 16.93 per cent, respectively. The narrative technique did not identify these 
years as an episode of fiscal consolidation. A possible explanation for the contradictory result 
in 1993 is that the positive change of 21.78 per cent is where the CAPB changes from ˗63.46 
per cent to ˗41.68 per cent. However, the rest of the positive changes identified during 1989, 
2002, 2004 and 2007 were positive values of CAPB. These findings suggest that our calculated 
CAPB aligns with the narrative technique, which also considered positive change as an episode 
without any benchmark. This comparison revealed that both approaches (broader and narrow) 
can be used to calculate fiscal consolidation episodes. Therefore, we present the results for the 
financial stability analysis under both approaches. 
The intuition behind these approaches is the same when CAPB improves. However, our 
concern was analysing the role of these episodes for banking stability. Market confidence is 
not expected to be restored in a fiscal vulnerable economy because of minor positive change in 
CAPB (Agnello et al., 2015a; Ardagna, 2009; Arezki et al., 2011).145 The existing literature 
has also used specific changes in the CAPB (Alesina & Ardagna, 2010; Alesina & Perotti, 1995; 
                                                 
145 For instance, banks are not expected to rebalance their portfolio if CAPB improves from ˗63.46 per cent to 
˗41.68 per cent, as occurred in 1993 for the case of Australia. 
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Ardagna, 2009; Barrios et al., 2010; Mirdala, 2013), instead of using only the first and second 
positive change in the CAPB. We did not exclusively rely on the broader approach to measure 
fiscal consolidation episodes because market confidence is not expected to be restored without 
a constant improvement (Agnello et al., 2015a; Ardagna, 2009). For banking stability analysis, 
we primarily used the narrow approach to calculate fiscal consolidation episodes, where a fiscal 
consolidation episode is a period in which the CAPB improves by at least 1.5 per cent of GDP 
in a year, or a period of two consecutive years in which the CAPB improves by at least one per 
cent of GDP per year. Using this definition, the fiscal consolidation episodes of all 53 
economies are given in Table F2 (Appendix F).146 However, we used the broader approach as 
an alternate approach in financial stability analysis. 
7.3 Fiscal Consolidation and Banking Sector Stability 
This section provides the results and discussion on the influence of fiscal consolidation on 
banking stability for all 47 economies.147 We categorise this section into descriptive and panel 
analysis. In the descriptive analysis section, we discuss the descriptive statistics of the banking 
and fiscal variables used in the study. In the panel analysis section, we discuss the role of fiscal 
consolidation for three panels: (i) all economies, (ii) all vulnerable economies and (iii) all non-
vulnerable economies.148 
                                                 
146 We further used the fiscal consolidation episodes with a broad and narrow approach in the banking stability 
analysis. We observed a statistically significant influence of fiscal consolidation episodes (narrow approach) on 
the banking stability of the selected economies. These results align with the existing literature (Agnello et al., 
2015a; Ardagna, 2009; Arezki et al., 2011). Some of these economies were not included in the banking stability 
analysis because of lack of available banking sector data in the Bankscope database. Costa Rica, the Dominican 
Republic, Panama, Paraguay and Uruguay were not included in the banking stability analysis because of the 
lack of available financial statements on their banking sector in the Bankscope database. In Table F3 (Appendix 
F), we present fiscal consolidation of 54 economies. 
147 As a result of the unavailability of data on banking sectors, we could not carry seven economies from the 
fiscal vulnerability analysis. These seven economies were Honduras, India, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Poland, 
Turkey and Uruguay. We included 47 economies in our panel analysis. Additionally, we included Hong Kong in 
the analysis. As a result, the panel of 47 economies included Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ghana, Greece, Haiti, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, 
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, Portugal, South Korea, 
Romania, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the UK, the US and 
Venezuela. 
148 The panel of all economies included 47 economies. The classification of vulnerable and non-vulnerable 
economies was based on our fiscal vulnerability analysis in Sections 6.2 and 6.3 (Chapter 6). Twenty-four 
economies were included in the panel of vulnerable economies: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, 
Greece, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, 
Pakistan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US. Twenty-three economies were included in 
the panel of non-vulnerable economies: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Costa Rica, the Dominican 
Republic, Finland, Ghana, Haiti, Hong Kong, Indonesia, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, 
South Korea, Romania, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Thailand and Venezuela. 
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7.3.1 Descriptive Analysis 
We provide the summary statistics for all banking and fiscal variables for all 47 economies in 
Table 7.1. We considered 739 banks in our analysis. We further categorised this table into three 
subsamples: (i) first sample with all 47 economies, (ii) second sample with vulnerable 
economies and (iii) third sample with non-vulnerable economies. We considered bank-specific 
banking variables to analyse the role of fiscal consolidation on banking stability. We observed 
that the Tier-2 ratio (M = 16.65, SD = 86.45) was slightly higher than the Tier-1 (M = 14.57, 
SD = 82.79) in the full sample of Table 7.1. We found substantial variation in both measures 
of banking stability. To analyse the source of variation, we further investigated the variation 
between the banks and within the banks.149 In both cases, we observed higher variation for the 
case of between banks than within banks. Banks have different capital structures, including 
equity, retained earnings, other classes of stocks and subordinated bonds (Cimadomo et al., 
2014). Along these lines, Mishkin (2000) indicated that banks have different capital structure 
because of the higher cost of holding capital.150 Further, the variation between Tier-1 and Tier-
2 indicates a slightly higher variation in Tier-2. We then analysed the variation in capital 
adequacy ratios in the subsamples. We observed a slightly higher variation in Tier-2 for the 
case of vulnerable economies (M = 13.69, SD = 24.38) than with the non-vulnerable economies 
(M = 13.27, SD = 18.76). One of the possible reasons for the higher variation in Tier-2 is the 
other classes of capital, including preferred stocks and subordinated bonds.151 Further, the 





                                                 
149 Variation between the banks was calculated across the sample of banks. However, variation within the banks 
was calculated across the sample period from 1990 to 2016.  
150 Bank managers prefer to hold less capital. In these cases, the amount of bank capital is determined by the 
bank capital requirements (also see Gropp & Heider, 2010).  
151 Sometimes, it includes revaluation reserves, subordinated term debt, hybrid capital instruments, undisclosed 
reserves and general loan-loss reserves. 
152 This is the only difference between Tier-1 and Tier-2. As given in Equation 3.3.9 (Section 3.3, Chapter 3), 
Tier-2 included equity, retained earnings, preferred stock and subordinated bonds. Another possible reason for 
this variation is risk-weighted assets. As indicated above, banks have different classes of assets, and these assets 
are subject to change subject to trade-off between risk and return. 
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Table 7.1: Descriptive Statistics           
  Mean SD Min Max Obs. 
All Economies      
Tier-1 14.57 82.79 0.16 499.84 7430 
Tier-2 16.65 86.45 0.06 499.84 8180 
Size 8.17 2.00 0.75 16.49 11594 
Return on Assets 0.91 2.74 -70.72 53.42 11468 
Output Gap -0.67 5.48 -55.63 47.3 18475 
Debt to GDP 71.02 35.11 4.10 229.61 16303 
Interest Rates 2.62 1.60 -0.22 14.47 16303 
CAPB -0.42 2.77 -13.32 16.41 18475 
Vulnerable 
Economies 
     
Tier-1 13.69 24.38 0.06 499.84 6779 
Tier-2 15.58 23.81 0.16 499.84 7132 
Size 8.01 1.91 0.75 15.21 10100 
Return on Assets 0.87 2.25 -45.92 53.42 9974 
Output Gap -0.72 2.54 -24.80 28.63 16025 
Debt to GDP 74.80 34.26 10.83 229.61 14579 
Interest Rates 2.81 1.42 -1.30 11.86 14579 
CAPB -0.79 2.5 -13.32 6.93 16025 
Non-vulnerable Economies         
Tier-1 13.27 18.76 0.81 470.1 651 
Tier-2 16.73 7.40 1.48 93.00 1048 
Size 9.15 2.31 1.22 16.49 1494 
Return on Assets 1.16 4.89 -70.72 32.53 1494 
Output Gap -0.28 13.58 -55.63 47.30 2450 
Debt to GDP 39.08 24.30 4.10 164.97 1724 
Interest Rates 1.02 2.02 -0.26 14.47 1724 
CAPB 2.04 3.08 -6.67 16.41 2450 
Note: Size indicates the log of total assets of the individual banks. Return on assets was calculated as the return 
on average assets of the individual bank. Average assets were calculated by taking the average of the beginning 
and ending assets. The value of beginning assets was the book value of assets on the balance sheet of the last 
year. Debt was the public debt to GDP. Interest rates were the long-term interest rates. CAPB indicates the 





Next, we found that the size (log of total assets) of all the banks included in the sample was 
less volatile (M = 8.17, SD = 2.00) because of the lower variation within the banks (M = 8.17, 
SD = 0.58). A possible explanation for this is the portion of fixed assets in the total assets.153 
In contrast, the variation of total assets between the banks (M = 8.40, SD = 1.49) was slightly 
higher than the variation of total assets within the banks. This variation arose because some 
banks have higher volatile assets if they have invested in financial assets. Further, the life of 
the banks is also expected to have a significant influence on the variation of total assets between 
the banks. Moreover, new banks are expected to have higher variation in their total assets than 
older banks. 
Next, we analysed the return on assets, which is calculated as the return on average assets. 
Return on assets was comparatively stable for all 739 banks of all economies (M = 0.91, SD = 
2.74). However, the variation within the banks (M = 0.91, SD = 2.31) was slightly higher than 
the variation between the banks (M = 0.91, SD = 1.49). This suggests that the banks had been 
changing their corporate strategies over the sample period because of internal and external 
factors. The overall minimum value indicated the period of losses (net losses after interest and 
tax). Conversely, banks had return on assets up to 53.42. Higher profits are expected to be 
helpful during a period of fiscal consolidation. Banks can easily investment in government 
securities without worrying about the lower return. 
Turning now to the fiscal variables, the last three variables were country-wise variables; 
therefore, the variation within the country indicated the overall variation. Similarly, the 
maximum and minimum values within the country represented the overall values. Among these 
variables, the public debt to GDP ratio (M = 71.02, SD = 35.11) provided useful information 
about the average public debt over the period for all the economies. The higher variation was 
within the countries, which was mainly attributable to the episodes of fiscal consolidation. 
There was no substantial variation in the rest of the statistics. We extended our analysis to the 
second subsample. Further, the public debt to GDP ratio (M = 74.80, SD = 34.26) provided 
useful information about the average public debt over the period, which was higher than the 
panel of non-vulnerable economies (M = 39.08, SD = 24.30).  
                                                 
153 Total assets are broadly categorised into fixed and current assets. Fixed assets normally remain fixed over the 
period within the banks. This variation is within the banks; thus, it is expected that the proportion of fixed assets 
in the total assets of banks is higher. However, all these assets are not included in the risk-weighted assets used 
for capital adequacy ratios. These risk-weighted assets are defined by the Basel Accords. 
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7.3.2 Panel Analysis 
To analyse the effect of fiscal consolidation on the banking stability of all 47 economies, we 
categorised the economies into vulnerable and non-vulnerable based on our fiscal vulnerability 
analysis (Sections 6.2 and 6.3, Chapter 6). We considered three panels: (i) all economies, (ii) 
all vulnerable economies and (iii) all non-vulnerable economies. We report the results of our 
baseline regressions (Equation 5.7.1, Section 5.7, Chapter 5) using Roodman collapse for all 
three cases in Table 7.2. The first row in the panel of all economies indicates the results of 
Equation 5.7.1 (Section 5.7, Chapter 5) for the case where Tier-1 was the banking stability 
variable (dependent variable). The results for Tier-2 are reported in the second row of the panel 
for all economies. We report the estimated coefficients corresponding to the fiscal 
consolidation for all three panels in Column 2 of Table 7.2. We report the estimated coefficients 




Table 7.2:  Role of Fiscal Consolidation in Banking Stability – Vulnerable and Non-Vulnerable Economies  








Interest rates Constant Obs. 
(1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
All Economies Tier-1 0.36** -0.41** -1.92** -0.11 -0.00 -0.176 6.33** 6371 
  Tier-2 0.28 -0.28 -2.27* 0.015 -0.00 -0.166 4.85 6978 
Vulnerable Economies Tier-1 0.58** -0.45** -2.27** -0.02 0.00 -0.20 6.51** 5879 
  Tier-2 0.55** -0.5** -2.84* 0.01 -0.01 -0.27 7.725** 5739 
Non-vulnerable Economies Tier-1 -0.11 -0.40 0.30 -0.22 -0.01 -0.01 16.44 579 
  Tier-2 -0.08 -1.48 0.97*** -0.03 0.04 0.24 27.56*** 964 
Note: Roodman collapse results of Tier-1 and Tier-2 capital regression. Column 2 indicates the capital adequacy ratios. The first and second rows in each panel report the regression results, 
where Tier-1 and Tier-2 are the dependent variables, respectively. A fiscal consolidation episode is measured as a period in which the CAPB improves by at least 1.5 per cent of GDP, or a 
period of two consecutive years in which the CAPB improves by at least one per cent of GDP per year (Ardagna, 2009). We labelled this ‘FC1’ in this section. Alternatively, we used CAPB as 
a measure of fiscal consolidation. In Column 3, we report the results of the alternate measure. Column 5 indicates the return on assets, which is calculated as the return on average assets of 
the individual bank. In Column 7, debt is the public debt to GDP. In Column 8, interest rates are the long-term interest rates. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10, five and one 






Using Roodman collapse, we found that the standard capital adequacy ratio, such as Tier-1 
ratio, improved by 0.36 percentage points in the presence of fiscal consolidation for the panel 
of all 47 economies.154 These results align with the findings in Cimadomo et al. (2014).155 
However, Cimadomo et al. (2014) discussed both possibilities of the banking stability due to 
fiscal consolidation including demand and supply effects. Focusing on bank balance sheets, 
institutional investors are expected to increase (decrease) the share of government securities 
over the total assets if the demand (supply) effect prevails.156 Our empirical evidence suggests 
that the demand effect prevails, and institutional investors prefer government securities in their 
investment portfolio. This results in lower risk-weighted assets because of the increased 
proportion of government securities. These risk-weighted assets are the denominators of capital 
adequacy ratios. Therefore, lower risk-weighted assets enhance the capital adequacy ratios of 
the banking sector. The results of the control variables indicated that small banks and less 
profitable banks have improved their capital adequacy ratios.157 Ardagna (2009) claimed that 
initial fiscal conditions are important in the role of fiscal consolidation.158 
However, there is no empirical evidence on the role of fiscal consolidation in banking stability 
considering the initial fiscal stance of any economy. We tested the role of fiscal consolidation 
in the banking stability of a large sample by considering their initial fiscal conditions. For this 
purpose, we categorised our large sample of 47 economies into vulnerable and non-vulnerable 
                                                 
154 These findings align with the existing literature (Agnello et al., 2015a; Ardagna, 2009; Arezki et al., 2011). 
155 Cimadomo et al. (2014) reported a 1.35 percentage point increase in the total capital ratio in response to the 
episode of fiscal consolidation. However, their sample included 17 industrialised economies for which a dataset 
constructed by the IMF in Devries et al. (2011) was available. Further, their sample covered 1994 to 2009. 
156 The direct channel works through the demand and supply effects of government securities. Fiscal 
consolidation decreases the supply of new government bonds—supply effect. At the same time, institutional 
investors consider fiscal consolidation a structural policy that improves long-term fiscal sustainability. A related 
lower perceived risk increases the demand for government securities—demand effect. 
157 The results of total assets (δs1 = ˗0.41, p < 0.05) for the case of Tier-1 capital adequacy ratio indicated that 
some of the banks had more risky assets in their portfolio of total assets. Another possible explanation is that the 
small banks had different portfolios than the large banks, and had improved their capital adequacy ratio. 
Similarly, the estimates of return on assets (δs2 = ˗1.92, p < 0.05; δs2 = ˗2.27, p > 0.10) for the case of Tier-1 and 
Tier-2, respectively, indicated that less profitable banks had improved their capital adequacy ratios. Another 
possible explanation of these estimates is that return on assets varies against different classes of bank assets. 
Return on assets includes all four classes of bank assets: (i) the loans extended to firms at any time, (ii) the loans 
extended to consumers (such as mortgages), (iii) the investment securities at any time t and (iv) government 
securities. In calculating return on assets, all assets are treated equally. 
158 In contrast, it is also relevant to state that fiscal consolidation—in terms of reducing government 
expenditures—may also decrease aggregate demand and banking sector profitability. Nevertheless, Ardagna 
(2009) advocated that the consequences of fiscal consolidation largely depend on an economy’s initial fiscal 
stance, and are not severe for fiscally vulnerable economies. He argued the costs of vulnerable economies to be 
lower than the losses in situations of severe banking and financial crisis. Ardagna also reported a decline in 
stock market prices during periods of loose fiscal policy, and a rise during periods of substantial fiscal 
tightening. In other words, these results depend on the initial fiscal position of each country, as well as the type 
of fiscal consolidation. Similar suggestions were provided in Agnello et al. (2015b) that large austerity plans are 
associated with promoting banking reforms in vulnerable economies. 
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economies. Among these 47 economies, we classified 24 economies as vulnerable and 23 
economies as non-vulnerable.159 Our results suggest that the standard capital adequacy ratio 
improves significantly in response to fiscal consolidation episodes in a panel of vulnerable 
economies, compared with a panel of non-vulnerable economies.160 This finding aligns with 
the existing literature (Agnello et al., 2015b; Ardagna, 2009; Arezki et al., 2011; Cimadomo et 
al., 2014). Overall, the demand effect prevails because of fiscal consolidation. 
In vulnerable economies, Tier-1 and Tier-2 improved with 0.58 and 0.55 percentage points, 
respectively, because of fiscal consolidation.161 We observed a substantial improvement in 
capital adequacy ratios against fiscal consolidation for the panel of vulnerable economies, 
compared with the panel of all economies. Among the capital adequacy ratios, we observed a 
higher improvement in Tier-2, which included equity, retained earnings, cumulative perpetual 
preferred stock and subordinated debt. These results indicated that investors of other 
securities—including preferred stock and subordinated debts—are more concerned with 
sovereign risk, especially in vulnerable economies. However, investors of all securities holders 
in vulnerable economies react more to the fiscal consolidation episodes.162 
Investors in vulnerable economies are very concerned about changes in the risks associated 
with government securities. Therefore, the demand effect prevails, and empirical evidence 
supports this effect by indicating higher capital adequacy ratios. Investors know that financial 
reforms are more likely to occur when the general economic conditions of an economy 
deteriorate. In this context, sovereign debt restructuring in a vulnerable economy also favours 
financial reports (see Agnello et al., 2015a). Vulnerable economies have more threat of 
sovereign credit rating downgrades and the widening of spreads for sovereign bonds and credit 
default swaps. One possible reason of this threat is the holding of foreign sovereign debt by 
                                                 
159 Twenty-four vulnerable economies: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Greece, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US. Twenty-three non-vulnerable economies: Argentina, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Chile, China, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Finland, Ghana, Haiti, Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, South Korea, Romania, the Russian Federation, South 
Africa, Thailand and Venezuela. 
160 See Section 2 of Table 7.2 for these results. These results also justify the crisis-induced reform hypothesis, as 
empirically tested in Agnello et al. (2015a). For more discussion, see Drazen and Grilli (1993). 
161 This indicates that the banks of the vulnerable economies shifted their portfolio from private securities to 
government securities because of fiscal consolidation episodes. Government securities are less risky; thus, the 
Basel Accords allot them less weight. Considering this risk-weighting, the capital adequacy ratio improves. 
162 These findings align with Arezki et al. (2011). For instance, they observed a higher systematic spillover 
effect in the case of Greece among the Eurozone countries. They linked this aspect with the sovereign rating, 
while our classification is based on the empirical investigation of fiscal vulnerability. This further suggests that 
investors are very concerned about the risk associated with government securities. 
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domestic banks (Arezki et al., 2011). Therefore, domestic banks and investors in vulnerable 
economies are expected to react drastically to episodes of fiscal consolidation. The empirical 
evidence from the panel of 24 vulnerable economies confirmed this situation, since the standard 
capital adequacy ratios, including Tier-1 and Tier-2, improved with 0.58 and 0.55 percentage 
points, respectively.163 The estimates of total assets (δs1 = ˗0.50, p < 0.05) and return on assets 
(δs2 = ˗2.84, p < 0.1) for Tier-2 also indicated that smaller and less profitable banks in 
vulnerable economies improved their capital adequacy ratios as a result of the fiscal 
consolidation episodes. However, the effect on the small banks was only obvious when Tier-2 
was used as a capital adequacy ratio. One possible reason for this is that large banks invested 
more in equity shares because they can afford the risk to some extent. Conversely, small banks 
in vulnerable economies invest more in less risky securities, including cumulative perpetual 
preferred stock and subordinated debt, in addition to their equity stock and retained earnings.164 
We then extended our analysis for the panel of 23 non-vulnerable economies.165 The results of 
this analysis indicated that none of the capital adequacy ratios was statistically significant 
against the fiscal consolidation episodes. These results align with the existing literature 
(Agnello et al., 2015a, 2015b; Arezki et al., 2011), since the fiscal consolidation episodes are 
considered significantly different by the investors of non-vulnerable economies. They are not 
as concerned about the risks associated with government securities. One possible explanation 
for this situation is that this risk is not visible in their economies. These investors know that 
financial reforms because of fiscal consolidation are unlikely to occur when the fiscal 
conditions of an economy are good. Examining the other banking variables, the return on assets 
is significantly positive, which makes sense in the case of non-vulnerable economies. For 
instance, investors in non-vulnerable economies make changes to their portfolio. Institutional 
investors prefer to shift towards private securities. The return of these securities is high 
compared with government securities. Therefore, the return on assets improves, which does 
not incorporate the risk associated with these securities. Conversely, the banking stability ratios 
incorporate the associated risks. Therefore, the risk-weighted assets of these banks improve 
significantly, which is the key component (denominator) of these capital adequacy ratios. In 
                                                 
163 These results are for fiscal consolidation using the narrow approach, where a fiscal consolidation episode is 
defined as a period in which the CAPB improves by at least 1.5 per cent of GDP, or a period of two consecutive 
years in which the CAPB improves by at least one per cent of GDP per year. 
164 The rest of the control variables were not significant. However, the behaviour of these variables changed in 
the case of the non-vulnerable panel. 
165 Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Finland, Ghana, Haiti, Hong 
Kong, Indonesia, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, South Korea, Romania, the Russian 
Federation, South Africa, Thailand and Venezuela. 
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summary, the results of the vulnerable and non-vulnerable panels suggest that the standard 
capital adequacy ratio improves significantly in vulnerable economies, compared with non-
vulnerable economies. 
7.4 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, we conducted a fiscal consolidation analysis and examined its role in the 
financial stability of the banking sector of 53 economies. Based on a rigorous reconciliation, 
we finally decided to apply a quantitative approach of fiscal consolidation using CAPB. In this 
quantitative analysis, we calculated fiscal consolidation episodes, where CAPB improves by at 
least 1.5 per cent of GDP in a year, or by at least one per cent of GDP per year in a period of 
two consecutive years (Ardagna, 2009). We calculated 202 fiscal consolidation episodes in our 
selected economies. We used these episodes in our next panel analysis. Applying Arellano–
Bond dynamic panel data estimation, Roodman collapse and straightforward fixed effects, our 
results of panel analysis suggested that fiscal consolidation improved banking stability by 0.36 
percentage points across the full sample of selected countries. These findings were followed 
by a 0.58 percentage point improvement in banking stability (Tier-1) in the subsample of 
vulnerable economies. Conversely, the results of the fiscal consolidation were not significant 
(statistically) for the case of the non-vulnerable economies. These findings suggest that fiscal 
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In continuation of Chapter 7, this chapter extends the role of fiscal consolidation in financial 
sector stability by conducting aggregated and disaggregated analysis. The purpose of this 
chapter is to provide further insight to fiscal consolidation with respect to banking and financial 
sector stability. Fiscal vulnerability increases corporate borrowing costs, which behave 
differently in different economies.166 Therefore, a country-specific analysis adds further value 
and should be useful for policy makers. We divided the country-specific analysis into 
aggregated and disaggregated analyses. In the aggregated analysis, we used TGE aggregated 
annual data from 1960 to 2017 for the capital adequacy ratio, z-scores and stock market 
capitalisation. In the disaggregated analysis, we used bank-wise disaggregated data for the 
capital adequacy ratio, including Tier-1 and Tier-2. We included all the banks for which these 
data were available from the Bankscope database.167 This chapter also presents the implications 
of the aggregated and disaggregated analysis. Overall, the results of the aggregated and 
disaggregated analyses are consistent with our panel analysis. The remainder of this chapter is 
organised as follows. Section 8.2 discusses the aggregated analysis of the role of fiscal 
consolidation in financial sector stability, while Section 8.3 presents the disaggregated analysis 
of the role of fiscal consolidation in financial sector stability. Section 8.4 presents the 
                                                 
166 See Agca and Celasum (2012) for further details on the linkage between fiscal defaults and corporate 
borrowing costs. 
167 Table C2 (Appendix C, Chapter 4) provides the details of all banks included in our disaggregated analysis. 
These were the maximum number of banks in the Bankscope database on 14 October 2014 for which the capital 
adequacy ratios were available. We extracted these capital adequacy ratios from the capitalisation section of 
Summary Analytics of Bankscope database. 
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implications of the aggregated and disaggregated analysis, while Section 8.5 concludes this 
chapter. 
8.2 Aggregated Analysis 
We conducted the country-specific analysis by using aggregated and disaggregated data on the 
banking and financial variables. We first used TGE annual data from 1960 to 2017 for the 
capital adequacy ratio, z-scores and stock market capitalisation. TGE database aggregates 
capital adequacy ratios and z-scores by using underlying bank-by-bank unconsolidated data 
from the Bankscope database. Due to the use of aggregated data, we call next subsection as the 
aggregated analysis on the impact of fiscal consolidation on the banking stability. We included 
all vulnerable and non-vulnerable economies in our aggregated analysis because the aggregated 
data were available for all 53 economies.168 We used Equation 5.7.2 (Section 5.7, Chapter 5) 
for the aggregated analysis, and report the results in Table G1 (Appendix G). We used two 
measures of fiscal consolidation (FC-I and FC-II) in the aggregate analysis. In Table G1 
(Appendix G), Column 2 represents the fiscal consolidation measures, where fiscal 
consolidation is measured as a period in which the CAPB improved by at least 1.5 per cent of 
GDP, or a period of two consecutive years in which the CAPB improved by at least one per 
cent of GDP per year (Ardagna, 2009). We labelled this strictly defined episode ‘FC-I’. Further, 
we used the change in CAPB as an alternate measure of fiscal consolidation, and labelled this 
‘FC-II’. Columns 5 to 7 of Table G1 (Appendix G) present the results of the aggregate analysis 
using data from TGE database. TGE_Total_Tier indicates the banking system regulatory 
capital to risk-weighted assets, as defined by TGE database. TGE_Z-score indicates the z-score 
as defined by TGE database, and TGE_SMC indicates the stock market capitalisation as defined 
by TGE database. 
We found mixed evidence from the aggregated analysis of all 53 economies. We observed that 
fiscal consolidation enhanced the financial stability of 18 economies.169  These results are 
                                                 
168 We used the vulnerable and non-vulnerable classification from the fiscal vulnerability analysis (see Section 
6.3) where 26 of 53 economies were vulnerable. 
169 These 18 economies included Belgium (γa1 = 1.93, p > .05; γa2 = 0.64, p > .01), China (γa1s = 62.34, p > .05), 
Colombia (γa1 = 2.44, p > .10), Costa Rica (γa1s = 1.82, p > .05), Denmark (γa1z = ˗1.27, p > .10), Finland (γa1z = 
˗4.94, p > .01), France (γa1 = 0.47, p > .05), Germany (γa2z = ˗2.18, p > .01), Greece (γa2s = 16.94, p > .05), 
Iceland (γa2 = 0.36, p > .05), India (γa1s = 89.53, p > .01), Ireland (γa1 = 1.67, p > .05; γa2 = 0.10, p > .10), Mexico 
(γa2z = ˗1.87, p > .05), Peru (γa1s = 12.87, p > .10), Romania (γa2s = 3.53, p > .10), Spain (γa1s = 29.85, p > .05; 
γa2s = 5.46, p > .05), Uruguay (γa2z = ˗0.15, p > .10) and the US (γa1 = 0.93, p > .05; γa2 = 0.19, p > .05; γa2s = 
5.28, p > .10). γa1, γa2, γa1z, γa2z, γa1s and γa2s indicate fiscal consolidation 1 using total tier, fiscal consolidation 2 
using total tier, fiscal consolidation 1 using z-score, fiscal consolidation 2 using z-score, fiscal consolidation 1 
using stock market capitalisation and fiscal consolidation 2 using stock market capitalisation, respectively. 
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consistent with Cimadomo et al. (2014), Panetta et al. (2011), Agca and Celasun (2012), 
Akitoby and Stratmann (2008) and Gennaioli et al. (2014). Most of these economies were 
European, and Panetta et al. (2011) specifically stated that investors’ concerns about sovereign 
risk have increased in the Eurozone. As a result, bank funding costs have risen abruptly through 
some channels.170 The results of all three measures indicated that the assets channel holdings 
of government securities were the most relevant to our first measure of risk-weighted 
regulatory capital. Further, this channel transmits into bank balance sheets and profitability. 
Considering all this, the investors in these economies are highly concerned with sovereign risk. 
Our results indicate that positive fiscal signals have increased the demand for government 
securities in Belgium, Colombia, France, Ireland and the US, and demand effect prevails in 
these economies. For the rest of the above economies, fiscal consolidation enhanced banks’ 
profitability and balance sheet size because we observed a significant influence of fiscal 
consolidation on the z-score and stock market capitalisation. For the case of Germany, the next 
section will discuss some special issues and the concerns of Wolfgang Schauble, the German 
Finance Minister (see Section 8.3, disaggregate analysis).  
Conversely, we observed that fiscal consolidation deteriorated the financial stability of 11 
economies.171 Recently, the financial regulatory authorities of these economies were seriously 
concerned about the capital requirements. For example, the APRA and Otoritas Jasa Keuangan 
(OJK) have frequently raised the capital requirements for the cases of Australia and Indonesia, 
respectively.172 Very little is discussed in the existing literature about this negative effect. The 
key possible reasons for the negative effect include the prevailing supply effect and investment 
in foreign financial securities. Investors of these economies are sometimes interested in 
investing their money in elsewhere. As a result, governments face difficulty in issuing new 
bonds to gain new debts. For example, Argentina faced this situation alongside capital flight 
(Cuddington, 1986). We could not find any previous studies examining this issue except 
Ardagna (2009), Agnello et al. (2015a, 2015b) and Arezki et al. (2011). According to Ardagna 
(2009), the initial fiscal stance of an economy is important in terms of fiscal consolidation for 
                                                 
170 These channels included: (i) an asset channel, which indicated that the holding of sovereign debt and their 
derivative positions have direct effects on returns and banking size; (ii) lessening in the value of collateral; (iii) 
sovereign downgrades tend to lower the rating of domestic banks; and (iv) reduced benefits from explicit and 
implicit government guarantees. 
171 These 11 economies included Australia (γa1 = ˗0.95, p > .05), Austria (γa1 = ˗1.54, p > .05), the Dominican 
Republic (γa1 = ˗2.52, p > .10), Ghana (γa1z = 1.13, p > .10), Hungary (γa1 = ˗1.09, p > .05), Indonesia (γa2 = 
˗0.93, p > .10), Norway (γa1 = ˗1.07, p > .10; γa1s = ˗21.38, p > .05; γa2s = ˗2.72, p > .10), Panama (γa1 = ˗2.82, 
p > .05; γa2 = ˗0.56, p > .05), Portugal (γa2 = ˗0.26, p > .05), Turkey (γa1 = ˗5.43, p > .05; γa1s = 8.90, p > .10) and 
the UK (γa1 = ˗1.24, p > .01). 
172 See Sipahutar and Suhartono (2018) for further details on the capital requirements in Indonesia. 
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financial stability. This strand of literature reveals that institutional investors in vulnerable 
economies are expected to behave differently to institutional investors in non-vulnerable 
economies. Further, the effect of fiscal consolidation also depends on the demand and supply 
effect.173 We observed that the above-mentioned economies included vulnerable and non-
vulnerable economies. Following Ardagna (2009), we extended our aggregate analysis to 
incorporate the initial fiscal stance of all 53 economies, which further enabled us to achieve 
our fifth research objective.174 
For this purpose, we analysed the effect of fiscal consolidation on the financial stability of 
vulnerable and non-vulnerable economies separately. We report these results in Columns 3 and 
4 of Table G1 (Appendix G). These results of the aggregated analysis revealed mixed evidence 
on the role of fiscal consolidation on financial stability. We observed a positive and statistically 
significant effect of fiscal consolidation for 12 of 26 vulnerable economies.175 These results 
align with the literature.176 For the first alternative measure of financial stability (banking 
system regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets), the demand side prevailed for the 12 
vulnerable economies. This indicates that institutional investors are very concerned about the 
risk associated with government bonds. Sovereign debt restructuring favours financial stability 
in these economies, as indicated in Angellano et al. (2015a). Nonetheless, we observed that 
fiscal consolidation worsened the financial stability in the five vulnerable economies of 
Australia (γa1 = ˗0.95, p > .05), Austria (γa1 = ˗1.54, p > .05), Hungary (γa1 = ˗1.09, p > .05), 
Portugal (γa2 = ˗0.26, p > .05) and the UK (γa1 = ˗1.24, p > .01).
177 Holding of government 
securities by foreign investors is one possible factor deteriorating risk-weighted regulatory 
capital. Further, this negative effect may be due to the supple effect.178 
                                                 
173 See Section 3.3 (Chapter 3) for further details on the demand and supply effect.  
174 See Section 1.6 (Chapter 1). 
175 These economies include Belgium (γa1 = 1.93, p > .05; γa2 = 0.64, p > .01), Colombia (γa1 = 2.44, p > .10), 
Denmark (γa1z = ˗1.27, p > .10), France (γa1 = 0.47, p > .05), Germany (γa2z = ˗2.18, p > .01), Greece (γa2s = 
16.94, p > .05), Iceland (γa2 = 0.36, p > .05), India (γa1s = 89.53, p > .01), Ireland (γa1 = 1.67, p > .05; γa2 = 0.10, 
p > .10), Mexico (γa2z = ˗1.87, p > .05), Spain (γa1s = 29.85, p > .05; γa2s = 5.46, p > .05) and the US (γa1 = 0.93, 
p > .05; γa2 = 0.19, p > .05; γa2s = 5.28, p > .10).  
176 For example, see Agnello et al. (2015b), Ardagna (2009), Arezki et al. (2011), Agca and Celasun (2012), 
Akitoby and Stratmann (2008), Cimadomo et al. (2014), Panetta et al. (2011) and Gennaioli et al. (2014). 
177 Interestingly, we noted that this effect was observed only for the capital adequacy ratio measure. We did not 
observe this effect for the other alternative measures (z-score and stock market capitalisation). This could be 
because of the aggregation procedure. We could not further explore the aggregation procedure because TGE 
database did not provide the details of the banks included in the aggregation process. 




We then extended our aggregated analysis to the economies categorised as non-vulnerable in 
our fiscal vulnerability analysis (see Section 6.3). In the results of the non-vulnerable 
economies, we observed that fiscal consolidation deteriorated the financial stability of the six 
economies of the Dominican Republic (γa1 = ˗2.52, p > .10), Ghana (γa1z = 1.13, p > .10), 
Indonesia (γa2 = ˗0.93, p > .10), Norway (γa1 = ˗1.07, p > .10; γa1s = ˗21.38, p > .05; γa2s = ˗2.72, 
p > .10), Panama (γa1 = ˗2.82, p > .05; γa2 = ˗0.56, p > .05) and Turkey (γa1 = ˗5.43, p > .05; γa1s 
= 8.90, p > .10). Overall, we observed this effect for the case of capital adequacy ratio, followed 
by the second alternative measure of z-score. Some of this evidence contrasts with the recent 
changes by financial services authorities.179 However, these results indicate that the supply side 
prevails in these six non-vulnerable economies. Considering the initial fiscal conditions of 
these economies, these results align with the existing literature (Agnello et al., 2015a, 2015b; 
Arezki et al., 2011) because sovereign debt restructuring is viewed differently in non-
vulnerable economies. Their investors are not as concerned about the risk associated with 
government bonds. Nonetheless, we observed a positive effect of fiscal consolidation in six of 
27 non-vulnerable economies: China (γa1s = 62.34, p > .05), Costa Rica (γa1s = 1.82, p > .05), 
Finland (γa1z = ˗4.94, p > .01), Peru (γa1s = 12.87, p > .10), Romania (γa2s = 3.53, p > .10) and 
Uruguay (γa2z = ˗0.15, p > .10). Interestingly, this effect was not observed in the capital 
adequacy ratio, except for Finland. This effect was mainly observed in the stock market 
capitalised. Stock market capitalisation, sometimes known as market value, is the market price 
of shares multiplied by the outstanding shares of listed domestic firms.180 Our results suggest 
that shareholders in China, Costa Rica, Peru and Romania make changes to their portfolio 
because of sovereign debt restructuring. These results align with Ardagna (2009) and Correa 
et al. (2014). However, we can further investigate the reasons for this occurrence, particularly 
when considering capital adequacy and z-score because of their aggregated data. 
Overall, we observed one inconsistency when comparing these results with our main results. 
Our key results indicated that the standard capital adequacy ratio improved significantly in the 
vulnerable economies, compared with the non-vulnerable economies. In this aggregate analysis, 
we observed that the capital adequacy ratio deteriorated in five of the vulnerable economies—
Australia, Austria, Hungary, Portugal and the UK. As already mentioned above, this could be 
due to the prevailing supply effect, investment in foreign financial securities and the 
                                                 
179 See Sipahutar and Suhartono (2018) for further details.  
180 The primary business of some unit trusts, investment funds and companies is to invest in the shares of other 
listed companies. These institutions were excluded from the list of domestic companies. 
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aggregation procedure. We could not further explore the aggregation procedure because TGE 
database did not provide the details of the banks included in the aggregation process. Therefore, 
we extended our analysis to the bank-wise data extracted from the Bankscope database. We 
labelled this analysis the ‘disaggregated analysis’, which is presented in Section 8.3 below. 
8.3 Disaggregated Analysis 
We present the results on the effect of fiscal consolidation on the banking stability of vulnerable 
economies in Table G1 (Appendix G). 181  Column 2 presents the results of the fiscal 
consolidation measures (FC-1 and FC-II). FC-I was measured as a period in which the CAPB 
improved by at least 1.5 per cent of GDP, or a period of two consecutive years in which the 
CAPB improved by at least one per cent of GDP per year (Ardagna, 2009). Further, we used 
the change in CAPB as an alternate measure of fiscal consolidation and labelled this FC-II. 
Columns 3 and 4 present the results of the disaggregated analysis, where BS_CAR indicates the 
capital adequacy ratios using Bankscope data. In particular, Columns 3 and 4 present the results 
of Equation 5.7.1 (Section 5.7, Chapter 5), with Tier-1 and Tier-2 used as the banking stability 
variables (dependent variables) against the fiscal consolidation, respectively. We employed the 
panel data regression models for each country, where the banks acted as a cross-sectional unit 
for time from 1990 to 2016. In this panel analysis, the number of observations varied from 
country to country because they depended on the availability of the branch-wise data from the 
financial statements.182 
                                                 
181 We estimated both fixed-effect panel data models and the GMM method proposed by Arellano and Bond 
(1991) through Roodman (2009) collapse to analyse the role of fiscal consolidation and banking sector stability. 
We observed higher variation in time (T) and the number of banks (N) in our sample for the 28 economies, 
where the number of banks (N) varied from one (Venezuela) to 739 (US). In cases of higher variation between T 
and N, it is suggested that, if T is large than N, the dynamic panel bias becomes insignificant, and a 
straightforward fixed-effects estimator works better (Roodman, 2009). Further, we used Hausman test 
(Hausman, 1978) and its results are consistent with the suggestions of Roodman (2009, p. 128). We followed 
these guidelines in the country-specific analysis of 28 economies. We applied Roodman collapse (collapse 
function of xtabond2 in Stata) for the case of France, Japan and the US. We applied Arellano–Bond for the case 
of Brazil, Germany, Greece, Hungary (Tier-1), Indonesia, Mexico and the UK. We applied the straightforward 
fixed-effects estimator for the case of Canada, Denmark, France (Tier-2), Hungary (Tier-2), Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, South Korea, the Russian Federation, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Thailand and Venezuela. For the case of France, the numbers of observations were different for Tier-1 and Tier-
2. We observed that Roodman collapse worked for Tier-1, since we had data for 32 banks. However, Roodman 
collapse and Arellano–Bond estimations did not work for Tier-2. Further, we could not apply the Tier-1 model 
for the case of Portugal because of the unavailability of data. For the case of dynamic models, lagged dependent 
variables were statistically significant at five per cent. 
182 Depending on the volume of the banking industry and the data management in this industry, the analysis of 
the US was based on 3,943 observations in the case of Tier-2 and 3,126 observations in the case of the Tier-1. 
Conversely, only eight observations for Tier-1 were available for the case of Venezuela. 
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We found mixed evidence when extending this empirical investigation to the country-specific 
analysis. We were left with 28 economies for the country-specific analysis.183 Among these 28 
economies, 19 were vulnerable and the remaining nine were non-vulnerable.184 In almost 50 
per cent of cases, there was a significant effect of fiscal consolation on banking sector stability. 
This significant effect was positive for all vulnerable economies.185 However, there was mixed 
evidence of this significant effect if the country was categorised as non-vulnerable in our fiscal 
vulnerability analysis.186 Table G1 (Appendix G) indicates that there was a significant positive 
effect of fiscal consolidation on capital adequacy ratios for six vulnerable economies (Australia, 
Ireland, Japan, Portugal, Spain and the US).187 We observed a few fiscal consolidation episodes 
                                                 
183 Out of 47 economies, we carried 28 economies in the country-specific analysis because of the lack of 
observations on the capital adequacy ratios. We attempted to gain the maximum data on capital adequacy ratios 
using Bloomberg (Bloomberg, 2016). However, we managed to gain the capital adequacy ratios of only one 
bank in 19 cases. Most of the data on capital adequacy ratios included the period of 25 years (1990 to 2014). 
Therefore, we dropped the countries with a number of observations lower than 25 to call it a panel of at least 
two banks. As a result, we dropped 19 economies from the country-specific analysis: Argentina, Austria, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Finland, Ghana, Haiti, 
Iceland, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, Romania and South Africa. We included the remaining 28 
economies in the country-specific analysis: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hong Kong, Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, South Korea, the Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the UK, the US and 
Venezuela. 
184 This classification of economies was based on our fiscal vulnerability analysis. In the country-specific 
analysis, the 19 vulnerable economies were Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Germany, Hungary, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US. 
In the country-specific analysis, the nine non-vulnerable economies were Brazil, Hong Kong, Indonesia, New 
Zealand, Norway, South Korea, the Russian Federation, Thailand and Venezuela. 
185 These economies included Australia, Ireland, Japan, Portugal, Spain, the US and Venezuela. 
186 These vulnerable and non-vulnerable cases are discussed below. 
187 For the case of Australia, our results (see Table F1, Appendix F) indicated that fiscal consolidation policy 
improved the capital adequacy ratios of the Australian banking sector, which is consistent with the existing 
literature (Ardagna, 2009; Cimadomo et al., 2014). Our base specification included lagged dependent variables 
because of the adoptive expectation of investors. In this case, the standard fixed effects were subject to Nickell 
biases, as reported in Cimadomo et al. (2014); therefore, the Arellano–Bond estimates were used for the 
analysis. The overall finding for the case of Australia was based on the results from the Tier-2 capital ratio, 
which is a comprehensive measure because it also includes preferred stock, subordinated debt and general loan-
loss reserves (Bank for International Settlement, 2017). This will increase the banking stability of the Australian 
economy, which is required in the current scenario. This aspect aligns with the Australian corporate media over 
the last two years (Christopher, 2016; James, 2015; Mike, 2016; Sue, 2015). Similarly, Australian regulators are 
reappraising their views on the acceptable level and forms of the capital (Gorajek & Turner, 2010). For 
robustness purposes, we estimated the effect of CAPB on the banking stability in a separate panel data analysis 
using Equation 5.7.1 (Section 5.7, Chapter 5), with a change in CAPB used as the fiscal consolidation. The 
coefficients from both measures (γ3 = 0.23 and γ4 = 0.15) were positive; however, the results against Tier-1 (γ3 = 
0.23) were statistically significant at 10 per cent. The estimate for the case of Tier-2 (γ4 = 0.15) was also 
positive. In general, these results are consistent, since there was a significant effect of fiscal consolidation on the 
Tier-1 ratio. This ratio improved by 0.23 because of a one per cent change in CAPB. These results indicate that 
fiscal consolidation improves the capital adequacy ratio through changes in the risk-weighted assets. The APRA 
is closely observing capital adequacy ratios in Australia. These risk-based capital ratios capture different risk 
profiles of banks and reflect the stability of the sector. Following the guidelines given in the Basel Accords, 
different loans carry different amounts of risk, which is logical because government securities are less risky than 
other corporate loans (Bank for International Settlement, 2015). In this framework, the higher value of risk-
weighted capital ratios indicates a higher level of banking stability. Both ratios are commonly taken as the most 
important indicator of banking stability because the higher ratio indicates higher protection against adverse 
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in the vulnerable economies. For example, there were two episodes each for Australia, Japan 
and the US.188 However, the effect of these fiscal consolidation episodes was significant, which 
aligns with the existing literature (Agnello et al., 2015a, 2015b; Arezki et al., 2011). We also 
observed that degree of vulnerability was higher in these three economies.189 We then analysed 
the remaining three cases of Ireland, Portugal and Spain. For the case of Ireland, our fiscal 
vulnerability analysis suggested that its degree of vulnerability was higher. Further, the timing 
of episodes for the case of Ireland was immediately after the short episodes identified in 
stability analysis.190 Our fiscal vulnerability analysis (Section 6.2) identified 2010 to 2016 as 
the short episodes where public debt was expected to reduce the primary balance. Our fiscal 
consolidation analysis indicated that 2006, 2007, 2011 and 2016 were the years of fiscal 
consolidation episodes (Table F2, Appendix F). These results of our disaggregated analysis 
reveal that the timing of fiscal consolidation was expected to have a significant effect on the 
capital adequacy ratios of Ireland. 
Next, we extended this comparison for the case of Portugal. The fiscal consolidation episodes 
of Portugal included 2006, 2007 and 2011 (Table F2, Appendix F). Our fiscal vulnerability 
analysis (Section 6.2) identified 2005 to 2007 as the short episode where public debt was 
expected to reduce the primary balance. These results indicated that the episodes of fiscal 
consolidation occurred immediately after the periods identified in the stability analysis. 
Therefore, the timing of fiscal consolidation was expected to have a significant effect because 
investors of all securities react more to fiscal consolidation episodes during vulnerable periods. 
For the case of Spain, we observed a higher degree of vulnerability in our fiscal vulnerability 
analysis (Figure E1, Appendix E). Similarly, our fiscal vulnerability analysis (Section 6.2) 
identified the periods of 1981, 1983 and 2014 to 2015 as short episodes of vulnerability. Our 
fiscal consolidation analysis indicated that 1994, 2007, 2010 and 2013 were the years of fiscal 
                                                 
shocks to banking assets. For instance, Estrella, Park, and Peristiani (2000) reported that the risk-weighted 
capital ratio outperforms the simple balance sheet ratios because these risk-weighted capital ratios are strong 
predictors of banking failure. Further, our results reveal that the size of the effect of fiscal consolidation varied 
slightly between the two measures of banking sector stability. However, the coefficient was positive in both 
cases. Following the strict definition of fiscal consolidation episodes (Alesina & Ardagna, 2010; Alesina & 
Perotti, 1995; Ardagna, 2009; Barrios et al., 2010; Mirdala, 2013), our estimates indicate that the capital 
adequacy ratio (Tier-2) improved by 0.96 because of fiscal consolidation episodes. For the case of the US, the 
results of the narrow and broader approach of fiscal consolidation indicated a positive effect (γs2 = 0.06, p < 
0.05; δs2 = 0.16, p < 0.05) for the case of Tier-2.  
188 The fiscal consolidation episodes in Australia, Japan and the US occurred in 1993 and 2007, 2001 and 2010, 
and 2010 and 2015, respectively. 
189 See Column 2 of Table 6.1 (Chapter 6) for the degree of vulnerability of these economies. 
190 Here, we analysed the episodes of fiscal consolidation to observe their timing. However, we did not compare 




consolidation episodes (Table F2, Appendix F). Both a higher degree of vulnerability and fiscal 
consolidations during vulnerable periods motivate investors to move towards government 
securities because these securities are considered safer during periods of fiscal consolidation. 
Among all the other vulnerable economies (Table G1, Appendix G), we observed a highly 
significant effect of fiscal consolidation on banking stability for the case of Japan (γs1 = 0.09, 
p > 0.01).191 Apart from the six economies of Australia, Ireland, Japan, Portugal, Spain and the 
US, we observed a positive effect of fiscal consolidation for the cases of Canada, Denmark, 
Hungary, Israel, Italy, Mexico, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK.192 
The results of the control variables provided some useful information regarding the banking 
sectors of vulnerable economies. For instance, looking at the control variables of the US, we 
observed some significant effects in total assets (δs1 = ˗0.18, p > 0.10), return on assets (δs2 = 
0.58, p > 0.01), output gap (δs3 = ˗0.20, p > 0.01) and interest rates (δs5 = ˗0.32, p > 0.01).
193 
Among all these controls, return on assets provided useful information regarding the changes 
made to the portfolio selection. These results only provided information on the shift from one 
class of securities to the other class of securities. These results did not provide any evidence on 
the associated risks, which was provided by the positive significant results of the fiscal 
consolidation episodes.194 
For the case of Australia, the disaggregated estimates of size also indicated that large banks 
tend to have a higher capital ratio, which is consistent with the existing literature (see 
Cimadomo et al., 2014). Based on the profitability of banks, the disaggregated results indicated 
that less profitable banks tend to have higher capital, which is also consistent with the existing 
evidence. Banks with lower profitability are more concerned about their capital because they 
are the first targets of rating agencies if something negative occurs. For instance, Frost (2017) 
reported that S&P lowered the rating for the Australian Mutual Provident Society (Australian 
Securities Exchange [ASX]: AMP), Bank of Queensland (ASX: BOQ) and Bendigo Bank 
(ASX: BEN). In such situations, banks with large profitability are the last institutions to be 
downgraded by rating agencies. Therefore, banks with lower profitability were expected to 
have higher capital. Regarding the macroeconomic controls, there was no statistically 
significant effect of these controls on the capital adequacy ratio of Australian banks. Among 
                                                 
191 For the case of Tier-2. 
192 For the case of Hungary, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK, this positive effect only occurred for Tier-2, not 
for Tier-1. 
193 These are the results for Tier-1. 
194 This is because return on assets uses average assets, not risk-weighted assets. 
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these variables, the effect of public debt on GDP was positive, yet not statistically significant 
in any of the measures. 
For the case of Greece, total assets (δs1 = 1.64, p < 0.05) and return on assets (δs2 = 0.47, p < 
0.10) were positive and significant for the case of Tier-1. Based on these disaggregated results, 
the total assets might comprise a significant portion of the financial assets, and a significant 
amount of return might go towards retained earnings, which increased the Tier-1 capital. 
Further, these results indicated the specific behaviour of equity and retained earnings. We 
observed the positive effect of fiscal consolidation on banking stability in 15 economies in the 
panel of vulnerable economies.195 Overall, the results align with the existing literature.196 
Among all of the vulnerable and non-vulnerable economies, we found negative significant 
results for the case of Germany and New Zealand. We discussed these results under the panel 
of non-vulnerable economies. 
Finally, we extended the country-specific analysis of banking stability to the countries 
identified as non-vulnerable in our fiscal vulnerability analysis. These results are provided in 
Table G1 (Appendix G). Columns 3 and 4 present the results of Equation 5.7.1 (Section 5.7, 
Chapter 5), with Tier-1 and Tier-2 used as the banking stability variables (dependent variables) 
against fiscal consolidation.197 This analysis was based on the panel regression by taking two 
dimensions, including different banks, over the period 1990 to 2017. For the non-vulnerable 
economies, we observed mixed evidence regarding the significant effect of fiscal consolidation 
on banking sector stability. There was a significant negative effect of fiscal consolidation on 
banking stability for the case of New Zealand (γs1 = ˗1.32, p < 0.05; уs2 = ˗1.25, p < 0.10) and 
Germany (γs1 = ˗0.28, p < 0.01; γs2 = ˗0.20, p < 0.05). Conversely, there was a significant 
positive effect of fiscal consolidation on banking sector stability for the case of Brazil (γs2 = 
0.62, p < 0.05), Indonesia (γs1 = 1.27, p < 0.10; уs2 = 1.25, p < 0.10), South Korea (γs1 = 0.13, 
p < 0.05; уs2 = 0.25, p < 0.05), the Russian Federation (γs1 = 0.88, p < 0.01) and Venezuela (γs1 
= 0.42, p < 0.01).198 
                                                 
195 These countries included Australia, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US. 
196 See Agnello et al. (2015a), Arezki et al. (2011), Cimadomo et al. (2014), Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1998) and Drazen and Grilli (1993). 
197 As with the vulnerable economies analysis, a fiscal consolidation episode is defined as a period in which the 
CAPB improves by at least 1.5 per cent of GDP, or a period of two consecutive years in which the CAPB 
improves by at least one per cent of GDP per year (narrow approach). 
198 These are the results for Tier-1 and Tier-2, respectively. 
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First, we examined the possible reasons for the results for New Zealand and Germany. We 
found eight fiscal consolidation episodes for the case of New Zealand and Germany.199 We 
classified these economies as non-vulnerable in our fiscal vulnerability analysis.200 Further, 
Moody’s sovereign credit rating assigned AAA to these economies, which is also consistent 
with our fiscal vulnerability analysis. 201  Germany balanced its budget at the general 
government level from 2011. In 2014, Wolfgang Schauble, the German Finance Minister, 
highlighted the balanced budget at federal level since 1969. Fiscal consolidation immediately 
after the debt crisis was surprising for other European countries because most countries were 
struggling with deficits and debt levels. Breuer (2015) indicated the factors behind fiscal 
consolidation in Germany. These factors included lower interest rates, lower property income 
paid by the German general government, and reduction in monetary social transfers. Therefore, 
the investors of these economies were not very concerned with fiscal consolidation efforts by 
their respective governments. Further, these factors were expected to decline the supply of new 
government securities substantially. For the case of New Zealand, holding government 
securities by foreign investors may be a reason for higher risk-weighted assets. Therefore, the 
supply effect prevails, which decreases the amount of government securities in the investment 
portfolio of institutional investors. This deteriorates the capital adequacy ratio. 
For the case of Brazil, Indonesia, South Korea and the Russian Federation, we found only 12 
fiscal consolidation episodes and observed positive significant effects of these episodes on 
banking stability.202 We classified these economies as non-vulnerable in our fiscal vulnerability 
analysis (Section 6.2). However, the financial investors of these economies were very 
concerned with government securities. This could be due to the capital requirement enforced 
by the regulatory services authorities. For example, we already observed that financial 
investors of Brazil invested US$1.375 billion in subordinated 10-year bonds of Itau Unibanco’s 
                                                 
199 Our fiscal consolidation analysis indicated that 1990 and 2012 were periods of fiscal consolidation for the 
case of New Zealand, while 1989, 1994, 1996, 2000, 2007 and 2011 were periods of fiscal consolidation for the 
case of Germany (Table F2, Appendix F). 
200 We categorised New Zealand as non-vulnerable in our fourth step because of its higher net financial worth. 
The fiscal framework of New Zealand has been purely based on accrual budgeting since the fiscal year 1993 to 
1994, which was prepared under generally accepted accounting principles. In this framework, net worth is one 
of the key fiscal aggregates calculated from the consolidated financial statements for the central government 
(Marti, 2006). 
201 This sovereign credit rating is as of December 2011. 
202 Our fiscal consolidation analysis indicated that 1990 was a period of fiscal consolidation for the case of 
Indonesia, while 2000 and 2010 were periods of fiscal consolidation for the case of South Korea. Further, 
Brazil’s periods occurred in 1990, 1994 and 1999. However, the Russian Federation had half of these fiscal 




hefty in 2012. During this period, financial institutions considered Tier-2 less expensive and 
preferred to issue this class of equity capital. This financing was invested significantly in the 
bonds by Bradesco, Banco do Brasil and Itau.203 This justifies the positive influence of fiscal 
consolidation on the banking stability of these economies. 
Further, Moody’s sovereign credit outlook assigned a positive outlook to these economies.204 
Holding of foreign sovereign debt by domestic banks is another possible reason for lower risk-
weighted assets, which improves the capital adequacy ratios. This effect should be obvious, 
since we used unconsolidated Bankscope data for the case of New Zealand, Germany, Brazil, 
Indonesia, South Korea and the Russian Federation. The Bankscope database provides 
consolidated and unconsolidated balance sheet data for all individual banks. Most of the 
analyses used consolidated balance sheet data. However, we used unconsolidated data to 
differentiate the domestic effect of fiscal consolidation in New Zealand, Germany, Brazil, 
Indonesia, South Korea and the Russian Federation. We observed the maximum number of 
fiscal consolidation episodes in Venezuela among all the selected economies. Interestingly, we 
identified Venezuela as a vulnerable economy using the fourth step of the fiscal vulnerability 
selection procedure (Figure 5.2, Chapter 5) because of lower financial net worth. This fact also 
aligns with the recent debt crises in Venezuela.205 One of the possible explanations for the 
significant influence of fiscal consolidation on banking stability is that investors are aware of 
the weak position of the country’s balance sheet, and are reluctant to buy government securities 
in the absence of fiscal consolidation. Resultantly, investors reacted more to fiscal 
consolidation efforts by the government. 
In the remaining almost 50 per cent of cases, there was an insignificant influence of fiscal 
consolidation on banking sector stability.206 The possible reasons for this insignificant effect 
can be categorised as follows: (i) no fiscal consolidation episode at all or less than one fiscal 
consolidation episode, 207  (ii) fiscal consolidation efforts occur during a non-vulnerable 
                                                 
203 See Kilby (2012) for further details on the behaviour of Brazilian lenders towards Tier-2 capital.  
204 This sovereign credit rating is as of December 2011.  
205 Despite this vulnerability because of lower financial net worth, overall, we categorised Venezuela as non-
vulnerable to maintain consistency with our fiscal vulnerability selection criteria (Figure 5.2, Chapter 5) for all 
53 economies. 
206 This also applies to the insignificant results we observed in our aggregate data analysis (Section 8.2).  
207 For instance, our fiscal consolidation analysis indicated no fiscal consolidation episode for the case of 
Canada and only one fiscal consolidation episode each for Denmark (2010), France (2011) and Mexico (1995). 
The fiscal consolidation episodes in Denmark and France could be a reaction to the ongoing Euro debt crises. 
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period,208 (iii) the presence of the threat of sovereign credit rating downgrades and the widening 
of spreads for sovereign bonds and credit default swaps209 and (iv) holdings of government 
securities by domestic banks.210 
8.4 Implications of Aggregated and Disaggregated Analysis 
We compared the results of the aggregated and disaggregated analysis of 35 economies. In this 
section, we present the similarities and differences between the aggregated and disaggregated 
analyses. We dropped 18 economies in this comparison mainly because of the unavailability 
of disaggregated data from the Bankscope database. 211  Table G1 (Appendix G) reveals 
consistent results for the case of 19 economies.212 These economies included 11 vulnerable and 
eight non-vulnerable economies. When considering the possible reasons for these consistencies, 
we began with the vulnerable economies. The aggregated and disaggregated analyses indicated 
a positive statistically significant influence of fiscal consolidation on banking stability for the 
case of three vulnerable economies—Iceland, Ireland and the US. These results are consistent 
with the existing literature (Agnello et al., 2015a, 2015b; Arezki et al., 2011). We observed 
that degree of vulnerability was higher in these four economies (see Column 2 of Table 6.1, 
Chapter 6), which is expected to deteriorate liquidity in the banking sector (Brutti, 2011). Under 
these fiscal conditions, austerity plans are associated with endorsing financial reforms (Agnello 
et al., 2015b). Therefore, investors react promptly and shift their portfolios towards government 
securities. Further, we also observed that fiscal consolidation occurred immediately after the 
short-term episodes of fiscal vulnerability in Ireland.213 These results also indicate that demand 
effect prevails for the case of these four economies. Penetta et al. (2011) called this an ‘asset 
                                                 
208 For instance, Hong Kong, the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland. These economies were not vulnerable 
to debt crises. Therefore, investors would not react to the fiscal consolidation efforts of the government.  
209 For instance, the investors expected sovereign credit rating downgrades for the case of Greece, Spain and 
Brazil in 2010 during the ongoing debt crisis. Therefore, this effect was insignificant in this case. 
210 We were unable to analyse the complete banking portfolios of some economies because of unavailability of 
data. However, it is expected that the banks of six economies did not hold a significant portion of government 
securities. These six economies were Hungary, Israel, Italy, Sweden, Thailand and the UK. 
211 These 18 economies were Belgium, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Finland, Ghana, 
Honduras, India, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania, Turkey and 
Uruguay.  
212 These 18 economies were Argentina, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Haiti, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand and the US. These 
economies were both vulnerable and non-vulnerable. The consistency was determined based on the statistical 
significance of the results. For instance, the results were considered consistent if γ was positive and statistically 
significant in both the aggregated and disaggregated analysis. 
213 See the discussion on Ireland in Section 8.3. 
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channel’, where the holdings of sovereign debt securities have a direct effect on the financial 
position of the banking sector. 
Conversely, the aggregated and disaggregated analyses indicated a statistically insignificant 
effect of fiscal consolidation for the case of eight vulnerable economies—Canada, Denmark, 
Greece, Israel, Italy, Pakistan, Sweden and Switzerland. One possible reason for this result is 
sovereign rating downgrading during vulnerable periods. Along these lines, Arezki et al. (2011) 
reported that the sign and magnitude of the spillover effect of sovereign downgrades depends 
on the rating agency and type of announcement. Therefore, it is possible that institutional 
investors rely more on sovereign downgrades than positive signals from debt restructuring by 
the government, and prefer to strict with non-government securities. 
Turning towards the non-vulnerable economies, we observed that both analyses indicated an 
insignificant effect of fiscal consolidation in seven non-vulnerable economies—Argentina, 
Bulgaria, Chile, China, Haiti, South Africa and Thailand. One possible reason for this result is 
that the banks of these economies hold significantly fewer government securities in their 
portfolio. The investors of these economies seem to be interested in investing their money 
elsewhere. In these circumstances, the government faces difficulty in issuing new bonds to gain 
new debts. For instance, Cuddington (1986) reported the case of Argentina when it faced such 
an experience alongside capital flight. We also observed that the aggregated and disaggregated 
analyses indicated a negative significant effect of fiscal consolidation on banking stability for 
Norway, which was also categorised as non-vulnerable in our fiscal vulnerability analysis 
(Section 6.2). In this case, the supply effect prevailed, and investors did not shift their portfolio 
towards government bonds. This deteriorated the capital adequacy ratios of the banking sector, 
which we observed in both the aggregated and disaggregated analyses. 
However, we observed that the results were inconsistent in 16 of 53 economies.214 These 16 
economies included 10 vulnerable and six non-vulnerable economies. Starting with the 
vulnerable economies, we observed that the disaggregated analysis indicated a positive and 
statistically significant effect for the case of six economies—Australia, Austria, Hungary, 
Japan, Portugal and Spain. The fiscal vulnerability analysis revealed that the degree of 
vulnerability was higher in all six economies (see Column 2 of Table 6.1, Chapter 6). Under 
these fiscal conditions, the risk-weighted assets of the banking sector worsen in response to 
                                                 
214 These 16 economies included Australia, Austria, Brazil, France, Germany, Hungary, Indonesia, Japan, the 
Netherlands, the Philippines, Portugal, the Russian Federation, South Korea, Spain, the UK and Venezuela. 
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austerity plans (Agnello et al., 2015b; Brutti, 2011; Penetta et al., 2011). The results of the 
disaggregated analysis are consistent with this strand of the literature. However, the aggregated 
analysis revealed a negative and statistically significant effect for the case of the above four 
vulnerable economies.215 We observed that TGE dataset did not consider different classes of 
capital for the composition of the capital adequacy ratios. Therefore, one possible reason for 
this result might be country-specific accounting standards.216 
Moving to consider the six non-vulnerable economies, the disaggregated analysis revealed a 
positive statistically significant effect for five countries—Brazil, Indonesia, the Russian 
Federation, South Korea and Venezuela. However, the aggregated analysis revealed an 
insignificant effect of fiscal consolidation on the banking stability of these economies. The 
early consolidated financial positions revealed less holding of financial assets by the banking 
sectors of Brazil and the Russian Federation. Therefore, the net financial worth of these 
economies was less than ˗10.217 These conditions could motivate institutional investors to 
enhance the size of their balance sheet. For instance, Brazilian lenders invested US$1.375 
billion in subordinated 10-year bonds of Itau Unibanco’s hefty in 2012. At the same time, 
financial institutions prefer to issue Tier-2 because they consider them less expensive. This 
financing was invested significantly in the bonds by Bradesco, Banco do Brasil and Itau.218 
Therefore, the disaggregated results revealed a positive significant effect on banking stability. 
For the case of Indonesia, we observed that their financial net worth was the highest among 
these non-vulnerable economies because OJK—the Financial Services Authority of 
Indonesia—set minimum requirements for capital adequacy ratios. 219  Therefore, the 
disaggregated results supported these regulatory changes in these economies.220 In summary, 
                                                 
215 These economies included Australia, Austria, Hungary and Portugal. The aggregated analysis revealed an 
insignificant effect for the case of Japan and Spain. 
216 For instance, see AASB 101 Presentation of Financial Statements and AASB 132 Financial Instruments: 
Presentation. 
217 See Sections 5.5.2 (Chapter 5), and Section 6.3 (Chapter 6) for discussion of the benchmark of ˗10 for 
financial net worth. 
218 See Kilby (2012) for further details on the behaviour of Brazilian lenders towards Tier-2 capital.  
219 See Sipahutar and Suhartono (2018) for further details on the capital adequacy ratios and capital 
requirements in Indonesia. 
220 At the end, we compared the disaggregated analysis with all three measures of financial sector stability, 
including z-score and stock market capitalisation. We mainly observed inconsistencies between the results of 
capital adequacy ratios. However, we observed inconsistent results because of stock market capitalisation for the 
case of China and Greece. We also observed inconsistency because of the z-score for the case of Denmark and 
Germany. We noted that TGE database aggregated values were calculated by adding the bank-by-bank 
unconsolidated financial statements data of Bankscope. These aggregated values were then used to calculate the 
banking system capital adequacy ratios and z-score. For this purpose, TGE uses the standard definition of 
capital adequacy ratios. See Section 3.3 (Chapter 3) for further details on the standard definitions of capital 
adequacy ratios. Similarly, the z-score is calculated using return on assets, equity and total assets of banks. 
However, TGE does not provide details of the banks used in the aggregation process. Therefore, we were unable 
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the findings of the country-specific analysis (aggregated and disaggregated) suggested that the 
degree of vulnerability and timing of fiscal consolidation are important in the role of fiscal 
consolidation for banking sector stability in vulnerable economies. In general, this analysis 
indicated that fiscal consolidation is important for banking sector stability, regardless of the 
initial fiscal stance of a country. 
8.5 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has provided further insight on the role of fiscal consolidation in financial sector 
stability through country-specific analysis because financial variables behave differently in 
different economies. The aggregated analysis revealed that the standard capital adequacy ratios 
improved significantly in the vulnerable economies, compared with the non-vulnerable 
economies. However, we observed that the capital adequacy ratios deteriorated in five 
vulnerable economies—Australia, Austria, Hungary, Portugal and the UK. These inconsistent 
results might be because of investments in foreign securities, the prevailing supply effect and 
the aggregation procedure by TGE database team. We further extended our analysis to the 
bank-wise disaggregated data extracted from the Bankscope database. The disaggregated 
analysis of non-vulnerable economies revealed that two countries (Indonesia and South Korea) 
indicated a 1.27 and 0.13 percentage point improvement in financial stability (Tier-I). Another 
two economies—New Zealand and Germany—indicated a decline of 1.32 and 0.28 percentage 
points in the capital adequacy ratio (Tier-I), respectively, because of their stance on fiscal 
consolidation. It is interesting to note that, in New Zealand and Germany, excessive fiscal 
consolidation might be occurring, which may further force the financial sector to opt for more 
risky assets in their portfolio of investment. As a result of the comprehensive range of data, we 
relied on the disaggregated analysis. These findings indicated that fiscal surplus may not 
warrant financial stability. Consequently, we may extract from the above results that fiscal 
consolidation—particularly in economies vulnerable to fiscal crisis—helps create financial 
stability. 
  
                                                 
to further investigate the reasons for inconsistencies. However, we preferred the results of the disaggregate 
analysis because we used bank-wise data with a greater number of observations—ranging up to 3,943 for the 












This thesis has explained how fiscal consolidation helps avoid fiscal vulnerability and 
reinforces banking stability through mitigating sovereign risks. This chapter is organised as 
follows. Section 9.2 provides the summary and concluding remarks of this analysis. More 
specifically, this section summarises each of the eight chapters of this study. Section 9.3 
elaborates on the contributions, distinctions and policy implications of this study for the public 
and the corporate sector. Section 9.4 discusses the limitations of this study, while Section 9.5 
presents future avenues for extending this research. 
9.2 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
Chapter 1 of this thesis elaborated the main theme of the thesis, along with the way in which 
all parts of this thesis are connected. Chapter 2 presented a wide range of literature on this field 
and identified the gaps in the existing literature. This literature review focused on two key 
areas—fiscal vulnerability and its linkage with banking stability. We classified the available 
literature on fiscal vulnerability into four classes with different alternative techniques. The next 
section of Chapter 2 provided the existing literature examining the way sovereign risk is 
transmitted into the banking sector. There is a substantial lack of theoretical and empirical 
literature on the role of fiscal consolidation in banking stability. This study filled this gap by 
suggesting that fiscal consolidation transmits into the capital adequacy ratios of the banking 
sector through two key channels: (i) government defaults are costly because they destroy bank 
balance sheets and (ii) higher bank funding costs have increased investors’ concerns about 
sovereign risks. In this interaction, fiscal consolidation plays a significant role by mitigating 
sovereign risk and increasing capital adequacy ratios. This research further extended the 
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literature by providing empirical evidence on 53 economies. The existing literature has 
indicated that the initial fiscal condition of an economy is important in the role of fiscal 
consolidation, where this role is expected to be substantial. The final analysis of this thesis 
filled this gap by providing empirical evidence on this topic. 
Chapter 3 presented the framework of analysis, which identified the appropriate channels 
though which fiscal consolidation is transmitted into the banking sector balance sheets. This 
chapter also presented the debt analysis of an economy through the evolution process of public 
debt. An economy never retires and essentially lives forever; thus, an economy does not need 
to pay off its debts entirely. In this framework, fiscal sustainably differentiates an economy 
from an individual or household. We presented the component-wise analysis of fiscal 
sustainability in this chapter. Among the different conditions of the fiscal balance, budget 
deficit is more relevant to debt analysis, where budget deficit can be financed through issuing 
new debts, monetising or using a mix of both options. The first option is the most commonly 
used measure of financing budget deficit; however, it depends on investors’ confidence, which 
deteriorates in the case of persistent fiscal vulnerability. In this situation, the general public and 
potential buyers stop buying government securities. Interestingly, banks are the key holders of 
government securities, especially in emerging economies, such as India. 
These conditions force institutional investors to rebalance their portfolio by shifting from 
government securities to private securities. Theoretically, banks make changes to their portfolio 
because of investors’ perceptions of sovereign risk. Banks also make changes to their 
investment portfolio because of the probability of default in the interbank lending market. 
Based on the regulatory framework (Basel Accords), this increases the weighted average assets 
of banks and subsequently deteriorates their capital adequacy ratios—the key measure of 
banking stability. As such, fiscal consolidation mitigates sovereign risk and transmits into bank 
balance sheets, thereby resulting in higher financial stability. This chapter provided a complete 
framework of analysis based on the concerned financial regulations. 
Chapter 4 presented the data collection process, data sources and their related issues, as we 
collected fiscal, financial and banking variable from several databases. For the empirical 
investigations, we used country-wise annual data for fiscal vulnerability analysis from 1960 to 
2017. We mainly relied on the database created by Mauro et al. (2013) for these fiscal variables. 
For the next part of our analysis, we used country-wise (aggregated) annual data from TGE 
and bank-wise (disaggregated) annual data from the Bankscope database. More directly, we 
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collected aggregated data on banking system regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets, z-score 
and stock market capitalisation from TGE database ranging from 1960 to 2017. For the 
disaggregated financial stability analysis, we collected bank-wise annual data on total assets, 
return on total assets, Tier-1 and Tier-2 from the Bankscope database, ranging from 1990 to 
2016. Normally, the consolidated balance sheet data are used for financial market analysis, 
which creates difficulty analysing the domestic effects of fiscal consolidation. Therefore, we 
decided to use consolidated bank balance sheet data for the financial stability analysis. 
Chapter 5 presented the empirical strategy by initially proposing a fiscal vulnerability selection 
procedure (Figure 5.2, Chapter 5) to overcome some quantitative issues in conventional 
techniques of fiscal vulnerability. Finally, we used this proposed fiscal vulnerability selection 
approach to identify the economies vulnerable to debt crisis. At the start of the fiscal 
vulnerability analysis, we suspected structured breaks in the data for most of our selected 53 
economies. We first applied a breakpoint unit root test to identify the break year. We then 
applied the Bai (Bai, 1997) and Bai–Perron (Bai & Perron, 1998) approach of multiple-
breakpoint test on Equation 5.2.1 (Section 5.2, Chapter 5). After this identification process, 
we used appropriate dummies for the significant breaks. This process (first step of our fiscal 
vulnerability selection procedure) provided a single debt coefficient, which could be 
misleading when the sample for the period of vulnerability was pooled with the non-
vulnerability period. We overcame this problem by extending our estimation to subsamples of 
at least 20 observations through forward, backward and moving screening processes. These 
screening processes partially eliminated this problem; therefore, we extended the analysis to 
the threshold regression. 
Using the identified vulnerable economies from these three steps (Bohn [1998], stability 
analysis and threshold regression), we further determined that, if the net financial worth of the 
identified economies (in the VaR and CVaR framework) was less than ˗10, the economy 
should be identified as vulnerable. This gave us the fiscal vulnerability selection procedure. 
The next part provided the fiscal consolidation measurement strategy, followed by the panel 
regression model to analyse the effect of fiscal consolidation on banking stability. For the 
country-specific financial stability investigation, we conducted aggregated and disaggregated 
analyses. We included the lagged dependent variable because of the presence of adoptive 
expectations. During disaggregated analysis, the standard fixed-effects panel regression can 
be subject to Nickell bias. Therefore, it is recommended to apply the GMM estimation 
procedure proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). We observed higher variation in the number 
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of banks (N) and number of years (T) in our large sample. We applied GMM estimation when 
N was greater than T. However, the dynamic panel bias became insignificant if T was greater 
than N then we applied standard fixed effect. We followed this estimation procedure in the 
country-wise analysis of banking stability. 
Chapter 6 discussed the results of the fiscal vulnerability analysis, where we classified the 
sample of these economies into vulnerable and non-vulnerable using our fiscal vulnerability 
selection procedure. In this multi-approach method, we extended our analysis from the 
conventional debt approach to the investment approach. In this manner, we selected the 
countries commonly identified by both approaches as vulnerable to debt crisis. Initially, Bohn’s 
(1998) method identified 30 of 53 economies as vulnerable (the first step of our fiscal 
vulnerability selection procedure). However, these results could be misleading when the 
sample for the period of vulnerability was pooled with the non-vulnerability sample, as one 
sample would nullify the effects of the other. Therefore, we extended these estimates to the 
subsample through forward, backward and moving screening processes, and the results 
revealed nine additional economies as vulnerable to debt crisis (the second step of our fiscal 
vulnerability procedure). 
It could be argued that these screening processes may not completely avoid the identification 
problem, since some vulnerable periods can be nullified by non-vulnerable periods within the 
subsample. To overcome this issue, we extended our analysis to a country-specific threshold 
regression, which could endogenously determine the period during which a country is 
vulnerable to crisis. Further, the threshold regression identified one additional economy (11 
total economies) where the vulnerable period was nullified by the non-vulnerable period within 
the sample. The threshold approach also helped us achieve our second objective of identifying 
the country-specific threshold of public debt. In total, we identified 40 of 53 economies as 
vulnerable to debt crisis, with a specific critical level of public debt to GDP ranging from a 
minimum of 21.16 per cent (France) to a maximum of 84.06 per cent (Belgium). These results 
are in contrast with the existing literature, including Reinhart and Rogoff (2010). To 
incorporate investment aspects of public debt, we analysed the financial net worth (VaR and 
CVaR) of these 40 vulnerable economies. We finally matched the results of debt and 
investment analysis to determine the fiscal health of these economies. Finally, we classified a 
total of 26 economies as vulnerable economies. This procedure offered a rigorous analysis and 
may be considered far superior to the existing procedures, which are subject to heavy criticism 
involving methodological issues or suggesting a single cut off of public debt to GDP as a 
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criterion of vulnerability to fiscal crisis. Finally, we compared these results with the results of 
alternative measures and with data from different rating agencies, including S&P, Moody’s 
and Fitch Group. 
In Chapter 7, we analysed fiscal consolidation and its role in the banking stability of the 53 
economies. In the fiscal consolidation analysis, we conducted a rigorous reconciliation of 
narrative techniques and quantitative approaches using CAPB. We calculated fiscal 
consolidation episodes where CAPB improved by at least 1.5 per cent of GDP in a year, or at 
least one per cent of GDP per year in a period of two consecutive years (Ardagna, 2009). Using 
this definition, we calculated 202 fiscal consolidation episodes from 1960 to 2015 in our 
selected countries. We used these fiscal consolidation episodes in the panel analysis of banking 
stability. We applied Arellano–Bond dynamic panel data estimation, Roodman collapse and 
straightforward fixed effects to analyse the influence of fiscal consolidation episodes in the 
banking stability of three panels: (i) all economies, (ii) vulnerable economies and (iii) non-
vulnerable economies. The results of this analysis indicated that standard capital adequacy 
ratios, such as the Tier-1 ratio, improved by 0.36 percentage points in the panel of all economies. 
However, the final objective of our study was to estimate the effect of fiscal consolidation on 
the banking sector separately for the groups of vulnerable and non-vulnerable economies. 
Therefore, we categorised these economies into two panels (vulnerable and non-vulnerable) 
and extended our analysis to these two panels separately. The results suggested that the 
standard capital adequacy ratio (Tier-1) improved by 0.58 percentage points in response to 
fiscal consolidation episodes in vulnerable economies. These results for the panel of non-
vulnerable economies were not statistically significant. These findings suggest that fiscal 
consolidation creates banking stability, particularly in vulnerable economies. 
Chapter 8 presented a country-specific analysis on the role of fiscal consolidation in the 
financial stability of 53 economies. This analysis was further bifurcated into aggregated and 
disaggregated analysis. This analysis provided more insights to the topic, since financial, fiscal 
and banking variables behave differently in different economies. The overall results of this 
analysis were consistent with the panel results; however, we observed some contradictions. For 
example, the aggregated analysis revealed that fiscal consolidation deteriorated financial 
stability in five vulnerable economies. This could be due to the lack of investor interest in 
domestic securities and the prevailing supply effect. The aggregation procedure for capital 
adequacy ratio may also be a reason for this inconsistency. We also observed some 
irregularities in the disaggregated analysis. For instance, the disaggregated country-specific 
136 
 
analysis of non-vulnerable economies revealed that Tier-1 (for FC-1) of Indonesia and South 
Korea improved by 1.27 and 0.13 percentage points, respectively. However, Tier-1 (FC-I) of 
New Zealand and Germany deteriorated by 1.32 and 0.28 percentage points, respectively. 
Excessive fiscal consolidation in New Zealand and Germany may further force the financial 
sector to opt for more risky assets in their portfolio of investment. These findings reveal that 
fiscal surplus may not warrant financial stability. Therefore, we may infer from the above 
findings that fiscal consolidation helps create financial stability, particularly in vulnerable 
economies. 
9.3 Contributions, Distinctions and Policy Implications of the Study 
This study has covered various important aspects of public economics and the banking sector. 
Therefore, a couple of important findings in these areas may be attributed to this study. One of 
the key findings is that the existing literature lacks consensus on the direction of the relationship 
between twin crises (sovereign defaults and financial crises). This thesis attempted to explore 
this missing link by considering the role of fiscal consolidation in banking stability through the 
channel of sovereign risk. The first part of this study investigated fiscal vulnerability to crisis 
through the perspective of fiscal consolidation by suggesting a fiscal vulnerability selection 
procedure. Along these lines, we overcame the issues of the technicalities involved to correctly 
estimate the parameter of fiscal vulnerability to crisis. Moreover, we incorporated the missing 
aspect of fiscal consolidation as a policy response to fiscal vulnerability. 
More directly, the first part of this study extended contributions to the existing fiscal literature 
in five main ways, as follows. First, it proposed a fiscal vulnerability selection procedure 
(Figure 5.2, Chapter 5) by incorporating the investment component of public debt that can be 
applied to a large sample of developing, emerging and developed economies. Second, it 
calculated a threshold level of debt as a proportion of GDP, beyond which a country may fall 
into fiscal crisis. Third, it calculated the threshold level based on the special case of the regime-
switching model, used for the first time in the literature on this topic. Fourth, it reconciled the 
results of the debt approach with the investment approach to confirm the results of the debt 
approach to estimate vulnerability to fiscal crisis. Fifth, it determined that the alternative 
approaches (fiscal vulnerability index and financial net worth/balance sheet) cannot be applied 
as standalone techniques in a fiscal vulnerability analysis. Thus, this study has an obvious 
advantage over other studies, since the existing studies focused on a single approach to 
investigate fiscal vulnerability. 
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The next part of this study provided a transmission mechanism through which fiscal 
vulnerability is transmitted into the banking sector by deteriorating banking stability. More 
specifically, persistent fiscal vulnerability increases sovereign risk, and the general public—
especially expected investors of government securities—lose confidence. In these situations, 
fiscal consolidation rebuilds this market confidence, and institutional investors finally include 
government securities in their investment portfolios to achieve the required adequacy ratio for 
banking stability. This gives a key distinction to this study over the existing literature, since 
the existing literature only discusses the transmission mechanism between sovereign risk and 
increasing banking costs. By applying this theoretical framework to two different panels of 53 
economies, this study further contributes to the empirical literature. We successfully estimated 
and found that fiscal consolidation performs an important role in banking sector stability, 
particularly during a fiscal crisis. Another distinction of this study is the fact that the Bankscope 
database has never been used on a large scale to explain banking sector stability in association 
with the changing stance of fiscal policy. 
The above observations reflect deeper implications for public policy makers and financial 
market practitioners. Considering the short-term pain and long-term gain view of budget 
consolidation, policy makers of vulnerable economies (especially the 26 economies identified 
as vulnerable in our analysis) should change their fiscal stance to mitigate their respective 
sovereign risks. Further, it is suggested that financial market practitioners should closely 
observe the changes in fiscal policy stance, and rebalance their investment portfolios 
accordingly. In this manner, they are expected to increase their profitability through gaining 
maximum return from the loans extended to firms and consumers, and on investment securities. 
Following our guidelines, these institutional investors can increase their capital adequacy ratio 
and subsequent banking stability if they rebalance their investment portfolio in response to 
changes in the fiscal policy stance by their respective governments. This is not suggested for 
all economies, since the role of fiscal consolidation depends on the initial fiscal stance of an 
economy. 
9.4 Limitations of the Study 
Despite these contributions and distinctions, we observed a few limitations of this study, mainly 
relating to the data, both sector specific and country specific. We attempted to incorporate the 
qualitative aspect of fiscal stance in the measurement of fiscal consolidation episodes. For this 
purpose, we required the following data sources for all 53 economies: (i) convergence and 
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stability programs submitted by the authorities to the European Commission, (ii) IMF reports 
and OECD reports for the OECD economies, (iii) budgets and budget speeches and (iv) central 
bank reports. These data were not available in the databases for all the selected developed, 
emerging and developing economies. Therefore, we restricted our fiscal consolidation 
measurement analysis to quantitative approaches only. Further, we observed that the data on 
capital adequacy ratios for some banks were not available in the Bankscope database. Even for 
Romania, Colombia and Costa Rica, the data for only one bank was available. From a sector 
perspective, this study was only limited to the banking sector. We only included stock market 
capitalisation in the aggregated analysis. Further, we restricted this study to the Basel Accords 
framework, and did not incorporate the country-specific capital adequacy requirements for all 
53 economies. 
9.5 Scope for Future Research 
The first logical step forward to extend this study is to incorporate external vulnerability for 
the country-specific cases. This research can also be extended by incorporating alternative 
measures of public debt, including net financial liabilities and net public debt, in the fiscal 
vulnerability analysis for all 53 economies. One of the key limitations of this research was the 
unavailability of public sector balance sheet data. However, data on government balance sheets 
are available for all OECD (2018) economies from 1990 onwards, which enabled us to 
calculate the net financial liabilities and net debt for these economies. The banking stability 
analysis can be extended by analysing the compositional effect. Alternative measures of 
banking stability could be used, including NPL score, probability of default score, and the price 
of credit default swaps. However, previous research indicated that capital ratios are good 
predictors of banking failures. This research can be extended by incorporating other 
components of financial markets. In this manner, future research can be extended by 
incorporating the stock market index in our framework of analysis. For this empirical 
investigation, standard event study methodology can be applied to determine the effect of fiscal 
consolidation episodes on the stock markets of vulnerable and non-vulnerable economies. 
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 Appendix A (Chapter 1) 
Table A1: Stylized Facts: Sovereign Default Episodes, Banking Crises and Fiscal Consolidation Episodes  





Small Fiscal Consolidation 
Episodes 
Started or ongoing 





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Albania 1991 to 1995 No Yes (1992)  1996, 1998-99, 2003, 2005. 
Algeria 1991 to 1996 Yes (1990) No 
 
1995-96, 1999-2000, 2003, 
2005. 
Angola 1985 to 2004 No Yes (1991)  1999-2000, 2004-06, 2010-11. 
Antigua 1996 to 2004 No No  2003-05, 2007, 2010-12, 2013. 
Argentina 1982 to 1993, Yes (1981), No No, Yes (2001)  1993 





   
1984-88 n/a 
  
   
1994-98 
 
Bolivia 1980 to 1984, No, No No, Yes (1986)  1990-91, 1993, 2002. 




Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992 to 1997 No Yes (1992)  n/a 
Brazil 1983 to 1994 No Yes (1994)  1991, 1994-95, 1997, 1999. 
Bulgaria 1990 to 1994 No Yes (1996) 
 
1991, 1994, 1997-99, 2002, 
2004-05, 2012-13. 
Burkina Faso 1983 to 1996 No Yes (1988)  n/a 
Cameroon 1985 to 2003 No Yes (1987)  1992, 1995, 1998. 
Canada 
   
1993-97 
 
Cape Verde 1981 to 1996 No Yes (1993)  n/a 
Central African, Rep  1981, 1983 to 2004 Yes (1980-81), Yes  No, No  n/a 
Chile 1983 to 1990 Yes (1981) No 
 
0 
     continued… 
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Table A1 (…continued): Stylized Facts: Sovereign Default Episodes, Banking Crises and Fiscal Consolidation Episodes  





Small Fiscal Consolidation 
Episodes 
Started or ongoing 





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Congo 1983 to 2004 No Yes (1992)  2000, 2003-05. 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1980 to 2004 No Yes (1980)  2000 
Costa Rica 1981, 1983 to No, No No, Yes (1994)  1992, 1995, 2003, 2006, 2007. 




Cote d’Ivoire 1983 to 1998, No, No Yes (1988), No  n/a 




Cuba 1982 to 2004 No No  n/a 
Denmark 
   
1983-86 1990, 1996-97. 
Dominica 2003 to 2004 No No  2002-03, 2005-06, 2013. 
Dominican Republic 1982 to 1994 No No  1990, 1992, 1995, 2001. 
Ecuador 1982 to 1995, Yes (1980), Yes (1998) No, No  n/a 




Ethiopia 1991 to 1999 No Yes (1994) 
 
1991-93, 1995-96, 2000, 2003-
04, 2007, 2011-12. 
Finland 
   
1993-2000 1990, 1995-98. 
Gabon 1986 to 1994, No, Yes (1997) Yes (1995), No  n/a 




Gambia 1986 to 1990 Yes (1985) No  1992, 2004, 2006-07, 2010. 
Ghana 1987 Yes (1986) No  1991, 1993-94, 2011-12. 
Greece 
   
1990-94 n/a 
Guatemala 1989 No Yes (1990)  1991, 2004, 2013. 
Guinea 1986 to 1988, Yes (1985), No No, Yes (1993)  n/a 
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Table A1 (…continued): Stylized Facts: Sovereign Default Episodes, Banking Crises and Fiscal Consolidation Episodes  





Small Fiscal Consolidation 
Episodes 
Started or ongoing 





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Guinea Bissau 1983 to 1996 No Yes (1995)  n/a 
Guyana 1982 to 2004 No No  n/a 
Haiti 1982 to 1994 No No  n/a 
Honduras 1981 to 2004 No No  n/a 
Indonesia 1998 to 2000, Yes (1997), Yes (2001) No, No  1993-94, 2000, 2002, 2010. 




Iran 1981 to 1995 No No 
 
1995, 1999-2000, 2004-05, 
2007. 
Iraq 1987 to 2004 No No  n/a 
Ireland 
   
1982-88 n/a 
Italy 
   
1990-95 1994-95, 1997-99. 
Jamaica 1981 to 1985, No, No No, Yes (1994) 
 
1997, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2010, 
2012-13. 





   
1979-87 1991-1994. 
Jordan 1989 to 1993 No Yes (1989) 
 
1991-92, 1999, 2003, 2006, 
2008, 2010, 2013. 
Kenya 1994 to 2004 Yes (1993) No 
 
1992-93, 1996, 2000, 2005, 
2011, 2013. 
Korea, Dem. Rep. 1980 to 2004 No No  2000 
Liberia 1987 to 2004 No Yes (1991)  2005-06, 2013. 
Macedonia 1992 to 1997 No Yes (1993)  2005 
Madagascar 1981 to 2002 No Yes (1988)  1995-96. 
Malawi 1982, 1988 No, No No, No  2010, 2013. 
Mauritania 1992 to 1996 Yes (1991) No 
 
n/a 
     continued… 
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Table A1 (…continued): Stylized Facts: Sovereign Default Episodes, Banking Crises and Fiscal Consolidation Episodes  
Country Sovereign Default 
Banking Crisis   
Started or ongoing 








Small Fiscal Consolidation 
Episodes 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Mexico 1982 to 1990 Yes (1981) No  1991-92. 
Moldova 1998, 2002 No, No No, No 
 
1996, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2003, 
2005, 2010, 2013. 
Morocco 1983, 1986 to Yes (1980), No No, No  1992, 1996, 2000. 




Mozambique 1980, 1983 to No, No No, Yes (1987)  2013 




Myanmar 1997 to 2004 Yes (1996) No  1992, 1996-97, 2000. 
Nicaragua 1980 to 2004 No Yes (late 1980s)  1993, 1995, 2002, 2006, 2011. 
Niger 1983 to 1991 No Yes (1983)  n/a 
Nigeria 1982 to 1992, No, No Yes (1991), No  2013 




Pakistan 1998 to 1999 No No  1994, 1998, 2000, 2009, 2013. 
Panama 1983 to 1996 No Yes (1988)  1993, 1995. 
Paraguay 1986 to 1992, No, Yes (2001) Yes (1995), No 
 
2001, 2003-04, 2008, 2010, 
2013. 




Peru 1984 to 1997 Yes (1983) No  1994, 1996, 2006, 2010. 
Philippines 1983 to 1992 Yes (1981) No  2005-06, 2011, 2013. 
Poland 1981 to 1994 No No  1994 
Romania 1981 to 1983, No, No No, Yes (1990s)  1993, 1995. 




Russia 1991 to 2000 No No  1995-96, 1999, 2000, 2001. 
SaoTomeand Principe 1987 to 1994 Yes (1980s) No 
 
n/a 
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Table A1 (…continued): Stylized Facts: Sovereign Default Episodes, Banking Crises and Fiscal Consolidation Episodes  
Country Sovereign Default 
Banking Crisis   
Started or ongoing 








Small Fiscal Consolidation 
Episodes 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Senegal 1981 to 1985, No, Yes (1989), Yes 
(1991) 
Yes (1988), No, No 
 
2002 




Serbia and Montenegro 1992 to 2004 No No  2013 
Seychelles 2000 to 2002 No No  1998-2000, 2005, 2008, 2011. 
Sierra Leone 1983 to 1984, No, No No, Yes (1990) 
 
1998-2000, 2002, 2004, 2009, 
2011. 




Slovenia 1992 to 1996 No Yes (1992)  1995-96, 2003, 2012-13. 
South Africa 1985 to 1987, No, No, No No, Yes (1989), No  1996, 1999, 2003. 




Sudan 1980 to 2004 No No  0 
Sweden 
   
1981-87 1994-97, 1999. 
  
   
1994-97 
 
Tanzania 1984 to 2004 No Yes (late 1980s)  2011, 2013. 
Togo 1980, 1982 to No, No, No, No No, No, No, Yes 
(1993)  
n/a 








Trinidad and Tobago 1988 to 1989 Yes (1987) No  0 
Turkey 1982 No Yes (1982)  1994, 1997, 2002. 
Uganda 1980 to 1993 No Yes (1994)  2004-08, 2012-13. 
Ukraine 1998 to 2000 No Yes (1998) 
 
2000, 2002, 2006, 2011, 2013. 
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Table A1 (…continued): Stylized Facts: Sovereign Default Episodes, Banking Crises and Fiscal Consolidation Episodes  
Country Sovereign Default 
Banking Crisis   
Started or ongoing 








Small Fiscal Consolidation 
Episodes 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
United Kingdom 




   
1993-98 
 
Uruguay 1983 to 1985, Yes (1981), Yes (1984) No, No 
 
1990, 1995-96, 2000, 2004, 
2013. 




Venezuela 1983 to 1988, Yes (early 1980s), No, No, Yes (1993), No  1990, 1996, 1999, 2004-05. 




Vietnam 1985 to 1998 No Yes (1997)  n/a 
Yemen 1985 to 2001 No Yes (1996)  1991, 1995-96, 2000. 
Yugoslavia 1983 to 1992 No No  n/a 
Zambia 1983 to 1994 No Yes (1995) 
 
1992, 1994, 1996, 1998-99, 
2001, 2003, 2006, 2008, 2009, 
2011. 
Zimbabwe 1980, 2000 to 2004 No, Yes (late 1990s) No, No  2010 
Total  110 30 44 13  
Note: The detail on sovereign defaults (column 2) and banking crises (column 3 and 4) is extracted from Gennaioli et al. (2014).  Small fiscal consolidation (column 6) episode is 
defined as a period where change in cyclical adjusted primary balance (CAPB) is greater than 1 per cent in a year.  Large fiscal consolidation episodes (column 5) are extracted 
from Blochliger, Song, and Sutherland (2012).  This sample period contains 110 default episodes (total of column 2) in 81 countries. Out of the 110 default episodes during 1980 to 
2005, 74 (total of column 3 and 4) were accompanied by a banking crisis. In 30 cases (total of column 3), banking crises were ongoing or had started in 3 years prior to sovereign 
default. While in 44 (total of column 4) of these cases, banking crises occurred in the same year or in a later year.  
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Australia Norway Switzerland Sweden Germany
Source: Data from 1980 to 2011 is extracted from historical public finance databases and is further updated from 
Fiscal Monitor April 2016. 
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 Appendix B (Chapter 3) 
Figure B1: Basel III Phase-in Arrangements (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision) 
 














 Appendix C (Chapter 4) 
Table C1: Financial Assets and Liabilities used in Calculation of Net Financial Worth 
Indicator Name 
Budgetary Central Government, Assets and Liabilities, Assets, Domestic, Cash, National Currency 
Budgetary Central Government, Assets and Liabilities, Assets, Foreign, Cash, National Currency 
Budgetary Central Government, Assets and Liabilities, Assets, Net Acquisition of Financial Assets Other 
than Cash, Cash, National Currency 
Budgetary Central Government, Assets and Liabilities, Financial Assets, Financial Derivatives, 
Classification of transactions in assets and liabilities, 2001 Manual, Cash, National Currency 
Budgetary Central Government, Assets and Liabilities, Financial Assets, Insurance Technical Reserves, 
Classification of transactions in assets and liabilities, 2001 Manual, Cash, National Currency 
Budgetary Central Government, Assets and Liabilities, Financial Assets, Loans, Classification of 
transactions in assets and liabilities, 2001 Manual, Cash, National Currency 
Budgetary Central Government, Assets and Liabilities, Financial Assets, Securities Other than Shares, 
Classification of transactions in assets and liabilities, 2001 Manual, Cash, National Currency 
Budgetary Central Government, Assets and Liabilities, Financial Assets, Shares and Other Equity, 
Classification of transactions in assets and liabilities, 2001 Manual, Cash, National Currency 
Budgetary Central Government, Assets and Liabilities, Liabilities, Classification of the stocks of assets and 
liabilities, 2001 Manual, Cash, National Currency 
Budgetary Central Government, Assets and Liabilities, Liabilities, Classification of transactions in assets 
and liabilities, 2001 Manual, Cash, National Currency 
Budgetary Central Government, Assets and Liabilities, Liabilities, Currency and Deposits, Classification 
of transactions in assets and liabilities, 2001 Manual, Cash, National Currency 
Budgetary Central Government, Assets and Liabilities, Liabilities, Domestic, Classification of transactions 
in assets and liabilities, 2001 Manual, Cash, National Currency 
Budgetary Central Government, Assets and Liabilities, Liabilities, Financial Derivatives, Classification of 
transactions in assets and liabilities, 2001 Manual, Cash, National Currency 
Budgetary Central Government, Assets and Liabilities, Liabilities, Foreign, Classification of transactions 
in assets and liabilities, 2001 Manual, Cash, National Currency 
Budgetary Central Government, Assets and Liabilities, Liabilities, Insurance Technical Reserves, 
Classification of transactions in assets and liabilities, 2001 Manual, Cash, National Currency 
Budgetary Central Government, Assets and Liabilities, Liabilities, Loans, Classification of transactions in 
assets and liabilities, 2001 Manual, Cash, National Currency 
Budgetary Central Government, Assets and Liabilities, Liabilities, Securities Other than Shares, 
Classification of transactions in assets and liabilities, 2001 Manual, Cash, National Currency 
Budgetary Central Government, Assets and Liabilities, Liabilities, Shares and Other Equity, Classification 
of transactions in assets and liabilities, 2001 Manual, Cash, National Currency 
Source: Author's calculation of net financial worth for the selected countries is based on these indicators as given in 








Table C2. The Banks used in the Analysis   
Country  Bank Bank Type 
Argentina Banco de la Nacion Argentina Commercial Bank 
 Banco Santander Rio S.A. Commercial Bank 
 Banco Macro SA Commercial Bank 
 BBVA Banco Frances SA Commercial Bank 
Australia Macquarie Bank Limited Investment Banks 
 Westpac Banking Corporation Commercial Bank 
 UFJ Australia Limited Investment Banks 
 Investec Holdings Pty Limited Investment Banks 
 Suncorp-Metway Ltd Commercial Bank 
 HSBC Bank Australia Limited Investment Banks 
 SG Australia Limited Commercial Bank 
 Bank of Queensland Limited Commercial Bank 
 Investec Australia Limited Investment Banks 
 Credit Agricole CIB Australia Limited Commercial Bank 
Austria Raiffeisenverband Salzburg eGen Cooperative Banks 
 Meinl Bank AG Commercial Bank 
 Kaerntner Sparkasse Savings Bank 
 Dornbirner Sparkasse Bank AG Savings Bank 
 Bank Gutmann AG Private Banking & Asset Mgt 
Companies 
 Raiffeisenbank Reutte rGmbH Cooperative Banks 
 Sparkasse Eferding-Peuerbach-Waiznkirchen Savings Bank 
 Autobank AG Commercial Bank 
Belgium Investar-Investeringsmaatschappij Argenta Investment & Trust Corporations 
 Europabank NV Commercial Bank 
Brazil Banco BMG SA Commercial Bank 
 Banco Votorantim SA Commercial Bank 
 Banco Industrial do Brasil S.A. Commercial Bank 
 Unibanco-Uniao de Bancos Brasileiros Commercial Bank 
 Banco BBM SA Investment Banks 
 Banco Alfa de Investimento S.A. Investment Banks 
 Banco Industrial e Comercial S.A. - 
BICBANCO 
Commercial Bank 
 Banco Mercantil do Brasil S.A. Commercial Bank 
 Banco do Estado do Espirito Santo S.A. - 
BANESTES 
Commercial Bank 
 Banco ABC - Brasil SA Commercial Bank 
 Banco Sudameris Brazil SA Commercial Bank 
 Conglomerado Financeiro Alfa (Combined) Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Banco Fibra S.A. Commercial Bank 
 Banco Indusval SA Commercial Bank 
 Banco Sofisa S.A. Commercial Bank 
Bulgaria Unionbank EAD Commercial Bank 
 DSK Bank Plc Savings Bank 
 First Investment Bank AD Commercial Bank 
Canada Export Development Canada Specialized Governmental Credit 
Institution 
 HSBC Bank Canada Commercial Bank 
 Caisse Centrale Desjardins Cooperative Banks 
 Laurentian Bank of Canada Commercial Bank 
  continued… 
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Table C2 (… continued): The Banks used in the Analysis  
Country  Bank Bank Type 
Canada Alberta Treasury Branches Specialized Governmental Credit 
Institution 
 Citibank Canada Commercial Bank 
 BNP Paribas (Canada) Commercial Bank 
 BPO Properties Ltd Investment Banks 
 Société Générale (Canada) Commercial Bank 
 JP Morgan Bank of Canada Commercial Bank 
 Citizens Bank of Canada Commercial Bank 
 JP Morgan Canada Investment Banks 
 ABN AMRO Bank NV Commercial Bank 
Chile Banco de Credito e Inversiones - BCI Commercial Bank 
 Banco BICE Commercial Bank 
China Agricultural Bank of China Limited Commercial Bank  
Xiamen International Bank Commercial Bank 
Colombia BBVA Colombia SA Commercial Bank 
Costa Rica Banco Nacional de Costa Rica Commercial Bank 
Greece ABH Financial Limited Commercial Bank 
 Cyprus Popular Bank Public Co Ltd Commercial Bank 
 Bank of Cyprus Public Company Limited-
Bank of Cyprus Group 
Investment Banks 
 Cyprus Development Bank Public Company 
Ltd 
Specialized Governmental Credit 
Institution 
 Hellenic Bank Public Company Limited Commercial Bank 
 Alpha Bank Cyprus Limited Commercial Bank 
 National Bank of Greece (Cyprus) Ltd. Commercial Bank 
 Turkish Bank Ltd. Commercial Bank 
Denmark Spar Nord Bank Commercial Bank 
 Selskabet af 1. september  Commercial Bank 
 Vestjysk Bank A/S Commercial Bank 
 Arbejdernes Landsbank A/S Commercial Bank 
 Bankaktieselskabet Alm. Brand Bank Commercial Bank 
 Fjordbank Mors A/S Savings Bank 
 Selskabet af 1. september 2008 A/S Commercial Bank 
 Sparekassen Thy Savings Bank 
 Middelfart Sparekasse Savings Bank 
 DiBa Bank A/S Commercial Bank 
Dominican 
Republic 
Grupo BHD, S.A. Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
Finland Alandsbanken Abp-Bank of Aland Plc Commercial Bank 
France Entenial Commercial Bank 
 Legal & General Bank (Fran Private Banking & Asset Mgt 
Companies 
 Crédit du Nord Commercial Bank 
 Banque Palatine Commercial Bank 
 Crédit Foncier de France Real Estate & Mortgage Bank 
 Crédit Industriel d'Alsace et de Lorraine - 
Banque CIAL 
Commercial Bank 
 BLOM Bank France SA Commercial Bank 
 BNP Paribas Commercial Bank 
 Banque Populaire De l'Ouest Cooperative Banks 
 Credit Agricole Corporate and Investment  Commercial Bank 
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Table C2 (… continued): The Banks used in the Analysis  
Country  Bank Bank Type 
France Bank-Credit Agricole CIB  
 BPIFrance Financement Commercial Bank 
 Casden Banque Populaire Cooperative Banks 
 Banque CIN-Crédit Industriel de Normandie Commercial Bank  
Le Crédit Lyonnais (LCL) Commercial Bank 
 Crédit Mutuel Océan Cooperative Banks 
 Banque CIC Nord Ouest Commercial Bank 
 Franfinance Finance Companies (Credit Card, 
Factoring & Leasing) 
 BNP Paribas Fortis Commercial Bank 
 ODDO et Compagnie Investment Banks 
 Edmond de Rothschild (France) Commercial Bank 
 Banque OBC - Odier Bungener Courvoisier Private Banking & Asset Mgt 
Companies 
 Union de Banques Arabes et Françaises 
UBAF 
Commercial Bank 
 Euronext Paris SA Clearing Institutions & Custody 
 SwissLife banque Privée Private Banking & Asset Mgt 
Companies 
 Monte Paschi Banque S.A. Commercial Bank 
 FC France Finance Companies (Credit Card, 
Factoring & Leasing) 
 Banque Privée Anjou Private Banking & Asset Mgt 
Companies 
 Banque Transatlantique SA Private Banking & Asset Mgt 
Companies 
 Compagnie Financière Lazard Frères Investment Banks 
 Union Financière de France Banque Group Finance Companies 
 Legal & General Bank (France) Private Banking & Asset Mgt 
Companies 
 KBL Richelieu Banque Privée Commercial Bank 
Germany Bankhaus Lampe KG Commercial Bank 
 Commerzbank AG Commercial Bank 
 MKB Mittelrheinische Bank GmbH Investment Banks 
 LRP Landesbank Rheinland-Pfalz Specialized Governmental Credit 
Institution 
 WGZ-Bank AG Westdeutsche 
Genossenschafts-Zentralbank 
Cooperative Banks 
 Bayerische Landesbank Specialized Governmental Credit 
Institution 
 IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG Investment Banks 
 HSBC Trinkaus & Burkhardt AG Private Banking & Asset Mgt 
Companies 
 Sparda-Bank Baden-Württemberg eG Cooperative Banks 
 B. Metzler seel. Sohn & Co. 
Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien-Metzler 
Bank 
Commercial Bank 
 GE Money Bank GmbH Commercial Bank 
 Hauck & Aufhaeuser Privatbankiers KGaA Commercial Bank 
 Edekabank Aktiengesellschaft Commercial Bank 
 Bankhaus Bauer AG Commercial Bank 
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Table C2 (… continued): The Banks used in the Analysis   
Country  Bank Bank Type 
Germany Grenke Bank Ag Private Banking & Asset Mgt 
Companies 
 NordFinanz Bank AG Commercial Bank 
Ghana Ecobank Ghana Limited Investment Banks 
 Universal Merchant Bank Commercial Bank 
Haiti Société Générale Haitienne de Banque SA – 
SOGEBANK 
Commercial Bank 
Haiti Unibank SA Commercial Bank  
Capital Bank Commercial Bank 
Hong Kong Dah Sing Bank, Ltd Commercial Bank 
 Nanyang Commercial Bank Ltd Commercial Bank 
 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
(Asia) Limited - ICBC (Asia) 
Commercial Bank 
 Hang Seng Bank Ltd. Commercial Bank 
 Bank of East Asia Ltd Commercial Bank 
 DBS Bank (Hong Kong) Limited Commercial Bank 
 Chekiang First Bank Ltd Commercial Bank 
 
CITIC International Financial Holdings 
Limited 
Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 China CITIC Bank International Limited Commercial Bank 
 Shanghai Commercial Bank Ltd Commercial Bank 
 Wing Lung Bank Ltd Commercial Bank 
 Chong Hing Bank Limited Commercial Bank 
 Fubon Bank (Hong Kong) Limited Commercial Bank 
 Chiyu Banking Corporation Ltd. Commercial Bank 
 Public Bank (Hong Kong) Limited Commercial Bank 
Hungary OTP Bank Plc Commercial Bank 
 K&H Bank Zrt Commercial Bank 
 UniCredit Bank Hungary Zrt Commercial Bank 
 MKB Bank Zrt Commercial Bank 
 CIB Bank Ltd-CIB Bank Zrt Commercial Bank 
 Inter-Europa Bank Zrt Commercial Bank 
 KDB Bank Europe Ltd Commercial Bank 
Iceland Arion Bank Commercial Bank  
Sparisjodabanki Islands hf Commercial Bank 
Indonesia Bank Permata Tbk Commercial Bank 
 Bank Rakyat Indonesia (Persero) Tbk Commercial Bank 
 Bank Central Asia Commercial Bank 
 Bank Internasional Indonesia Tb Others (still to be classified as per 
Bankscope classification) 
 PT Bank CIMB Niaga Tbk Commercial Bank 
 Bank Internasional Indonesia Tbk Commercial Bank 
 Bank Lippo Tbk. Commercial Bank 
 Bank Commonwealth Commercial Bank 
 Danareksa (Persero) Investment Banks 
Ireland Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Limited Commercial Bank 
 Scotiabank (Ireland) Limited Securities Firm 
 Bank of Ireland-Governor and Company of 
the Bank of Ireland 
Commercial Bank 
 Commerz Europe (Ireland) Commercial Bank 
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Table C2 (… continued): The Banks used in the Analysis   
Country  Bank Bank Type 
Israel UBank Ltd Commercial Bank 
 Mizrahi Tefahot Bank Ltd. Commercial Bank 
 Bank Hapoalim BM Commercial Bank 
 Union Bank of Israel Ltd Commercial Bank 
 Mercantile Discount Bank Ltd. Commercial Bank 
 Bank of Jerusalem Commercial Bank 
Italy Banca Popolare di Milano SCaRL Cooperative Banks 
 Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA-Gruppo 
Monte dei Paschi di Siena 
Commercial Bank 
Italy Finanziaria Internationale Holdings SpA Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
Japan The Shikoku Bank Ltd Commercial Bank 
 Hitachi Capital Corporation Finance Companies (Credit Card, 
Factoring & Leasing) 
 The Awa Bank Commercial Bank 
 The Bank of Saga, Ltd Commercial Bank 
 IwaiCosmo Securities Co Ltd Investment bank 
 The Shinwa Bank Ltd Commercial Bank 
 Kansai Urban Banking Corpo Commercial Bank 
 Chiba Kogyo Bank Commercial Bank 
 Yamaguchi Bank Commercial Bank 
 The Kinki Osaka Bank Ltd Commercial Bank 
 Hiroshima Bank Ltd Commercial Bank 
 Joyo Bank Ltd. Commercial Bank 
 The Suruga Bank, Ltd Commercial Bank 
 Minami-Nippon Bank, Ltd. Commercial Bank 
 The Daishi Bank Ltd Commercial Bank 
 The Kagoshima Bank Ltd Commercial Bank 
 The Hokkoku Bank Ltd Commercial Bank 
 Shizuoka Bank Commercial Bank 
 Bank of Fukuoka Ltd. Commercial Bank 
 Shinsei Bank Limited Commercial Bank 
 The 77 Bank Commercial Bank 
 The Nishi-Nippon City Bank Ltd Commercial Bank 
 Bank of Kyoto Commercial Bank 
 North Pacific Bank Commercial Bank 
 Hachijuni Bank Commercial Bank 
 The Gunma Bank Ltd Commercial Bank 
 The Chugoku Bank, Ltd Commercial Bank 
 Aichi Bank Commercial Bank 
 The Eighteenth Bank Commercial Bank 
 Shinkin Central Bank Cooperative Banks 
 Chiba Bank Ltd. Commercial Bank 
 Hyakugo Bank Ltd. Commercial Bank 
 Ogaki Kyoritsu Bank Commercial Bank 
 Aozora Bank Ltd Investment Banks 
 The Shiga Bank, Ltd Commercial Bank 
 Hokkaido Bank Commercial Bank 
 The Higo Bank Commercial Bank 
 Hyakujushi Bank Ltd. Commercial Bank 
 San-In Godo Bank, Ltd Commercial Bank 
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Table C2 (… continued): The Banks used in the Analysis  
Country  Bank Bank Type 
Japan Kansai Urban Banking Corporation Commercial Bank 
 The Keiyo Bank, Ltd Commercial Bank 
 Musashino Bank Commercial Bank 
 Kiyo Bank Commercial Bank 
 The Nanto Bank Ltd Commercial Bank 
 Chukyo Bank Ltd Commercial Bank 
 UFJ Bank Ltd Commercial Bank 
 Rokinren Bank Cooperative Bank 
 Miyazaki Bank Commercial Bank 
 Akita Bank Ltd Commercial Bank  
Tochigi Bank, Ltd. Commercial Bank 
 The Aomori Bank Ltd Commercial Bank 
 The Tokyo Tomin Bank, Ltd Commercial Bank 
 Tokyo Star Bank Ltd. Commercial Bank 
 The Hokuetsu Bank Ltd Commercial Bank 
 The Ehime Bank, Ltd Commercial Bank 
 Saikyo Bank Commercial Bank 
 First Bank of Toyama, Ltd. Commercial Bank 
 Mizuho Investors Securities Co Ltd Investment Banks 
 Nagano Bank Ltd. Commercial Bank 
 Tomato Bank, Ltd Commercial Bank 
 SMBC Consumer Finance Co Ltd Finance Companies (Credit Card, 
Factoring & Leasing) 
 Bank of Kochi, Ltd Commercial Bank 
 Aplus Financial Co., Ltd Finance Companies (Credit Card, 
Factoring & Leasing) 
 The Tajima Bank Ltd Commercial Bank 
 Fukushima Bank Commercial Bank 
 Chikuho Bank Commercial Bank 
 The Okinawa Kaiho Bank Ltd Commercial Bank 
 Okasan Securities Group Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 The Fukuho Bank, Ltd Commercial Bank 
 Kanagawa Bank, Ltd. Commercial Bank 
Mexico HSBC Mexico, SA Commercial Bank 
 Banco Nacional de Mexico, SA - BANAMEX Commercial Bank 
 Grupo Financiero BANORTE Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Banco Regional de Monterrey S.A. - 
BANREGIO 
Commercial Bank 
 Grupo Financiero HSBC SA de CV Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Nacional Financiera S.N.C. Specialized Governmental Credit 
Institution 
 Banco Interacciones, SA de CV Commercial Bank 
 Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior SNC - 
BANCOMEXT 
Specialized Governmental Credit 
Institution 
 Banco Inbursa SA Commercial Bank 
 Banco Nacional de Obras y Servicios 
Publicos, SNC - BANOBRAS 
Specialized Governmental Credit 
Institution 
 Banco del Bajio Commercial Bank 
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Table C2 (… continued): The Banks used in the Analysis   
Country  Bank Bank Type 
Mexico Afirme Grupo Financiero SA Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Banco Ve por Mas, SA Commercial Bank 
Netherlands Cooperatieve Centrale Raif Cooperative Banks 
 DVB Bank NV Real Estate & Mortgage Bank 
 CenE Bankiers Commercial Bank 
 KBC Bank Nederland NV Commercial Bank 
 Bank Mendes Gans NV Commercial Bank 
 NIBC Bank NV Commercial Bank 
 Kas Bank NV Securities Firm 
 AEGON Bank NV Commercial Bank 
 Bank of Tokyo - Mitsubishi UFJ (Holland) 
NV 
Commercial Bank 
 GE Artesia Bank Commercial Bank 
 Staalbankiers NV Private Banking & Asset Mgt 
Companies 
 CITCO Bank Nederland NV Clearing Institutions & Custody  
Demir-Halk Bank (Nederland) NV-DHB 
Bank 
Commercial Bank 
 Dexia Bank Nederland NV Commercial Bank 
New Zealand  ANZ Bank, New Zealand Commercial Bank 
 National Bank of New Zealand Ltd. Commercial Bank 
 ASB Bank Commercial Bank 
 Rabobank Nederland New Zealand Banking 
Group 
Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
Norway Sparebank 1 Nord-Norge Savings Bank 
 Nordea Bank Norge ASA Commercial Bank 
 SpareBank 1 SMN Savings Bank 
 Pareto A/S Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 SpareBank 1 SR-Bank Savings Bank 
 BNbank ASA Real Estate & Mortgage Bank 
Pakistan Muslim Commercial Banks Commercial Bank 
 Habib Bank Limited Commercial Bank 
 Bank of Punjab Commercial Bank 
Panama Banco General SA Real Estate & Mortgage Bank  
Banco Latinoamericano de Comercio Exterior 
S.A. 
Finance Companies (Credit Card, 
Factoring & Leasing) 
Peru Scotiabank Peru SAA Commercial Bank 
Philippines Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company Commercial Bank 
 Bank of The Philippine Islands Commercial Bank 
 Rizal Commercial Banking Corp. Commercial Bank 
 United Coconut Planters Bank - UCPB Commercial Bank 
Portugal Caixa - Banco de Investime Commercial Bank 
 Caixa - Banco de Investimento SA Commercial Bank 
South Korea Kyongnam Bank Commercial Bank 
 Korea Exchange Bank Commercial Bank 
 Citibank Korea Inc. Commercial Bank 
 Daegu Bank Ltd. Commercial Bank 
 National Federation of Fisheries 
Cooperatives-Suhyup Bank 
Commercial Bank 
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Table C2 (… continued): The Banks used in the Analysis   
Country  Bank Bank Type 
South Korea KB Kookmin Bank Commercial Bank 
 Industrial Bank of Korea Commercial Bank 
Romania BRD-Groupe Societe Generale SA Commercial Bank 
Russian 
Federation 
VTB Bank, an Open Joint-Stock Company 
(JSC) 
Commercial Bank 
 AK Bars Bank Commercial Bank 
 ZAO Citibank Commercial Bank 
 Banca Intesa ZAO Micro-Financing Institutions 
 Investbank PJSC Investment Banks 
South Africa Industrial Development Corporation of South 
Africa 
Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
South Africa Standard Bank Group Limited Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Ithala Development Finance Corporation 
Limited 
Finance Companies (Credit Card, 
Factoring & Leasing) 
Spain Banco Espanol de Crédito SA, BANESTO Commercial Bank 
 Banco Popular Espanol SA Cooperative Banks 
 
Caja de Ahorros de Cataluña-Caixa d'Estalvis 
de Catalunya 
Savings Bank 
 Bankinter SA Commercial Bank 
 
Caixa de Aforros de Vigo, Ourense e 
Pontevedra-Caixanova 
Savings Bank 
 Banco Pastor SA Commercial Bank 
 
Caja de Ahorros y Monte de piedad de 
Córdoba - Caja Sur 
Savings Bank 
 Deutsche Bank SAE Commercial Bank 
 Scotiabank Trinidad & Tobago Limited Commercial Bank 
 Republic Bank Limited Commercial Bank 
 
Banco Guipuzcoano SA Others (still to be classified as per 
Bankscope classification) 
 Banca March SA Commercial Bank 
 First Citizens Bank Limited Commercial Bank 
 
Banco Urquijo SA Private Banking & Asset Mgt 
Companies 
Sweden Skandinaviska Enskilda Ban Commercial Bank 
 GE Money Bank AB Commercial Bank 
 Landshypotek Bank AB Real Estate & Mortgage Bank 
 Nordea Bank Sweden AB (publ) Commercial Bank 
 Alandsbanken Asset Management AB Commercial Bank 
Switzerland Falcon Private Bank Ltd Private Banking & Asset Mgt 
Companies 
 Banque Pasche SA Private Banking & Asset Mgt 
Companies 
 Hinduja Bank (Switzerland) Ltd Commercial Bank 
 Banque Cantonale de Genève Specialized Governmental Credit 
Institution 
 Valiant Holding Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Banque Cantonale Vaudoise Specialized Governmental Credit 
Institution 
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Table C2 (… continued): The Banks used in the Analysis  
Country  Bank Bank Type 
Switzerland PKB Privatbank AG Private Banking & Asset Mgt 
Companies 
 BSI AG-BSI SA Private Banking & Asset Mgt 
Companies 
 BNP Paribas (Suisse) SA Investment Banks 
 Bank J. Safra Sarasin AG Private Banking & Asset Mgt 
Companies 
 BNP Paribas Private Bank (Switzerland) SA Commercial Bank 
 Coutts & Co Ltd Private Banking & Asset Mgt 
Companies 
 Union Bancaire Privée - UBP Private Banking & Asset Mgt 
Companies 
 Habib Bank AG Zurich Commercial Bank 
 Société Générale Private Banking (Suisse) SA Private Banking & Asset Mgt 
Companies 
 Corner Banca S.A. Commercial Bank 
 Clariden Leu AG Private Banking & Asset Mgt 
Companies 
 Rothschild Bank AG Private Banking & Asset Mgt 
Companies 
 Financière Syz & Co Private Banking & Asset Mgt 
Companies 
 CBH Compagnie Bancaire Helvétque SA-
Banque SCS Alliance SA 
Commercial Bank 
 Bank EEK Commercial Bank 
 Banque Safdie SA Private Banking & Asset Mgt 
Companies 
 Finter Bank Zuerich AG Private Banking & Asset Mgt 
Companies 
 Morval Vonwiller Holding S.A. Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Bellevue Group AG Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Banque de Patrimoines Privés Genève BPG 
SA 
Commercial Bank 
 Mercantil Bank (Schweiz) AG Commercial Bank 
 La compagnie Benjamin de Rothschild SA Group Finance Companies 
 Banca Arner S.A. Commercial Bank 
Thailand Bangkok Bank Public Company Limited Commercial Bank 
 Siam Commercial Bank Public Company 
Limited 
Commercial Bank 
 Kasikornbank Public Company Limited Commercial Bank 
 CIMB Thai Bank Public Company Limited Commercial Bank 
 Kiatnakin Bank Public Company Limited Commercial Bank 
United 
Kingdom 
First Farmers and Merchants Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Yorkshire Building Society Real Estate & Mortgage Bank 
 C. Hoare & Co Commercial Bank 
 Barclays Plc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
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Table C2 (… continued): The Banks used in the Analysis  
Country  Bank Bank Type 
United 
Kingdom 
Schroders Plc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 MBNA Limited Commercial Bank 
 Close Brothers Group Plc Investment Banks 
 London Scottish Bank Plc Commercial Bank 
 Darlington Building Society Real Estate & Mortgage Bank 
 Scottish Building Society Real Estate & Mortgage Bank 
 3i Group plc Investment & Trust Corporations 
 Finsbury Pavement Limited Commercial Bank 
 Barnsley Building Society Real Estate & Mortgage Bank 
 Britannia Building Society Real Estate & Mortgage Bank 
 National Counties Building Society Real Estate & Mortgage Bank 
 Market Harborough Building Society Real Estate & Mortgage Bank 
 Coutts & Co Private Banking & Asset Mgt 
Companies 
 Investec Bank Plc Commercial Bank 
 Skipton Building Society Real Estate & Mortgage Bank 
 HSBC Bank plc Commercial Bank 
 Yorkshire Bank Plc Commercial Bank 
 Monmouthshire Building Society Real Estate & Mortgage Bank 
 Royal Bank of Canada (Channel Islands) 
Limited 
Commercial Bank 
 Leeds Building Society Real Estate & Mortgage Bank 
 Bank of America Merrill Lynch International 
Limited 
Securities Firm 
 West Bromwich Building Society Real Estate & Mortgage Bank 
 Danske Bank Commercial Bank 
 Close Brothers Limited Investment Banks 
 N M Rothschild & Sons Limited Commercial Bank 
 Principality Building Society Real Estate & Mortgage Bank 
 Dunfermline Building Society Real Estate & Mortgage Bank 
 Newcastle Building Society Real Estate & Mortgage Bank 
 Northern Trust (Guernsey) Limited Private Banking & Asset Mgt 
Companies 
 Norwich & Peterborough Building Society Real Estate & Mortgage Bank 
 Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander Ltd Commercial Bank 
 Stroud & Swindon Building Society Real Estate & Mortgage Bank 
 British Arab Commercial Bank Plc Commercial Bank 
 Gulf International Bank (UK) Ltd Investment Banks 
 Scarborough Building Society Real Estate & Mortgage Bank 
 Ahli United Bank (UK) Plc Commercial Bank 
 Cumberland Building Society Others (still to be classified as per 
Bankscope classification) 
 Bank Leumi (UK) Plc Commercial Bank 
 Adam & Company Group plc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Rothschild Bank International Limited Private Banking & Asset Mgt 
Companies 
 Saffron Building Society Real Estate & Mortgage Bank 
 Cambridge Building Society Real Estate & Mortgage Bank 
 Butterfield Bank (Guernsey) Limited Commercial Bank 
  continued… 
176 
 
Table C2 (… continued): The Banks used in the Analysis  
Country  Bank Bank Type 
United 
Kingdom 
Leek United Building Society Real Estate & Mortgage Bank 
 Newbury Building Society Real Estate & Mortgage Bank 
 Ipswich Building Society Real Estate & Mortgage Bank 
 Manchester Building Society Real Estate & Mortgage Bank 
 Ansbacher & Co Limited Private Banking & Asset Mgt 
Companies 
 Leopold Joseph Holdings Plc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Celtic Bank Limited Commercial Bank 
 Heritable Bank Plc Commercial Bank 
 Weatherbys Bank Limited Commercial Bank 
 Bath Investment & Building Society BIBS Real Estate & Mortgage Bank 
 Leopold Joseph (Guernsey) Limited Commercial Bank 
 R Raphael & Sons Plc Commercial Bank 
 BSI Generali Bank (CI) Limited (Old) Private Banking & Asset Mgt 
Companies 
 Riggs Bank Europe Limited Commercial Bank 
 Robert W Baird Group Ltd Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Dalbeattie Finance Company Limited Finance Companies (Credit Card, 
Factoring & Leasing) 
 Sumitomo Mitsui Trust (UK) Limited Investment & Trust Corporations 
USA Hancock Holding Company Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Colombo Bank Savings Bank 
 Union National Financial Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Cathay General Bancorp Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Bermuda Commercial Bank Lt Commercial Bank 
 Credomatic International C Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Palestine Investment Bank Investment Banks 
 First Citizens BancShares Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Meridian Bank, National As Commercial Bank 
 Banco Agricola Commercial Bank 
 Pinnacle Bancorp, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Park National Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Arrow Financial Corp. Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 HSBC USA Inc. Others (still to be classified as per 
Bankscope classification) 
 United Bankshares, Inc. Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Southern Michigan Bancorp, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Tri City Bankshares Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
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Table C2 (… continued): The Banks used in the Analysis  
Country  Bank Bank Type 
USA Frontier Financial Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Wells Fargo Advisors LLC Investment Banks 
 First Keystone Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Northern Trust Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Bank of Hawaii Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 FNBH Bancorp, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 UBS Financial Services Inc Private Banking & Asset Mgt 
Companies 
 First Financial Bancorp Private Banking & Asset Mgt 
Companies 
 BMO Financial Corp Private Banking & Asset Mgt 
Companies 
 Bank of America Corporation Private Banking & Asset Mgt 
Companies 
 Comerica Incorporated Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Wintrust Financial Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Morgan Stanley Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Community West Bancshares Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Bremer Financial Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Prosperity Bancshares, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Mid Penn Bancorp, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Intrust Financial Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Citizens & Northern Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Bear Stearns Companies LLC Investment Banks 
 Fifth Third Bancorp Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Legg Mason Inc Private Banking & Asset Mgt 
Companies 
 Freddie Mac Real Estate & Mortgage Bank 
 State Street Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Merchants Bancshares Inc. Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Fidelity Southern Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
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Table C2 (… continued): The Banks used in the Analysis  
Country  Bank Bank Type 
USA Bank of Tokyo - Mitsubishi UFJ Trust  Commercial Bank 
 SunTrust Banks, Inc. Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Bank of New York Company, Inc. (The) Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Northern Trust Company (The) Private Banking & Asset Mgt 
Companies 
 AgriBank, FCB & Seventh District 
Associations (Combined) 
Finance Companies (Credit Card, 
Factoring & Leasing) 
 Cobank, ACB Cooperative Banks 
 KeyCorp Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 M&T Bank Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 International Finance Corporation - IFC Multi-Lateral Government Banks 
 BancWest Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 BBVA Compass Bancshares Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Deutsche Bank Trust Corporation Investment & Trust Corporations 
 LNB Bancorp, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Associated Banc-Corp. Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 TransAtlantic Bank Commercial Bank 
 TCF Financial Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 AmSouth Bancorporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 American State Financial Corp Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Citizens National Bancorp, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 William Blair & Company LLC Investment Banks 
 Zions Bancorporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Hills Bancorporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 MUFG Americas Holdings Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Great Southern Bancorp, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 United Community Bank Commercial Bank 
 First BanCorp Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 HSBC Finance Corporation Finance Companies (Credit Card, 
Factoring & Leasing) 
 People's United Bank Commercial Bank 
 HMN Financial Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Wachovia Bank of Delaware NA Commercial Bank 




Table C2 (… continued): The Banks used in the Analysis  
Country  Bank Bank Type 
USA New York Community Bancorp, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 E*Trade Bank Savings Bank 
 Mellon Financial Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Charles Schwab & Co. Inc Investment Banks 
 Jefferies Group LLC Investment Banks 
 Hudson City Bancorp Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Boston Private Financial Holdings Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Tompkins Financial Corp Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Centrue Financial Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Ohio Valley Banc Corp Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Taylor Capital Group, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 United Community Banks, Inc Commercial Bank 
 SNBNY Holdings Limited Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Integra Bank Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Wells Fargo & Company Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Firstbank Holding Company of Colorado Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Whitney Holding Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Iberiabank Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 PNC Financial Services Group Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 NBT Bancorp, Inc. Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 First National Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Southwest Bancorp, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Midwest Banc Holdings, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 BOK Financial Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 SVB Financial Group Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Synovus Financial Corp Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Colonial BancGroup, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
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Table C2 (… continued): The Banks used in the Analysis  
Country  Bank Bank Type 
USA East West Bancorp, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Cullen/Frost Bankers, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Frost Bank Commercial Bank 
 FirstMerit Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 First Horizon National Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Raymond James Financial Inc Investment Banks 
 Commerce Bancshares, Inc. Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Goldman Sachs Group, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Piper Jaffray & Co Investment Banks 
 Sterling Bancshares, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 First National of Nebraska, Inc. Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Sandy Spring Bancorp, Inc. Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Penns Woods Bancorp, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Sun Bancorp, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Fulton Financial Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 UMB Financial Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Apple Bank for Savings Commercial Bank 
 MBNA Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 DNB Financial Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Bank of Kentucky Financial Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 M&I Bank, FSB Savings Bank 
 Susquehanna Bancshares, Inc. Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 TCF National Bank Savings Bank 
 BNY Mellon, National Association Commercial Bank 
 FBOP Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 American Express Bank Ltd. Commercial Bank 
 Valley National Bancorp Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Chevy Chase Bank, FSB Savings Bank 
 Astoria Financial Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Investors Bancorp, MHC Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
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Table C2 (… continued): The Banks used in the Analysis  
Country  Bank Bank Type 
USA Milford Bank (The) Commercial Bank 
 Hato Rey Oriental CTR BR Commercial Bank 
 MidSouth Bancorp, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Pacific Capital Bancorp Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Bank Leumi Le-Israel Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Citigroup Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Arvest Bank Group, Inc. Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 First of Long Island Corporation (The) Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Westernbank Puerto Rico Commercial Bank 
 South Financial Group, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Trustmark Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Wilmington Trust Corporation Commercial Bank 
 MB Financial Inc Commercial Bank 
 Citizens Republic Bancorp, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Old National Bancorp Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Central Bancompany Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Stifel Financial Corp Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Eastern Bank Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 National Penn Bancshares, Inc. Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Doral Financial Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Corus Bankshares, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 PlainsCapital Bank Commercial Bank 
 First Citizens Bancorporation Inc. Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 First Midwest Bancorp, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 OFG Bancorp Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 First Interstate Bancsystem, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Community Bank System, Inc. Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Santander BanCorp Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 CIBC World Markets Corp Investment Banks 
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Table C2 (… continued): The Banks used in the Analysis   
Country  Bank Bank Type 
USA  CVB Financial Corp Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Provident Bankshares Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 First Commonwealth Financial Corp. Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Chemical Financial Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 WesBanco, Inc. Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 R-G Premier Bank of Puerto Rico Real Estate & Mortgage Bank 
 BancFirst Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 First Banks, Incorporated Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Renasant Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 First Merchants Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 First Financial Bankshares, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Mizuho Bank (USA) Commercial Bank 
 Harleysville National Corporation Commercial Bank 
 T. Rowe Price Group, Inc Private Banking & Asset Mgt 
Companies 
 Irwin Financial Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 City National Bank of Florida Commercial Bank 
 Westamerica Bancorporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Central Pacific Financial Corp. Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 1st Source Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Columbia Bank (MHC) Savings Bank 
 W.T.B. Financial Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Banner Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Simmons First National Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 SWS Group Inc Investment Banks 
 Johnson Bank Commercial Bank 
 Amarillo National Bancorp, Inc. Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 AMCORE Financial, Inc. Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Community Trust Bancorp, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 First Busey Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
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Table C2 (… continued): The Banks used in the Analysis   
Country  Bank Bank Type 
USA BTC Financial Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Southside Bancshares, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 First American Bank Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Republic Bancorp Inc. Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 City Holding Company Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Lakeland Bancorp, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Ocean Bankshares, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Valley View Bancshares, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Hudson Valley Holding Corp Others (still to be classified as per 
Bankscope classification) 
 Financial Institutions, Inc Others (still to be classified as per 
Bankscope classification) 
 Broadway Bancshares, Inc. Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 CoBiz Financial Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Sterling Bancorp Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 SunTrust Robinson Humphrey, Inc Investment Banks 
 Smithtown Bancorp, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 First Community Bancshares, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Capital City Bank Group, Inc. Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Cambridge Financial Group, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 West Coast Bancorp Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 American Chartered Bank Commercial Bank 
 Green Bankshares, Inc. Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Southern Bancshares (North Carolina), Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Seacoast Banking Corporation of Florida Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 OceanFirst Financial Corp Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 1867 Western Financial Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Independent Bank Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
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Table C2 (… continued): The Banks used in the Analysis   
Country  Bank Bank Type 
USA Univest Corporation of Pennsylvania Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Morgan Keegan & Company Inc. Investment Banks 
 German American Bancorp Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Dickinson Financial Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 First Regional Bancorp Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 West Suburban Bancorp, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Old Second Bancorp, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 First Commercial Bank Commercial Bank 
 NewBridge Bancorp Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Canandaigua National Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 ESB Financial Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 National Mercantile Bancorp Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Bridge Bancorp, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 The Bank of Kentucky, Inc Commercial Bank 
 Enterprise Bancorp Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Lauritzen Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 National Consumer Cooperative Bank Commercial Bank 
 Farmers Capital Bank Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Meta Financial Group, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Wilson Bank Holding Company Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Star Financial Group, Inc. Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 ConnectOne Bancorp Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 AmericanWest Bancorporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Cadence Financial Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Intervest Bancshares Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Emprise Financial Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Marquette National Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 WNB Bancshares, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
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Table C2 (… continued): The Banks used in the Analysis   
Country  Bank Bank Type 
USA Isabella Bank Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Heritage Commerce Corp Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Firstbank Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Chemung Financial Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 First Bancorp, Inc (The) Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 First United Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Far East National Bank Commercial Bank 
 C&F Financial Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Peoples Bancorp Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Henderson Citizens Bancshares Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Bank of Tampa (The) Commercial Bank 
 Ames National Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Orrstown Financial Services, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Marquette Financial Companies Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Colony Bankcorp, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Hawthorn Bancshares Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Farmers National Banc Corp Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Provident Financial Holdings, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Palmetto Bancshares, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Bank First National Corp Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 AmeriServ Financial, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 ACNB Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Capital Trust Holdings Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Baylake Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 PAB Bankshares, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Bank of Commerce Holdings Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Unity Bancorp, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
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Table C2 (… continued): The Banks used in the Analysis   
Country  Bank Bank Type 
USA  Northway Financial, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Old Point Financial Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 TF Financial Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 O.A.K. Financial Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Croghan Bancshares, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Falcon International Bank Commercial Bank 
 Kentucky Bancshares, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Community Bancshares, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Citizens 1st Bank Commercial Bank 
 Lincoln Bancorp Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Norwood Financial Corp Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 First Pulaski National Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Meridian Bank, National Association Commercial Bank 
 NB&T Financial Group, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 SB Financial Group, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Highlands Bankshares, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Union Bankshares, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Albank Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Citizens Incorporated Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 DCB Financial Corporation Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Latin American Agribusiness Development 
Corporation SA 
Investment & Trust Corporations 
 CIB Marine Bancshares, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Deutsche Bank Trust Company Delaware Commercial Bank 
 Delta National Bank and Trust Company Commercial Bank 
 Iowa First Bancshares Corp Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Denmark Bancshares, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 Bankers' Bank Commercial Bank 
 Habersham Bancorp Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 International Finance Bank Commercial Bank 
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Table C2 (… continued): The Banks used in the Analysis   
Country  Bank Bank Type 
USA Citizens Security Bank (Guam), Inc. Commercial Bank 
 Fentura Financial, Inc Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies 
 American Savings Bank, FSB Savings Bank 
 Gateways Bank, Federal Savings Bank Savings Bank 
 BankPacific Ltd Savings Bank 
 Gleacher & Company Inc Investment Banks 
 Siebert Financial Corp Securities Firm 
Venezuela Mercantil Servicios Financieros, C.A. Bank Holding & Holding 
Companies  
Banco de Venezuela, S.A.C.A. Commercial Bank 
Note. Column 2 indicates the number of banks included in the Bankscope dataset and we include these banks in 
the disaggregated analysis. These were the maximum number of banks in Bankscope database on 14 October 
2014 for which the capital adequacy ratios were available. We use these capital adequacy ratios from the 
capitalization section of Summary Analytics. Column 3 provides the total number of banks in the economy. This 
data is extracted from the central banks of the countries where this detail is available. For some economies, we 
use other country specific resources. For instance, we use https://thebanks.eu/banks-by-country/Norway for the 





Table C3. Definition of Variables Used in the Study 
Variable Definition 
Dependent Variables 
Primary balance to 
GDP (S) 
We calculated the primary balance by deducting government expenditure 
(without the amount of interest paid on public debt) from government revenue. 
Both government revenue and government primary expenditure are a per cent 





Tier-1 is defined as the Tier-1 capital divided by the risk-weighted assets. 
Similarly, Tier-2 is defined as the Tier-2 capital divided by the risk-weighted 
assets. Tier-1 capital includes equity and retained earnings. Tier-2 capital 
includes equity, retained earnings, preferred stock and subordinated bonds. 
Risk-weighted assets are calculated by multiplying bank assets with their 
respective risk weights allocated by the Basel Accords. These bank assets 
include: (i) loans extended to firms, (ii) loans extended to consumers (such as 




A fiscal consolidation episode is defined as a period in which the cyclically 
CAPB improves by at least 1.5 per cent of GDP in a year, or by at least one per 
cent of GDP per year in a period of two consecutive years. 
Public debt per 
cent of GDP (D) 
General government gross public debt per cent of GDP. We follow the concept 
of gross debt given in Chapter 7, Section F on Memorandum Items, and 
Subsection 1 on Debt of the IMF GFS. Paragraph 7.142 of the IMF GFS 
defines debt as all liabilities that require payments by debtors to creditors at a 
date or dates in the future. These payments include interest and/or the principal. 
Therefore, all liabilities in the GFS are debt, except the shares, other equity and 
financial derivatives.  
GVAR 
GVAR indicates the temporary government expenditure. We calculated this by 
using Equation 4.6.1.1. 
YVAR 
YVAR is a business cycle indicator. We calculated this by using Equation 
4.6.1.2. 
Total assets 
Total assets include loans, other earning assets and non-earning assets. The 
complete details on total assets, as calculated in the Bankscope database, are 
provided in Table 4.1. 
Return on assets Return on the average assets of the individual bank. 
Output gap 
The output gap refers to the difference between the actual and potential GDP as 
a per cent of potential GDP. 
Long-term interest 
rates 





Table C4: Number of Banks in Bankscope Database 
Country No_of_Banks_BS Total_No_of_Banks 
(1) (2) (3) 
Argentina 4 16 
Australia 10 59 
Austria 8 60 
Belgium 2 22 
Brazil 15 30 
Bulgaria 3 26 
Canada 13 82 
Chile 2 12 
China 2 37 
Colombia 1 14 
Costa Rica 1 15 
Greece 8 38 
Denmark 10 116 
The Dominican Republic 1 5 
Finland 1 14 
France 32 638 
Germany 16 84 
Ghana 2 39 
Haiti 3 6 
Hong Kong 15 190 
Hungary 7 30 
Iceland 2 5 
Indonesia 9 120 
Ireland 4 19 
Israel 6 20 
Italy 3 580 
Japan 70 198 
Mexico 13 48 
The Netherlands 14 50 
New Zealand 4 26 
Norway 6 168 
Pakistan 2 34 
Panama 2 70 
Peru 1 14 
The Philippines 4 36 
Portugal 2 31 
South Korea 7 148 
Romania 1 41 
Russia  5 575 
South Africa 3 43 
Spain 14 48 
Sweden 5 117 
Switzerland 29 253 
Thailand 5 36 
The UK 64 345 
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Table C4 (…continued): Number of Banks in Bankscope Database 
Country No_of_Banks_BS Total_No_of_Banks 
(1) (2) (3) 
The US 305 6,799 
Venezuela 2 25 
Note: Column 2 indicates the number of banks included in the Bankscope dataset, and we included these banks 
in the disaggregated analysis. These were the maximum number of banks in the Bankscope database on 14 
October 2014 for which the capital adequacy ratios were available. We used these capital adequacy ratios from 
the capitalisation section of Summary Analytics. Column 3 provides the total number of banks in the economy. 
These data were extracted from the central banks of the countries where this detail was available. For some 























Appendix D (Chapter 5) 
 
Investment Aspect of Public Debt 
Consistent with governmental accounting concepts, Seiferling (2013) reported that the general 
government debt in fiscal statistics includes public investment aspects, which are elaborated in 
a simple model below. 
Under accrual accounting, the operating balance is represented as follows: 
𝑁𝑂𝐵𝑡 = 𝑇𝐶𝑅𝑡 − 𝑇𝐶𝐸𝑡                    (D1 
where NOBt is the net operating balance at time t; TCRt is the total current revenues, including 
expected earnings from the future fund; and TCEt is the total current expenses (the real 
operating expenses).221 Thus, the net lending or surplus of any institutional unit at time t will 
be (δt) as follows
222: 
𝛿𝑡 = 𝑁𝑂𝐵𝑡 − 𝑁𝐹𝐴?̃?                     (D2 
where 𝑁𝐹𝐴?̃?  represents the net acquisition of non-financial assets of any institutional unit, 
which is used in the calculation of surplus or deficits. The net result of Equation D2 can be 
either of surplus or deficits, which can be used as follows: 
𝛿 < 0 =  (− 𝐹𝐴) 𝑜𝑟 (+ 𝐿)223                   (D3 
𝛿 > 0 =  (+ 𝐹𝐴) 𝑜𝑟 (− 𝐿)224                   (D4 
Then, the net result of the net acquisition of financial assets and net incurrence of liabilities can 
be represented as follows: 
𝛿𝑡 = ∑ 𝑠?̃?𝑖𝑡
𝐹𝐴8
𝑖=1
⏞    
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
− ∑ 𝑠?̃?𝑖𝑡
𝐿8
𝑖=1⏟    
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
               (D5 
                                                 
221 Expected earnings of future funds are included when considering the case of the Australian general 
government. See Budget Strategy and Outlook, 2011–12, Budget Paper No. 1, Statement 3, Table 4 (Australian 
Government, 2012) for further details. 
222 Here, the institutional unit is the general government of Australia, since it can be the entire public sector or 
the state, central or local government. For further details, see Chapter 2 of the GFS Manual 2001 (IMF, 2001). 
223 In the case of deficits, the deficit amount is financed through the incurrence of liabilities or the sale of 
financial assets. 






 = currency and deposits (f = FA or f = L) 
 𝑠?̃?2
𝑓
 = securities other than shares (f = FA or f = L) 
𝑠?̃?3
𝑓
 = loans (f = FA or f = L) 
𝑠?̃?4
𝑓
 = shares and other equity (f = FA or f = L) 
𝑠?̃?5
𝑓
 = insurance technical reserves (f = FA or f = L) 
𝑠?̃?6
𝑓
 = other accounts receivable (f = FA)/other accounts payable (f = L) 
𝑠?̃?7
𝑓
 = unfunded superannuation liability (f = L) 
𝑠?̃?8
𝑓
 = other employee entitlements and provisions (f = L). 
The common mistake in the existing literature is the missing aspect of flow items. For instance, 
the generic definition of gross public debt is the sum of surplus/deficits over an entire period. 
By incorporating flow items, the stock (st) of any instrument, i, at any time, t, can be rewritten 


















⏞                        
𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠
                (D6 
where 𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡−1
𝑓
represents the openings balance of the stock of instrument i, and 𝑠?̃?𝑖𝑡
𝑓
 represents all 
transactions relating to this instrument during time t. SNA 2008 (United Nations Statistics 
Division, 2018) considers ∆𝑟𝑒 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢
𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡
𝑓  and ∆𝑣𝑜𝑙
𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡
𝑓  two key components of the flows. 
Although these components are not part of the transactions, both components can change the 
value of assets, liability and net worth. The first component, ∆𝑟𝑒 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢
𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡
𝑓 , includes 
revaluation of asset or liability (f = NFA, FA or L) and capital gain or losses on this instrument 
i at any point t. For instance, the changes in the monetary value of any asset or liability can 
change these values because of exchange rate changes or the structure of prices in the economy. 
These changes are classified as revaluation change. 225  The second component, ∆𝑣𝑜𝑙
𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡
𝑓 , 
                                                 
225 For further details, see GFSM 2001 (IMF, 2001). 
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involves changes in the volume of an asset and liability (f = NFA, FA or L) for instrument i at 
time t. Following the IMF (2013), this component is not a result of the revaluation and 
transactions. Some examples of this component are financial or banking crises, natural disasters, 
written-off unilateral debts, and restructuring and reclassification of institutional units. 
Based on Equations D1 to D6, it is obvious that the deficit measures do not incorporate the last 
two components of Equation D6. Therefore, the deficits are significantly large during periods 
of financial or banking crisis, natural disasters or large fluctuation in exchange rates. These 
significant deficits have real effects on debt and the government balance sheet. Consequently, 
the key difference between deficits and debt is stock transactions residual. 
Based on Equation D6, the total stock of assets and liabilities is the sum of the eight items 
mentioned under Equation D5, and can be expressed as follows: 
𝑓𝑡 = ∑ 𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡
𝑓8








𝑓 ) ; (𝑓 ≡ {𝐹𝐴,𝑁𝐹𝐴, 𝐿})8𝑖=1  
                       (D7 
Equation D7 presents a snapshot of the accumulation of all assets and liabilities of an 
institutional unit (the general government in this case) at a specific point in time, normally at 
the end of the year. This includes (𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡−1
𝑓
) stock from the previous period, along with the flows 






𝑓 ). Based on Equation D7, the net 
worth or financial position of any government at time t is the total stock of all assets (financial 
and non-financial) minus the total stock of the liabilities, and can be written as: 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑡 = 𝐹𝐴𝑡 + 𝑁𝐹𝐴𝑡 − 𝐿𝑡                   (D8 
Considering only financial assets, net financial worth can be written as: 







Figure D1: Value at Risk (VAR), Conditional Value and Risk (CVaR) Framework for 
Financial Net Worth Approach  
 









 Appendix E (Chapter 6) 





Augmented Dickey–Fuller test statistics 
Null hypothesis: Series is non-stationary 
Level 1st Difference 
S Dp YVAR GVAR S Dp YVAR GVAR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Argentina -1.32 -1.92 -4.52*** -2.72 -4.28*** -4.35*** 
 -7.18*** 
Australia -3.01*** -2.03 -6.83*** -6.67*** 
 -3.68***   
Austria -4.36*** -1.92 -7.08*** -7.78***  -5.18***   
Belgium -1.92* 0.13 -5.46*** -5.76*** -9.83*** -3.67*** 
  
Brazil -1.91* -3.39* -4.78*** -3.39*** -9.08*** -5.70*** 
  
Bulgaria -3.35* -2.99 -3.24*** -3.41* -4.81*** -13.29*** 
 -5.89*** 
Canada -1.49 -2.33 -5.98*** -8.07*** -6.25*** -4.28*** 
  
Chile -2.90*** -2.50 -5.69*** -8.21***  -4.23***   
China -3.53** 3.43 -0.08 -3.68*** 
 -9.30*** -3.85***  
Colombia -2.92*** -2.86 -4.10*** -6.39*** 
 -3.73***   
Costa Rica -4.52*** -0.82 -6.10*** -5.51*** 
 -5.97***   
Denmark -3.15** -0.60 -7.36*** -7.32*** -5.99*** -3.49*** 
  
Dominican Republic -3.35*** -2.15 -8.81*** -7.79*** 
 -9.19***   
Finland -1.94** -3.02 -7.72*** -7.44*** -6.53*** -4.67*** 
  
France -2.98*** -2.70 -5.59*** -6.09***  -5.34***   
Germany -3.98*** -2.79 -5.08*** -5.90*** 
 -4.22***   
Ghana -3.96*** -2.68 -5.45*** -5.25*** 
 -5.56***   
Greece -2.39** -1.37 -7.74*** -6.82*** -8.18*** -6.97*** 
  
Haiti -2.03** -2.33 -4.36*** -3.08 -5.11*** -6.18*** 
 -5.82*** 
Honduras -2.52** -0.34 -6.66*** -8.41*** -7.63*** -7.26***   
Hong Kong -3.75** -2.28 -4.53*** -6.60*** -4.53*** -2.52** 
  
Hungary -3.52*** -2.59 -5.20*** -5.34*** 
 -4.17***   





Table E1 (…continued): Unit Root Tests 
Country 
Augmented Dickey–Fuller test statistics 
Null hypothesis: Series is non-stationary  
Level 1st Difference  
S Dp YVAR GVAR S Dp YVAR GVAR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Iceland -5.07*** -4.14*** -8.01*** -9.45***         
India -3.41** -2.05 -6.99*** -6.48*** -6.25*** -7.45***     
Indonesia -1.14 -3.00** -6.01*** -8.55*** -8.52*** -4.74***     
Ireland -2.83*** -2.77* -6.38*** -6.49***   -3.50***     
Israel -2.14** -9.90*** -6.14*** -4.30*** -6.79***       
Italy -1.61* -1.99 -7.88*** -6.63*** -8.30*** -4.34***     
Japan -1.43 0.72 -5.23*** -5.95*** -6.47*** -4.45***     
Mexico -1.73* -1.80 -5.84*** -6.95*** -7.16*** -6.81***     
Netherlands -3.57*** -1.97 -7.26*** -4.05***   -3.99***     
New Zealand -2.57** -2.54 -7.73*** -10.08*** -5.37*** -3.38***     
Nicaragua -7.68*** -2.94* -8.15*** -107.27***   -6.15***     
Norway -1.12 -2.03 -5.79*** -5.46*** -6.91*** -6.78***     
Pakistan -1.98** -2.39 -5.23*** -7.82*** -8.19*** -6.86***     
Panama -4.32*** -0.43 -6.02*** -4.92***   -4.24***     
Paraguay -3.59*** -0.82 -6.48*** -6.78***   -4.82***     
Peru -2.95*** -2.79 -8.41*** -5.59***   -7.42***     
Philippines -3.18** -0.55 -5.64*** -7.17*** -5.05*** -5.12***     
Polnad -2.78* -0.76 -2.56** -1.99** -4.60*** -5.61*** -4.70*** -4.76*** 
Portugal -3.00*** -2.74 -3.46*** -7.18***   -3.59***     
Romania -2.35** 0.46 -4.23*** -2.69*** -8.105*** -3.59***     
Russian Federation* -1.76* -3.55*** 2.20 -2.86 -3.76***   -1.84* -3.19*** 
South Africa -2.73*** -2.63* -7.20*** -7.38***   -7.05***     
South Korea -2.95*** -2.07 -4.93*** -5.75***   -4.42***     
Spain -2.91*** -2.65 -7.33*** -7.39***   -3.46***     





Table E1 (…continued): Unit Root Tests 
Country 
Augmented Dickey–Fuller test statistics 
Null hypothesis: Series is non-stationary  
Level 1st Difference  
S Dp YVAR GVAR S Dp YVAR GVAR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Sweden -3.19*** -0.42 -8.55*** -7.82***   -5.83***     
Switzerland -2.71*** 0.03 -5.47*** -4.41***   -6.51***     
Thailand -3.83*** -3.46* -2.10** -1.54   -5.14*** -7.83*** -12.66*** 
Turkey -2.77*** -2.05 -5.64*** -7.69***   -6.74***     
United Kingdom -3.34*** -0.87 -7.09*** -6.50***   -3.18***     
Uruguay -4.73*** -2.67* -6.97*** -9.69***   -4.72***     
USA -3.73** -2.63 -4.04 -0.16 -5.88*** -3.06** -10.69*** -6.43*** 
Venezuela -0.12 -0.92 -6.57*** -6.21*** -8.86*** -7.80***     



















Phillips–Perron test statistics 
Null hypothesis: Series is non-stationary 
Level 1st Difference 
S Dp YVAR GVAR S Dp YVAR GVAR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Argentina -1.37 -1.98 -4.49*** -5.57*** -4.32*** -4.46***     
Australia -2.45** -0.86 -6.81*** -6.64***   -3.68***     
Austria -4.11*** 2.08 -7.08*** -7.77***   -5.15***     
Belgium -1.78* 0.21 -5.43*** -5.59*** -9.83*** -3.71***     
Brazil -1.90* -2.50 -4.80*** -3.40*** -9.05*** -5.70***     
Bulgaria -3.38* -2.98 -3.28*** -3.41* -4.81*** -10.49***   -6.23*** 
Canada -1.49 0.28 -5.87*** -8.05*** -6.27*** -4.30***     
Chile -2.58** -1.09 -5.66*** -8.61***   -4.29***     
China -2.10 -1.63 -0.53 -2.35** -4.68*** -9.28*** -3.91***   
Colombia -3.07*** 0.85 -3.85*** -6.61***   -3.85***     
Costa Rica -2.93*** -0.89 -6.09*** -5.55***   -5.93***     
Denmark -1.71* -0.42 -7.36*** -7.32*** -5.84*** -3.55***     
Dominican Republic -3.35*** -2.24 -8.81*** -7.79***   -8.93***     
Finland -2.10** -2.21 -7.72*** -7.44*** -6.57*** -3.42***     
France -2.98*** -2.75 -5.60*** -6.12***   -5.28***     
Germany -3.98*** 1.27 -5.05*** -5.90***   -4.24***     
Ghana -3.98*** -1.63 -5.45*** -4.84***   -5.53***     
Greece -2.31** -1.58 -7.74*** -6.810*** -8.29*** -7.04***     
Haiti -1.99** -1.20 -3.54*** -1.92* -7.93*** -4.87***   -5.69*** 
Honduras -2.52** -0.41 -6.66*** -8.47*** -7.63*** -7.29***     
Hong Kong -3.85** -2.69 -4.58*** -6.72*** -10.27*** -2.52**     
Hungary -3.52*** -0.58 -5.15*** -5.27***   -3.96***     
Iceland -5.04*** -0.70 -8.01*** -9.45***   -4.66***     
India -2.61* -2.05 -6.99*** -6.48*** -6.15*** -7.45***     





Table E1 (…continued): Unit Root Tests 
Country 
Phillips–Perron test statistics 
Null hypothesis: Series is non-stationary  
Level 1st Difference  
S Dp YVAR GVAR S Dp YVAR GVAR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Indonesia -2.60** -1.10 -6.02*** -7.73*** -9.59*** -3.92***     
Ireland -2.93*** -0.58 -6.38*** -6.51***   -3.51***     
Israel -2.27** -7.91*** -6.17*** -4.30*** -6.79***       
Italy -1.52 -0.56 -8.01*** -6.63*** -8.44*** -4.35***     
Japan -1.71* -2.08 -6.87*** -7.28*** -6.48*** -4.34***     
Mexico -1.74* -1.81 -5.80*** -6.95*** -7.16*** -6.79***     
Netherlands -3.57*** -0.58 -7.26*** -7.26***   -3.99***     
New Zealand -2.05** -2.55 -7.58*** -9.75*** -5.38*** -5.77***     
Nicaragua -6.91*** -0.51 -13.07*** -107.27***   -6.15***     
Norway -1.14 -2.23 -5.62*** -5.18*** -6.97*** -6.78***     
Pakistan -1.96** -2.38 -3.50*** -8.19*** -8.19*** -6.85***     
Panama -5.15*** -0.45 -6.02*** -4.92***   -4.26***     
Paraguay -3.57*** -1.01 -6.48*** -6.78***   -4.89***     
Peru -2.98*** -1.97 -8.37*** -5.59***   -7.07***     
Philippines -3.24** -0.26 -5.64*** -7.28*** -8.77*** -4.97***     
Polnad -4.05*** -0.18 -2.64** -2.09**   -5.54*** -5.85*** -4.74*** 
Portugal -2.79*** 2.25 -2.06** -7.22***   -3.61*** -10.79***   
Romania -3.46*** 0.69 -4.23*** -2.74***   -3.61***     
Russian Federation* -3.26 -3.17*** 6.87 0.25 -4.52***   -1.083142 -3.19*** 
South Africa -2.57** -2.43 -7.20*** -7.38*** -10.07*** -7.04***     
South Korea -2.05** -1.78 -7.99*** -5.81*** -12.31*** -4.39***     
Spain -2.50** -2.03 -7.34*** -7.39*** -6.19*** -3.51***     
Sweden -2.52** -0.43 -8.56*** -7.83*** -5.00*** -5.82***     
Switzerland -3.00*** -0.03 -5.47*** -4.42***   -6.51***     





Table E1 (…continued): Unit Root Tests 
Country 
Phillips–Perron test statistics 
Null hypothesis: Series is non-stationary  
Level 1st Difference  
S Dp YVAR GVAR S Dp YVAR GVAR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Thailand -3.87*** -0.40 -6.28*** -15.31***   -5.10***     
Turkey -2.71*** -2.28 -5.67*** -7.69***   -6.75***     
United Kingdom -2.80*** -1.09 -7.09*** -6.44***   -3.17***     
Uruguay -4.71*** -0.61 -6.97*** -9.81***   -4.69***     
USA -2.38** -1.55 -4.19*** 0.46 -5.88*** -3.16**   -6.66*** 
Venezuela -2.72 -0.86 -6.54*** -6.18*** -9.31*** -7.80***     





















Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin test statistic 
Null hypothesis: Series is stationary 
Level 1st Difference 
S Dp YVAR GVAR S Dp YVAR GVAR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Argentina 0.18 0.08 0.22 0.06         
Australia 0.10 0.11 0.07 0.08         
Austria 0.18  0.13* 0.07 0.10   0.10     
Belgium 0.34  0.16** 0.06 0.23   0.13     
Brazil 0.12 0.05 0.39 0.10         
Bulgaria 0.08  0.17** 0.15 0.10   0.29     
Canada 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.12         
Chile 0.18 0.17 0.26 0.08         
China 0.29  0.16**  0.13* 0.09   0.29 0.27   
Colombia 0.08  0.17** 0.04 0.08   0.09     
Costa Rica 0.11 0.21 0.06 0.07         
Denmark 0.15  0.17** 0.11 0.13   0.16     
Dominican Republic 0.23 0.13 0.15 0.12         
Finland 0.14 0.10  0.35* 0.28     0.28   
France 0.08  0.24*** 0.07 0.13   0.12     
Germany 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.11         
Ghana 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.07         
Greece 0.07  0.19**  0.38* 0.19   0.28     
Haiti 0.19 0.16 0.30 0.24         
Honduras 0.07  0.20** 0.20 0.16   0.23     
Hong Kong  0.50**  0.14* 0.05 0.05  0.46* 0.19     
Hungary 0.12  0.12* 0.29 0.28   0.11     
Iceland 0.06 0.04 0.19 0.16         
India 0.11  0.14* 0.32 0.28   0.09     





Table E1 (…continued): Unit Root Tests 
Country 
Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin test statistic 
Null hypothesis: Series is stationary 
Level 1st Difference  
S Dp YVAR GVAR S Dp YVAR GVAR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Indonesia 0.24 0.12 0.12  0.36*       0.34 
Ireland 0.10 0.10 0.27 0.27         
Israel 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.13         
Italy  0.12*  0.13*     0.13 0.09     
Japan  0.12*  0.21** 0.16 0.27 0.05 0.10     
Mexico 0.20  0.20** 0.06 0.18   0.11     
Netherlands 0.13 0.09 0.28 0.17         
New Zealand 0.09 0.09 0.23 0.32         
Nicaragua  0.14* 0.22  0.15** 0.28     0.34   
Norway 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.06         
Pakistan 0.12  0.19** 0.06 0.07   0.16     
Panama 0.10  0.23*** 0.10 0.07   0.10     
Paraguay 0.05 0.17 0.24 0.05         
Peru 0.10 0.26 0.05 0.05         
Philippines  0.17**  0.19** 0.17 0.11 0.27 0.25     
Polnad 0.20 0.20 0.07 0.10         
Portugal 0.18  0.13*  0.22*** 0.06   0.07 0.30   
Romania 0.10 0.09 0.28 0.21         
Russian Federation*  0.13*  0.16**  0.14* 0.11 0.26 0.06 0.34   
South Africa 0.10 0.13 0.09 0.07         
South Korea  0.26***  0.15** 0.16 0.14 0.19 0.19     
Spain 0.08 0.11 0.27 0.25         
Sweden 0.09  0.19** 0.08 0.03   0.12     
Switzerland 0.09  0.14* 0.09 0.17   0.19     





Table E1 (…continued): Unit Root Tests 
Country 
Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin test statistic 
Null hypothesis: Series is stationary 
Level 1st Difference  
S Dp YVAR GVAR S Dp YVAR GVAR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Thailand 0.08 0.06 0.07  0.45*       0.21 
Turkey 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.12         
United Kingdom 0.06  0.22*** 0.12 0.29   0.04     
Uruguay 0.08 0.07 0.13 0.13         
USA 0.09  0.16**  0.12* 0.32   0.06 0.29   
Venezuela  0.19**  0.17** 0.20 0.14         
Note: *, ** and *** denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10, five and one per cent levels, respectively. Column 1 of Table E1 presents the country name. Columns 2 to 5 present 
the test statistics of the unit root test in the level for S, Dp, YVAR and GVAR, respectively. Similarly, Columns 6 to 9 present the test statistics of the unit root test in the first difference for S, 















Table E2. Breakpoint Unit Root Test Results 
Country Variables 










Trend Specification Break Specification 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Argentina s -3.93 2011 Intercept only Intercept only -9.28*** 1985 Intercept only Intercept only 
  Pd -5.13** 2001 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept 
 
  
  YVAR -11.17*** 1975 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
  GVAR -27.02*** 1975 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
Australia s -5.04** 2007 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
  Pd -3.45 2007 Intercept only Intercept only -4.60** 2007 Intercept only Intercept only 
  YVAR -17.74*** 1992 Trend and Intercept Intercept only 
 
  
  GVAR -9.63*** 1991 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
Austria s -5.04*** 1974 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
  Pd -2.96 1989 Trend and Intercept Trend only -5.65*** 1974 Trend and Intercept Intercept only 
  YVAR -23.04*** 1984 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
  GVAR -13.33*** 1984 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
Belgium s -2.74 2000 Trend and Intercept Trend only -11.86*** 1981 Trend and Intercept Intercept only 
  Pd -3.75 1991 Trend and Intercept Trend only -4.89** 1993 Trend and Intercept Intercept only 
  YVAR -6.86*** 2013 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
  GVAR -8.57*** 2011 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
Brazil s -3.87 1984 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept -9.55*** 1994 Intercept only Intercept only 
  Pd -2.84 1997 Intercept only Intercept only -7.15*** 2000 Intercept only Intercept only 
  YVAR -11.65*** 2008 Trend and Intercept Intercept only 
 
  
  GVAR -8.36*** 2009 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
Bulgaria s -4.63* 2004 Trend and Intercept Intercept only -7.54*** 2008 Trend and Intercept Intercept only 
  Pd -7.47*** 2007 Trend and Intercept Intercept only 
 
  
  YVAR -4.01 2008 Intercept only Intercept only -9.70*** 2008 Trend and Intercept Intercept only 
  GVAR -4.27* 2002 Trend and Intercept Trend only -9.71*** 2009 Trend and Intercept Trend only 





Table E2 (…continued). Breakpoint Unit Root Test Results 
Country Variables 










Trend Specification Break Specification  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  
Canada s -3.70 2005 Trend and Intercept Trend only -7.04*** 2009 Intercept only Intercept only  
 Pd -4.04 1989 Intercept only Intercept only -5.85*** 1995 Trend and Intercept Intercept only  
  YVAR -19.17*** 1990 Trend and Intercept Intercept only 
 
  
  GVAR -9.03*** 1995 Trend and Intercept Intercept only 
 
  
Chile s -4.38* 1990 Trend and Intercept Intercept only -6.20*** 1988 Intercept only Intercept only 
  Pd -3.35 1984 Trend and Intercept Trend only -5.88*** 1991 Trend and Intercept Intercept only 
  YVAR -6.33*** 2016 Trend and Intercept Trend only  
 
  
  GVAR -11.21*** 1999 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
China s -4.48** 2015 Trend and Intercept Trend only  
 
  
  Pd -4.64 2005 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept -15.36*** 2010 Intercept only Intercept only 
  YVAR -3.22 2009 Trend and Intercept Trend only -5.15*** 2007 Intercept only Intercept only 
  GVAR -5.33*** 2009 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept 
 
  
Colombia s -4.71** 1999 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
  Pd -4.74** 1998 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
  YVAR -9.48*** 1998 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept 
 
  
  GVAR -10.39*** 1998 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept 
 
  
Costa Rica s -6.00*** 1986 Trend and Intercept Trend only  
 
  
  Pd -16.52*** 1980 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept 
 
  
  YVAR -7.56*** 1980 Trend and Intercept Trend only  
 
  
  GVAR -5.80*** 1981 Trend and Intercept Trend only  
 
  
Denmark s -4.19 2005 Trend and Intercept Trend only -6.34*** 1986 Intercept only Intercept only 
  Pd -3.27 1991 Trend and Intercept Trend only -5.17** 1993 Trend and Intercept Intercept only 
  YVAR -7.86*** 1994 Trend and Intercept Trend only  
 
  
  GVAR -14.91*** 1993 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  





Table E2 (…continued). Breakpoint Unit Root Test Results 
Country Variables 










Trend Specification Break Specification 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Domin. Rep. s -5.66*** 1993 Trend and Intercept Trend only     
 Pd -4.98* 1990 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept -11.45*** 1989 Trend and Intercept Intercept only 
 YVAR -9.01*** 2008 Trend and Intercept Intercept only     
  GVAR -11.50*** 2003 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
Finland s -3.64 2008 Intercept only Intercept only -7.19*** 2009 Intercept only Intercept only 
  Pd -7.85*** 1991 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept 
 
  
  YVAR -56.31*** 2013 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept 
 
  
  GVAR -19.99*** 2012 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept 
 
  
France s -4.80 2008 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept -9.94*** 2009 Intercept only Intercept only 
  Pd -3.43 1977 Trend and Intercept Trend only -6.05*** 2008 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept 
  YVAR -7.81*** 2007 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept 
 
  
  GVAR -6.76*** 1981 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
Germany s -5.24*** 1976 Trend and Intercept Trend only  
 
  
  Pd -4.33 2008 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept -6.05*** 2007 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept 
  YVAR -5.18*** 1990 Trend and Intercept Trend only  
 
  
  GVAR -7.91*** 1995 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
Ghana s -6.52*** 2003 Trend and Intercept Trend only  
 
  
  Pd -3.68 2000 Trend and Intercept Intercept only -7.95*** 2000 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept 
  YVAR -5.83*** 2009 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
  GVAR -6.57*** 2013 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept 
 
  
Greece s -3.49 2009 Intercept only Intercept only -9.90*** 2009 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept 
  Pd -2.26 1977 Trend and Intercept Trend only -8.85*** 2008 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept 
  YVAR -8.96*** 2006 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept 
 
  





Table E2 (…continued). Breakpoint Unit Root Test Results 
Country Variables 










Trend Specification Break Specification  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  GVAR -23.31*** 2007 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept     
Haiti s -5.46*** 2010 Intercept only Intercept only     
  Pd* -6.85*** 1986 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept     
  YVAR -6.360*** 2005 Trend and Intercept Trend only     
  GVAR -4.16 2011 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept -8.30*** 2013 Trend and Intercept Trend only 
Honduras s -5.57*** 1988 Trend and Intercept Intercept only     
  Pd* -5.42** 1989 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept 
 
  
  YVAR -11.06*** 1990 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
  GVAR -12.38*** 1990 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
Hong Kong s -5.93*** 2016 Trend and Intercept Trend only  
 
  
  Pd* -7.32*** 2009 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept 
 
  
  YVAR -6.37*** 1999 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept 
 
  
  GVAR -7.21*** 2004 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept 
 
  
Hungary s -4.49* 2006 Trend and Intercept Trend only -5.49*** 2006 Trend and Intercept Intercept only 
  Pd* -6.54*** 2004 Trend and Intercept Trend only  
 
  
  YVAR -47.79*** 2008 Trend and Intercept Trend only  
 
  
  GVAR -8.39*** 2003 Trend and Intercept Trend only  
 
  
Iceland s -6.14*** 2007 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept 
 
  
  Pd -5.17** 2007 Trend and Intercept Intercept only -10.48*** 2007 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept 
  YVAR -8.70*** 1996 Trend and Intercept Trend only  
 
  
  GVAR -9.88*** 1989 Trend and Intercept Trend only  
 
  
India s -3.96 1986 Trend and Intercept Trend only -7.16*** 2007 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept 
  Pd* -9.74*** 1992 Trend and Intercept Intercept only       
 YVAR -7.54*** 2014 Trend and Intercept Trend only        





Table E2 (…continued). Breakpoint Unit Root Test Results 
Country Variables 










Trend Specification Break Specification 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  GVAR -6.96*** 1976 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
Indonesia s* -5.98*** 2003 Trend and Intercept Trend only  
 
  
  Pd -12.10*** 1997 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept 
 
  
  YVAR -9.57*** 1998 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept 
 
  
  GVAR -10.45*** 1998 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept 
 
  
Ireland s -5.02*** 2010 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
  Pd -5.10*** 2011 Trend and Intercept Trend only  
 
  
  YVAR -247.28*** 2012 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
  GVAR -34.14*** 2011 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
Israel s -6.31*** 2005 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
  Pd -9.75*** 2017 Trend and Intercept Trend only  
 
  
  YVAR -44.70*** 2001 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept 
 
  
  GVAR -58.83*** 2001 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
Italy s -2.78 1999 Trend and Intercept Trend only -8.81*** 2009 Intercept only Intercept only 
  Pd -3.95 1990 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept -5.79*** 1993 Trend and Intercept Intercept only 
  YVAR -14.64*** 2013 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
  GVAR -8.52*** 1992 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
Japan s -3.35 1983 Trend and Intercept Intercept only -8.18*** 2009 Intercept only Intercept only 
  Pd -2.90 1990 Trend and Intercept Trend only -6.30*** 2007 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept 
  YVAR -9.48*** 2001 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept 
 
  
  GVAR -15.52*** 2011 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
Mexico s -5.47** 1982 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept 
 
  
  Pd -5.00* 1990 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept -8.23*** 1986 Trend and Intercept Intercept only 
  YVAR -11.47*** 2002 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  





Table E2 (…continued). Breakpoint Unit Root Test Results 
Country Variables 










Trend Specification Break Specification 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 GVAR -9.01*** 2002 Intercept only Intercept only    
Netherlands s -6.08*** 2008 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept    
  Pd -5.47** 2007 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept 
 
  
  YVAR -13.61*** 2013 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
  GVAR -15.11*** 2013 Trend and Intercept Intercept only 
 
  
New Zealand s -4.10 1992 Trend and Intercept Intercept only -5.84*** 1983 Trend and Intercept Intercept only 
  Pd -4.68* 1978 Trend and Intercept Intercept only -6.05*** 1991 Trend and Intercept Intercept only 
  YVAR -10.25*** 1990 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
  GVAR -11.77*** 2009 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept 
 
  
Nicaragua s -11.23*** 2001 Trend and Intercept Intercept only 
 
  
  Pd -5.98*** 1982 Trend and Intercept Intercept only 
 
  
  YVAR -7.64*** 2010 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
  GVAR -104.62*** 2002 Trend and Intercept Trend only  
 
  
Norway s -4.24 2004 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept -8.23*** 2000 Intercept only Intercept only 
  Pd -3.03 2011 Trend and Intercept Intercept only -7.97*** 2012 Intercept only Intercept only 
  YVAR -7.27*** 1982 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
  GVAR -6.11*** 2003 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
Pakistan s -4.19 1987 Intercept only Intercept only -8.35*** 1989 Intercept only Intercept only 
  Pd -2.82 1990 Trend and Intercept Trend only -7.03*** 1986 Intercept only Intercept only 
  YVAR -5.82*** 2001 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
  GVAR -9.82*** 2008 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
Panama s -6.09*** 1993 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept 
 
  
  Pd -4.75** 1991 Trend and Intercept Trend only -5.46*** 1988 Intercept only Intercept only 
  YVAR -7.97*** 1989 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  





Table E2 (…continued). Breakpoint Unit Root Test Results 
Country Variables 










Trend Specification Break Specification 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  GVAR -6.28*** 1977 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
Paraguay s -4.71** 1984 Intercept only Intercept only -8.26*** 2003 Intercept only Intercept only 
 Pd -4.87** 1992 Trend and Intercept Trend only -6.10*** 2002 Intercept only Intercept only 
 YVAR -25.38*** 2002 Intercept only Intercept only     
  GVAR -15.11*** 1998 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
Peru s -5.14*** 2012 Trend and Intercept Trend only  
 
  
  Pd -3.96 2007 Intercept only Intercept only -8.05*** 2012 Trend and Intercept Trend only 
  YVAR -10.25*** 1982 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
  GVAR -6.30*** 1977 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
Philippines s -5.78*** 1997 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept 
 
  
  Pd -3.90 1982 Trend and Intercept Intercept only -7.09*** 1986 Intercept only Intercept only 
  YVAR -6.90*** 1992 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
  GVAR -7.89*** 2009 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
Poland s -10.59*** 2009 Trend and Intercept Intercept only 
 
  
  Pd -5.75*** 2001 Trend and Intercept Trend only  
 
  
  YVAR -3.39 2006 Trend and Intercept Trend only -6.09*** 2013 Intercept only Intercept only 
  GVAR -2.25 2010 Intercept only Intercept only -5.20*** 2009 Trend and Intercept Trend only 
Portugal s -4.31 1982 Trend and Intercept Intercept only -9.57*** 2009 Intercept only Intercept only 
  Pd -5.01** 2008 Trend and Intercept Intercept only -12.29*** 2012 Intercept only Intercept only 
  YVAR -7.75*** 2013 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
  GVAR -12.05*** 2008 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  














Table E2 (…continued). Breakpoint Unit Root Test Results 
Country Variables 










Trend Specification Break Specification 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  YVAR -7.47*** 1999 Intercept only Intercept only     
  GVAR -5.65*** 2009 Intercept only Intercept only     
Russia* s -12.87*** 2008 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept     
  Pd -7.19*** 2000 Intercept only Intercept only     
 YVAR -2.59 2009 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept -5.96*** 2015 Intercept only Intercept only 
 GVAR -4.61** 2015 Intercept only Intercept only -5.06*** 2015 Intercept only Intercept only 
South Africa s -4.92** 2007 Trend and Intercept Intercept only -9.49*** 1974 Intercept only Intercept only 
  Pd -3.22 1979 Trend and Intercept Intercept only -7.54*** 1977 Intercept only Intercept only 
  YVAR -17.83*** 1986 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
  GVAR -10.25*** 1986 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
South Korea s -5.54*** 1991 Trend and Intercept Intercept only 
 
  
  Pd -4.35 1985 Trend and Intercept Intercept only -4.88** 1998 Intercept only Intercept only 
  YVAR -22.33*** 2009 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
  GVAR -9.38*** 2008 Trend and Intercept Intercept only 
 
  
Spain s -4.38* 2007 Intercept only Intercept only -8.60*** 2009 Intercept only Intercept only 
  Pd -2.53 2007 Intercept only Intercept only -10.88*** 2009 Intercept only Intercept only 
  YVAR -25.59*** 2010 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
  GVAR -72.88*** 2010 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
Sweden s -5.07* 1983 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept -5.17*** 1984 Intercept only Intercept only 
  Pd -4.09 1992 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept -7.89*** 1993 Intercept only Intercept only 
  YVAR -11.48*** 2012 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
  GVAR -9.38*** 1990 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
Switzerland s -3.70 1997 Intercept only Intercept only -6.66*** 2006 Intercept only Intercept only 
  Pd -2.63 2003 Trend and Intercept Trend only -6.96*** 2006 Intercept only Intercept only 





Table E2 (…continued). Breakpoint Unit Root Test Results 
Country Variables 










Trend Specification Break Specification 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  YVAR -21.53*** 2003 Intercept only Intercept only     
  GVAR -5.58** 1994 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept -9.16*** 1994 Intercept only  
Thailand s -5.26** 1986 Trend and Intercept Intercept only -10.97*** 1974 Intercept only Thailand 
  Pd -4.65** 1996 Intercept only Intercept only -8.062*** 2000 Intercept only  
  YVAR -11.06*** 2009 Intercept only Intercept only     
 GVAR -3.45 2003 Intercept only Intercept only -15.12*** 2009 Intercept only Intercept only 
Turkey s -4.50** 1993 Intercept only Intercept only -9.13*** 2001 Intercept only Intercept only 
  Pd -5.40*** 1998 Trend and Intercept Intercept only 
 
  
  YVAR -7.80*** 2009 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept 
 
  
  GVAR -10.15*** 1989 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
United Kingdom s -4.63** 2007 Intercept only Intercept only -7.75*** 2009 Intercept only Intercept only 
  Pd -3.86 2007 Intercept only Intercept only -5.44** 2007 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept 
  YVAR -7.09*** 1992 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
  GVAR -12.44*** 2008 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
Uruguay s -7.06*** 1989 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
  Pd -3.77 1981 Intercept only Intercept only -6.22*** 2002 Intercept only Intercept only 
  YVAR -8.78*** 2003 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
  GVAR -12.27*** 1989 Trend and Intercept Intercept only 
 
  
USA s -5.48** 2007 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept -7.21*** 2009 Intercept only Intercept only 
  Pd -5.19*** 1982 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept 
 
  
  YVAR -4.66** 2015 Intercept only Intercept only -11.34*** 2010 Intercept only Intercept only 
  GVAR -6.24*** 2013 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
Venezuela s -7.53*** 2004 Trend and Intercept Trend and Intercept 
 
  
  Pd -3.21 1991 Trend and Intercept Trend only -9.41*** 1986 Intercept only Intercept only 
  YVAR -10.01*** 1985 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  





Table E2 (…continued). Breakpoint Unit Root Test Results 
Country Variables 












Trend Specification Break Specification 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  GVAR -12.39*** 1985 Intercept only Intercept only 
 
  
Note. *, ** and *** denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10, five and one per cent levels, respectively. Following Perron (1989), we considered four basic models for our data with a 
one-time break. The first model is in level for non-trending data. The second model is in level for trending data. The third model is in both level and trend. The fourth model is in trend. 
Additionally, we considered the innovational outlier version of the four models. The innovational outlier model assumes that the break occurs gradually. Columns 4 and 5 provide the one-time 
break date of the breakpoint unit root test in the level and first difference, respectively. Columns 5 and 6 provide the trend and break specification in the level, respectively. Similarly, Columns 
















Table E3: Estimated Break Years Using Multiple Breakpoint Test  
Sr. No. Country Estimated Break Years Test Specification Method Selected Break Criterion 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1 Australia 1974, 1983, 1992, 2000, 2008 
Compare information criteria for 0 to M globally 
determined breaks 
Schwarz criterion selected breaks 
2 Austria 2004 
Bai-Perron tests of L+1 vs. L sequentially 
determined breaks 
Sequential F-statistic determined breaks 
3 Belgium 1972, 1984, 1992, 2001, 2009 
Compare information criteria for 0 to M globally 
determined breaks 
Schwarz criterion selected breaks 
4 Brazil 2001, 2004, 2007, 2011, 2014 
Bai-Perron tests of 1 to M globally determined 
breaks 
Sequential F-statistic determined breaks  
Significant F-statistic largest breaks  
UDmax determined breaks  
WDmax determined breaks 
5 Canada 1970, 1980, 1988, 1996, 2009 
Bai-Perron tests of 1 to M globally determined 
breaks 
Significant F-statistic largest breaks 
6 Chile 1982, 1991, 1997, 2004, 2011 
Bai-Perron tests of 1 to M globally determined 
breaks 
Significant F-statistic largest breaks 
7 Colombia 1983, 2000, 2009 
Compare information criteria for 0 to M globally 
determined breaks 
Schwarz criterion selected breaks 
8 Coasta Rica 1980, 2005 
Compare information criteria for 0 to M globally 
determined breaks 
Schwarz criterion selected breaks 
9 Denmark 1974, 1984, 1992, 2009 
Compare information criteria for 0 to M globally 
determined breaks 
Schwarz criterion selected breaks 
10 Finland 1969, 1977, 1992, 2001, 2009 
Bai-Perron tests of 1 to M globally determined 
breaks 
Significant F-statistic largest breaks 





Table E3 (…continued): Estimated Break Years Using Multiple Breakpoint Test  
Sr. No. Country Estimated Break Years Test Specification Method Selected Break Criterion 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
11 France 1975, 2006 
Bai-Perron tests of L+1 vs. L sequentially 
determined breaks 
Sequential F-statistic determined breaks 
12 Germany 1983 
Bai-Perron tests of L+1 vs. L sequentially 
determined breaks 
Sequential F-statistic determined breaks 
13 Ghana 1975, 1983, 1992, 2000, 2008 
Bai-Perron tests of 1 to M globally determined 
breaks 
Significant F-statistic largest breaks  
UDmax determined breaks  
WDmax determined breaks 
14 Greece 
1991, 2002 
Bai-Perron tests of L+1 vs. L sequentially 
determined breaks 
Sequential F-statistic determined breaks 
15 Honduras 1975, 1983, 1992, 2001, 2009 
Bai-Perron tests of 1 to M globally determined 
breaks 
Significant F-statistic largest breaks 
16 Iceland 1976, 1985, 1993, 2001, 2009 
Bai-Perron tests of 1 to M globally determined 
breaks 
Sequential F-statistic determined breaks 
Significant F-statistic largest breaks 
17 India 1980, 1992, 2009 
Bai-Perron tests of L+1 vs. L globally determined 
breaks 
Significant F-statistic largest breaks 
18 Indonesia 1978, 1984, 1993, 2001, 2007 
Bai-Perron tests of 1 to M globally determined 
breaks 
Sequential F-statistic determined breaks  
Significant F-statistic largest breaks  
UDmax determined breaks  
WDmax determined breaks 
19 Ireland 1984, 1998, 2004, 2010 
Bai-Perron tests of L+1 vs. L sequentially 
determined breaks 
Sequential F-statistic determined breaks 





Table E3 (…continued): Estimated Break Years Using Multiple Breakpoint Test  
Sr. No. Country Estimated Break Years Test Specification Method Selected Break Criterion 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
20 Israel 1989, 1993, 1998, 2005, 2009 
Bai-Perron tests of 1 to M globally determined 
breaks 
Sequential F-statistic determined breaks  
Significant F-statistic largest breaks  
UDmax determined breaks  
WDmax determined breaks 
21 Italy 1971, 1979, 1988, 1998, 2006 
Bai-Perron tests of 1 to M globally determined 
breaks 
Sequential F-statistic determined breaks  
Significant F-statistic largest breaks 
22 Japan 1970, 1979, 1988, 2000, 2008 
Bai-Perron tests of 1 to M globally determined 
breaks 
Significant F-statistic largest breaks 
23 Mexico 1974, 1982, 1993, 2001, 2009 
Bai-Perron tests of 1 to M globally determined 
breaks 
Significant F-statistic largest breaks 
24 Netherlands 1980, 1995, 2003 
Compare information criteria for 0 to M globally 
determined breaks 
Schwarz criterion selected breaks 
25 New Zealand 1986, 1992, 1997, 2006, 2011 
Bai-Perron tests of 1 to M globally determined 
breaks 
Sequential F-statistic determined breaks  
Significant F-statistic largest breaks  
UDmax determined breaks  
WDmax determined breaks 
26 Norway 1970, 1978, 1986, 1994, 2009 
Bai-Perron tests of 1 to M globally determined 
breaks 
Sequential F-statistic determined breaks  
Significant F-statistic largest breaks 
27 Pakistan 1973, 1980, 1989, 2003, 2010 
Bai-Perron tests of 1 to M globally determined 
breaks 
Sequential F-statistic determined breaks  
Significant F-statistic largest breaks  






Table E3 (…continued): Estimated Break Years Using Multiple Breakpoint Test  
Sr. No. Country Estimated Break Years Test Specification Method Selected Break Criterion 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
28 Panama 1971, 1982, 1989, 1996, 2003 
Bai-Perron tests of 1 to M globally determined 
breaks 
Sequential F-statistic determined breaks  
Significant F-statistic largest breaks 
29 Paraguay 1978, 1984, 1990, 1996, 2002 
Bai-Perron tests of 1 to M globally determined 
breaks 
Significant F-statistic largest breaks 
30 Philippines 1973, 1983, 1991, 2000, 2009 
Bai-Perron tests of 1 to M globally determined 
breaks 
Significant F-statistic largest breaks 
31 Portugal 1972, 1983, 1991, 1999, 2009 
Bai-Perron tests of 1 to M globally determined 
breaks 
Sequential F-statistic determined breaks  
Significant F-statistic largest breaks 
32 South Africa 1968, 1981, 1990, 1997, 2007 
Bai-Perron tests of 1 to M globally determined 
breaks 
Sequential F-statistic determined breaks  
Significant F-statistic largest breaks 
33 South Korea 1969, 1979, 1988, 2000, 2009 
Bai-Perron tests of 1 to M globally determined 
breaks 
Sequential F-statistic determined breaks  
Significant F-statistic largest breaks 
34 Spain 1971, 1979, 1987, 1995, 2009 
Bai-Perron tests of 1 to M globally determined 
breaks 
Sequential F-statistic determined breaks  
Significant F-statistic largest breaks 
35 Sweden 1969, 1977, 1985, 1993, 2002 
Bai-Perron tests of 1 to M globally determined 
breaks 
Sequential F-statistic determined breaks  
Significant F-statistic largest breaks 
36 Switzerland 1986, 1991, 1999, 2004, 2011 
Bai-Perron tests of 1 to M globally determined 
breaks 
Significant F-statistic largest breaks  
UDmax determined breaks  
WDmax determined breaks 
37 Thailand 1971, 1979, 1987, 1995, 2007 
Bai-Perron tests of 1 to M globally determined 
breaks 
Sequential F-statistic determined breaks  
Significant F-statistic largest breaks 
38 United Kingdom 1973, 1985, 1993, 2001, 2009 
Bai-Perron tests of 1 to M globally determined 
breaks 
Sequential F-statistic determined breaks  
Significant F-statistic largest breaks  
WDmax determined breaks 
39 Uruguay 1983, 1989, 1995, 2001, 2007 
Bai-Perron tests of 1 to M globally determined 
breaks 
Sequential F-statistic determined breaks 
Significant F-statistic largest breaks 
40 
United States 1971, 1983, 1991, 2001, 2009 
Bai-Perron tests of 1 to M globally determined 
breaks Significant F-statistic largest breaks 
Note. These estimated break years are significant at the 0.05 level. In some cases, different criteria give different break years. We report only the maximum number of breaks in those cases. 
However, we include dummies for all break years identified using the multiple-breakpoint test. Column 2 presents the country name and Column 3 presents the maximum number of 
estimated breaks. Columns 4 and 5 present the test specification method and selected breaks criterion, respectively. L and M above indicates the pre-specified number of breaks and the 





Figure E1: Stability Analysis (Forward, Backward and Moving Screening Processes) 
   
 














































Figure E1 (…continued): Stability Analysis (Forward, Backward and Moving Screening Processes) 
   










































Figure E1 (…continued): Stability Analysis (Forward, Backward and Moving Screening Processes) 
   





































Figure E1 (…continued): Stability Analysis (Forward, Backward and Moving Screening Processes) 
 
   
 



































Figure E1 (…continued): Stability Analysis (Forward, Backward and Moving Screening Processes) 
  
  





































Figure E1 (…continued): Stability Analysis (Forward, Backward and Moving Screening Processes) 
  
  















































Figure E1 (…continued): Stability Analysis (Forward, Backward and Moving Screening Processes) 
  
 








































 Figure E1 (…continued): Stability Analysis (Forward, Backward and Moving Screening Processes) 
  
  














































Figure E1 (…continued): Stability Analysis (Forward, Backward and Moving Screening Processes) 
  
  













































Figure E1 (…continued): Stability Analysis (Forward, Backward and Moving Screening Processes) 
  
   






































Figure E1 (…continued): Stability Analysis (Forward, Backward and Moving Screening Processes) 
   
  










































Figure E1 (…continued): Stability Analysis (Forward, Backward and Moving Screening Processes)
  
  





















































Figure E1 (…continued): Stability Analysis (Forward, Backward and Moving Screening Processes) 
   
 



































Figure E1 (…continued): Stability Analysis (Forward, Backward and Moving Screening Processes) 


















 Appendix F (Chapter 7) 
Table F1: Fiscal Consolidation, Threshold and Descriptive Approach 
Year 




FC  Descriptive 
Approach 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
1986 1.80 23.00 -15.00 
   
0 
1987 3.30 22.00 9.6.00 24.00 
 
1 1 
1988 4.20 25.00 21.00 12.00 -13.00 1 1 
1989 3.30 23.00 29.00 7.60 -4.00 1 0 
1990 1.10 22.00 4.00 -25.00 -32.00 0 0 
1991 -1.90 23.00 -63.00 -67.00 -42.00 0 0 
1992 -2.70 27.00 -63.00 -0.70 66.00 1 0 
1993 -0.70 30.00 -42.00 22.00 23.00 1 0 
1994 -0.20 31.00 -23.00 18.00 -3.40 1 1 
1995 0.80 31.00 -23.00 0.30 -18.00 1 1 
1996 1.80 29.00 -19.00 4.50 4.20 1 1 
1997 2.60 26.00 -15.00 3.80 -0.70 1 1 
1998 2.70 24.00 0.80 16.00 12.00 1 1 
1999 3.80 23.00 7.00 6.20 -9.30 1 1 
2000 1.30 19.00 6.00 -1.00 -7.20 0 0 
2001 1.70 17.00 -0.10 -6.00 -5.00 0 0 
2002 2.80 15.00 12.00 12.00 18.00 1 0 
2003 2.50 13.00 7.70 -4.00 -16.00 0 0 
2004 2.60 12.00 16.00 8.70 13.00 1 0 
2005 3.00 11.00 16.00 -0.90 -9.60 0 0 
2006 2.60 9.90 7.90 -7.60 -6.70 0 0 
2007 2.80 9.60 25.00 17.00 25.00 1 0 
2008 -2.00 12.00 13.00 -12.00 -29.00 0 N/A 
2009 -3.70 17.00 -3.80 -17.00 -4.80 0 N/A 
2010 -3.40 21.00 -14.00 -10.00 6.60 0 N/A 
2011 -4.00 24.00 -25.00 -11.00 -1.20 0 N/A 
2012 -3.40 28.00 -15.00 10.00 22.00 1 N/A 
2013 -3.10 31.00 -29.00 -14.00 -24.00 0 N/A 
2014 -3.60 34.00 -30.00 -1.70 12.00 0 N/A 
2015 -3.30 38.00 
    
N/A 
Note. Fiscal consolidation under the descriptive approach/narrative technique (Devries et al., 2011) was 
calculated using calendar year data. We calculated fiscal consolidation using fiscal year data because of the 
unavailability of calendar year data for all 53 economies. We applied a broader approach to calculate fiscal 
consolidation episodes, where we analysed the changes in CAPB by taking its first and second differences of 
CAPB. If the first or second difference of CAPB was positive for a specific period, we classified that period as a 
fiscal consolidation episode. ‘PB’ and ‘PD’ in Columns 2 and 3 indicate ‘primary balance’ and ‘public debt’ as 
per cent of GDP, respectively. We present CAPB in Column 4. We present first and second difference of CAPB in 
Columns 5 and 6, respectively. We present fiscal consolidation episodes using a broader and descriptive approach 









Table F2: Year-wise Fiscal Consolidation Episodes                 
Country Years of Fiscal Consolidation Episodes 
Argentina 2010            
Australia 1993 2007           
Austria 1997 2001 2005 2011         
Belgium 2006 2010           
Bolivia 1994 1995 1999 2000 2006 2008 2010      
Brazil 1990 1994 1999          
Bulgaria 1995 1996 2001 2008 2010         
Chile 1989 1992 2000 2006 2007 2010 2011      
China 2007 2011           
Colombia 2000 2012           
Costa Rica 1991 1992 1995 2012        
Denmark 2010            
Dominican Republic 1989 1992 2000 2005 2007       
Finland 1989 2000 2010 2011         
France 2011            
Germany 1989 1994 1996 2000 2007 2011       
Ghana 1991 2000 2003 2009 2011 2013       
Greece 1991 1994 2005 2010         
Haiti 2004 2007 2010          
Honduras 1989 1991 1995 1998 2000 2004 2010      
Hong Kong 2006 2007 2009 2010 2013 2016       
Hungary 1990 1994 1996 1999 2000 2003 2004 2007 2011    
Iceland 1991 1995 2000 2005 2010        
India 2007            
Indonesia 1990            





Table F2 (…continued): Year-wise Fiscal Consolidation Episodes 
Ireland 2000 2006 2007 2011 2016       
Israel 1991 1995 2000 2010        
Italy 1997 2000 2007         
Japan 2001 2010          
Mexico 1995           
Netherlands 1991 1993 1996 2000 2008 2010      
New Zealand 1990 2012          
Nicaragua 1991 1995 1997 2001 2002 2006      
Norway 1990 1995 1996 2000 2004 2005 2006 2008 2010 2011  
Pakistan 1989 1990 1994 2003 2009       
Panama 1990 1994 2005 2006 2007       
Paraguay 1989 1990 1993 1994 2001 2003 2004     
Peru 1989 1991 2000 2006 2007 2010 2011     
Philippines 2011           
Poland 1990 1993 2007 2011        
Portugal 1992 1995 2002 2006 2007 2011      
Romania 1990 1991 1993         
Russian Federation 1999 2000 2005 2008 2010 2011      
South Africa 1990 1995 2010         
South Korea 2000 2010          
Spain 1994 2007 2010 2013        
Sweden 1989 1994 2000 2010        
Thailand 1993 2000 2003 2015        
Turkey 1990 1994 1995 1998 1999 2002 2010     
United Kingdom 2000 2010 2011         
United Kingdom 2010           
           continued… 





Table F2 (…continued): Year-wise Fiscal Consolidation Episodes 
United Kingdom 2011           
United States of America 2010 2015          
Venezuela 1989 1990 1993 1995 1996 1999 2000 2002 2003 2010 2012 
Note. A fiscal consolidation episode is a period in which the CAPB improves by at least 1.5 per cent of GDP, or a period of two consecutive years in which the CAPB 
improves by at least one per cent of GDP per year (Ardagna, 2009). For calculation of CAPB, the data for government revenue and primary balance from 2012 to 21016 
were extracted from a fiscal affairs database using STA-T1, STA-T3, STA-T5, STA-T7, STA-T9 and STA-T10. Later, primary surplus was calculated as (government revenue 
− primary expenditure). Data of output gap were extracted from Dataset: Economic Outlook Number 100, November 2016 (OECD, 2016). Output gaps are deviations of 
actual GDP from potential GDP as a per cent of potential GDP. 








 Appendix G (Chapter 8) 








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Argentina FC - I   0.08 0.23 0.59   
 FC - II   -0.53 0.15 0.43   
Australia FC - I 0.70** 0.70** -0.95** 1.13 7.13 
 FC - II 0.37 0.62** -0.07 0.43 7.34 
Austria FC - I   5.13** -1.54** -1.88 -2.42 
 FC - II   1.77 0.22 -1.33 -1.48 
Belgium FC - I     1.93** 1.26 6.88 
 FC - II     0.64*** -0.14 -1.11 
Brazil FC - I 0.16 0.617** -1.66 1.51   
 FC - II   2.62** -0.13 -0.04 -6.24 
Bulgaria FC - I 0.02 -0.14 1.33 -0.52 -5.62 
 FC - II 0.28 0.06 -0.13 0.08 -4.15 
Canada FC - I           
 FC - II 4.43 4.49 1.63 0.44 -12.63 
Chile FC - I 0.05 -0.02 0.20 -0.08 6.35 
 FC - II 0.09 0.00 0.02 -0.02 1.31 
China FC - I -0.39 -1.45 0.08 3.05 62.34** 
 FC - II 3.02 0.94 -0.56 0.60 18.06 
Colombia FC - I     2.44* -0.55*   
 FC - II     -0.12 -0.02   
Costa Rica FC - I           
 FC - II     -0.20 -0.17 1.82** 
Denmark FC - I 0.26 0.39 -3.23 -1.27*   
 FC - II 0.47 1.18 -0.30 -0.16 3.47 
Domin. 
Republic 
FC - I     -2.52* -0.99   
 FC - II     -0.09 -0.33   
Finland FC - I     -2.18* -4.94*** 49.65 
 FC - II     -0.27 -0.25 -2.18 
France FC - I -0.44 -0.12 0.47** -0.69 -0.86 
 FC - II -3.26** -2.70* 0.22 -1.12 -1.16 
Germany FC - I -0.28*** -0.20** -0.08 0.45 -3.33 
 FC - II -0.44* -0.31** 0.10 -2.18*** -4.46 
Ghana FC - I     -1.35 1.13* -0.58 
 FC - II     -0.12 -0.01 -0.18 
Greece FC - I -0.06 -0.39 -0.68 1.02 1.54 
 FC - II 0.07 -0.91 0.21 0.47 16.94** 
Haiti FC - I -0.05 -0.08   -0.61   
 FC - II 0.09 0.04   -0.32   
Honduras FC - I     -0.20 -0.79   
 FC - II     0.02 0.08   













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Hungary FC - I -0.24 0.03 -1.09** -0.25 2.68 
 FC - II 0.10* 0.04 -0.14 -0.03 -0.42 
Iceland FC - I   0.57 0.53 -0.06   
 FC - II   1.23* 0.36** 0.02   
India FC - I     -0.65 -0.41 89.53*** 
 FC - II     -0.26 -0.41 27.50 
Indonesia FC - I 1.27* 1.25*       
 FC - II   1.25* -0.93* -0.08 -0.73 
Ireland FC - I 0.54** 0.48 1.67** -0.28 2.72 
 FC - II 1.54** 0.07 0.10* -0.01 -0.08 
Israel FC - I 0.02 0.14 0.44 0.02 8.94 
 FC - II 0.01 0.16 -0.04 -0.08 1.17 
Italy FC - I 0.57 0.29 -0.04 0.99 1.06 
 FC - II 0.09 -0.17 0.04 1.78 1.18 
Japan FC - I 0.07* 0.09*** 0.34 0.42 -9.08 
 FC - II 0.06 0.10* 0.10 0.23 -4.01 
Mexico FC - I 0.02 0.37       
 FC - II     0.01 -1.87** -2.20 
Netherlands FC - I -0.02 -0.02 -0.74 -0.89 6.10 
 FC - II -0.01 -0.25** -0.31 0.64 0.65 
New Zealand FC - I -1.32** -1.25*       
 FC - II       2.15 -5.31 
Nicaragua FC - I       0.19   
 FC - II       -0.25   
Norway FC - I 0.00 -0.03 -1.07* 0.27 -21.38** 
 FC - II -0.02 -0.09** -0.11 0.05 -2.72* 
Pakistan FC - I -0.68 0.37 0.06 1.74 -7.38 
 FC - II -2.13 0.51 -0.13 0.45 5.55 
Panama FC - I     -2.82** -2.14* 7.79** 
 FC - II     -0.56** -0.29 1.43* 
Paraguay  FC - I     -0.21 -0.44   
 FC - II     0.49 -0.02   
Peru FC - I     -0.02 -0.08 12.87* 
 FC - II     -0.01 -0.21 1.52 
Philippines FC - I   -1.61** -0.12 -0.76 -7.49 
 FC - II   -1.37 0.15 0.20 -9.27 
Poland FC - I     -0.42 0.28 9.98 
 FC - II     -0.05 0.09 0.67 
Portugal FC - I   1.83*** -0.06 1.32 4.63 
 FC - II   0.30*** -0.26** 0.00 0.32 
Romania FC - I           
 FC - II     -0.92 0.40 3.53*** 
     continued… 













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Russia FC - I 0.88*** -0.06 2.26 -0.02   
 FC - II 0.56 0.21 0.22 -0.04  
South Africa FC - I -0.43 -0.17 0.08 -3.45 31.02 
 FC - II -0.59 0.19 -0.51 2.69 -21.77 
South Korea FC - I 0.13** 0.25** -0.54 -0.78 -2.70 
 FC - II 0.26 0.47* -0.08 -0.07 0.68 
Spain FC - I 0.48 0.34*** 0.19 0.07 29.85** 
 FC - II 0.24 0.34 -0.07 0.07 5.46** 
Sweden FC - I -0.04 0.31 -0.68 0.42 -12.67 
 FC - II 0.18 0.69 -0.27 -0.03 -6.53 
Switzerland FC - I -9.31 2.48       
 FC - II 0.00 0.00 -0.52 1.46 -38.65 
Thailand FC - I 0.06 0.10       
 FC - II 0.13 0.20 -0.42 -0.07 -4.05 
Turkey FC - I     -5.43** 0.27 8.90* 
 FC - II     -0.85 0.07 0.74 
UK FC - I -0.01 0.08 -1.24*** 2.18 -24.62 
 FC - II -0.20 0.03 -0.12 0.58 -5.09 
Uruguay FC - I     6.24 -0.78   
 FC - II     0.45 -0.15*   
USA FC - I 0.05 0.06** 0.93** 0.72 20.65 
 FC - II 0.22* 0.16** 0.19** 0.07 5.28* 
Venezuela FC - I 0.42*** 0.19 0.50 -2.18   
 FC - II 0.63*** 0.22 0.27 -0.23   
Note: The first column presents the country name. The second column presents the fiscal consolidation measures. 
Fiscal consolidation is measured as a period in which the CAPB improves by at least 1.5 per cent of GDP, or a 
period of two consecutive years in which the CAPB improves by at least one per cent of GDP per year (Ardagna, 
2009). We labelled this strictly defined episode ‘FC-I’. Further, we used the change in CAPB as an alternate 
measure of fiscal consolidation and labelled it ‘FC-II’. Columns 3 and 4 present the results of the disaggregated 
analysis, where BS_CAR indicates the capital adequacy ratios using Bankscope data. Columns 5 to 7 present the 
results of the aggregate analysis using data from TGE database. TGE_Total_Tier indicates the banking system 
regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets, as defined by TGE database. TGE_Z-score indicates the z-score as 
defined by TGE database, while TGE_SMC indicates the stock market capitalisation as defined by TGE database. 
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10, five and one per cent, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
